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INTRODUCTION
TERMINOLOGY & OVERVIEW
A variety of corporate acquisition transactions are loosely described as “going
private” transactions.1 In the ones at issue in this Article, which are commonly
described as “freezeouts,” the public stockholders sell their shares en masse to a
controlling stockholder at their company (a “controller.)” The controller can be either
a person or another company (a parent corporation);2 and the acquisition occurs most
commonly through the vehicle of a merger or tender offer, and often a combination of
both.
From the perspective of equity, what is distinctive about freezeouts is that the
controller’s formal and informal power over the target company’s board gives the
controller the ability to manipulate the transaction, to its financial advantage.3 Most
importantly, in whatever form they are structured, freezeouts allow controllers to
inhibit corporate directors from furthering or even adequately protecting the minority
stockholders’ welfare in these transactions.4 In effect, freezeouts provide controllers
an opportunity to combine their market power with their legal authority and influence
influence over the target board so that they operate at both the “buy” and the “sell”
sides of these transactions. In recognition of this fact, and the attendant vulnerability
of minority investors in this context, freezeouts are considered classic self-dealing
transactions as defined within corporate fiduciary law.5
Corporate law affords controllers considerable discretion to pursue their selfinterest -- for example in voting their shares as they choose.6 However, once their
power over the board is implicated, as it is in freezeouts, controllers owe fiduciary
duties to the minority stockholders at their company.7 In cash out mergers, equity
defines controllers’ obligations to the minority in terms of a duty of “fairness;”8 in
freezeouts based on tender offers, the case law describes controllers as owing a duty
to avoid coercion and misrepresentation.9 In both structural forms, therefore,
freezeouts raise basic questions about the definition and significance of fairness and
investors’ freedom of choice within corporate fiduciary law, as it has developed in
this context.10 Moreover, because fiduciary doctrine develops through the
adjudication of private suits, freezeouts provide an intriguing context to examine a
question at the forefront of contemporary corporate law reform: that is, civil
litigation’s contribution to supporting (or undermining) strong acquisitions and
capital markets.11
The substance and efficacy of the fiduciary doctrine governing freezeouts is of
signal importance because corporate fiduciary law, and preeminently Delaware's
fiduciary law,12 rather than other areas of law or regulation, most fundamentally
defines the scope of controllers’ entitlements and duties to minority investors in
freezeouts.13 And yet Delaware’s freezeout doctrine is presently in disarray. As
stated above, the case law imposes exacting standards on controllers in cash out
mergers and more minimal constraints if the controller’s deal is structured as a tender
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offer freezeout (that is, a combined tender offer and short form merger).14 The two
strands in the case law reflect different substantive definitions of the "fair price”
controllers must pay to acquire the public, “minority” shares,15 and different views
about whether the courts should actively oversee controllers’ conduct in freezeouts.
These doctrinal differences have evolved, furthermore, without adequate attention to
whether controllers have genuinely different capacities for overreaching in these two
settings.16
Ironically, the substantially different levels of equitable protection afforded
minority investors in cash out mergers and tender offer freezeouts has promoted
controllers’ capacity for overreaching, to minority investors’ detriment. Because
different equitable standards attach to the different formats, controllers have been able
to profit from a kind of “structural arbitrage.” (Since controllers initiate freezeouts,
they have authority to select their format.) In selecting, switching, even mixing and
matching the different legal formats for freezeouts, controllers are able to exploit the
complexity and uncertainty in the law governing freezeouts to the disadvantage of
minority shareholders. This is one important feature of the present disarray in the
doctrine governing freezeouts. Because freezeout transactions are occurring at a
significant rate,17 and because they raise important questions about fiduciary law’s
influence on high stakes acquisitions activity,18 the disarray in freezeout law merits
attention and better resolution.
THE DISARRAY IN FREEZEOUT DOCTRINE
Delaware's Chancery Court has become aware of the shortcomings in its freezeout
doctrine and in a recent trilogy of opinions has proposed sweeping reform. These
recent decisions are In re Cox Communications, 19 In re Cysive20 and In re Pure
Resources.21 (Notably, each of these monumental opinions was authored by ViceChancellor Leo Strine, Jr.22) In these decisions, the Chancery Court is proposing to
unify the two bodies of case law governing freezeouts.23 In furtherance of this goal,
the Chancery Court is proposing, also, that the deferential “business judgment rule”24
standard of review should apply in a stockholder suit against a freezeout. Consistent
with this proposal, the rigorous entire fairness standard would apply only if and after
the controller’s freezeout offer was rejected by either the independent directors or
holders of the outstanding minority stock, and the controller nevertheless proceeded
to consummate the freezeout.25 (These proposals are referred to collectively herein as
the “Cox Reforms”). As enunciated in Cox, a duty of fairness would apply in the
freezeout only if and when a controller proceeded with the transaction over the
disapproval of either the independent directors or a majority of the minority shares.
In Cox, the Chancery Court contends that such combined independent director
and disinterested shareholder assent (“Dual Ratification”) is adequate evidence of
arm's-length dealings and, hence, the freezeout's fairness. The Cox opinion contends
that so long as there's been Dual Ratification, allowing equitable review of the
freezeout’s fairness upon a shareholder complaint is a waste of resources.26 Hence, if
Cox and the other recent freezeout cases are respected as authoritative, and validated
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by the Supreme Court ultimately, going private doctrine will be "going private.”27 If
the business judgment rule becomes the presumptive standard of review, freezeouts
will be subject to less frequent and less vigorous judicial oversight; most stockholder
complaints in freezeouts would be dismissed on the pleadings.
This Article devotes careful attention to the reasoning in Cox, Cysive and Pure
because these decisions are likely to shape the future development of freezeout
doctrine.28 These recent Chancery Court opinions present their reforms to freezeout
doctrine as empirically-sound, pragmatic measures designed to reduce litigation,
benefit minority investors and strengthen the capital markets generally. Cox
contends, furthermore, that eliminating judicial review for fairness where there's been
Dual Ratification will make going private doctrine more logical, clear and consistent
with corporate law's fundamental tenets – especially its deference towards decisions
by disinterested directors.29 Parts II and III of this Article explain why several of
these claims are contestable, if not erroneous.
At this juncture it’s important to note that the reforms also coincide with a
broader, popular policy orientation that disfavors class action suits, including suits by
stockholders.30 Specifically, the Cox Reforms evidence the contemporary distaste for
stockholder suits against business,31 and the popular mistrust of the lawyers who
bring them.32 Accordingly, a full treatment of the Cox Reforms requires some
discussion of these broader, institutional issues.33 Congress’ concern over meritless
stockholder claims and “litigation agency costs”34 was dramatically evidenced by its
enactment of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), which
imposed substantial procedural hurdles to plaintiffs’ prevailing in securities class
actions.35 In the name of preventing savvy plaintiffs’ lawyers from pursuing class
actions in state court and thereby circumventing the procedural checks established by
the PLSRA, Congress enacted The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998 ("SLUSA”) shortly thereafter.36 Even in enacting the sweeping corporate
governance reforms in The Sarbanes Oxley Act ("SOX"), Congress eschewed
anything that would promote stockholder class actions.37 In sum, Cox’s jaundiced
view of the plaintiffs’ bar and its skeptical view of investor class actions38 fits into
the broad swath of contemporary law reform and public policy in which markets are
portrayed as naturally “free” and requiring minimal judicial intervention or other
regulatory support.39
Mirroring federal limits on stockholder class-actions, state corporate law imposes
substantial limits on shareholder derivative suits.40 Although Congress saved
fiduciary claims for misrepresentation from being preempted by SLUSA,41 many
corporate legal academicians view shareholder litigation as a deadweight cost for
firms and the economy.** From this perspective, corporate fiduciary law should
operate essentially as a normative force, and only in the rarest instances involve the
imposition of real sanctions.42 Again, a principal rationale for this view is that
shareholders can largely fend for themselves in markets, and without recourse to the
courts -- for example through diversification and the exercise of collective
opposition.43 Over the past two decades, this viewpoint has been influential in
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corporate legal scholarship and in certain strands of the case law. Indeed, Cox
fervently contends that in freezeouts, the “piece-work” of judicial review is rarely
worth the cost.44
This Article rejects the view that equitable actions in freezeouts are essentially
exogenous burdens on an acquisitions market that would otherwise be self sustaining,
wealth-maximizing and socially salutary. Instead, it espouses a more affirmative,
symbiotic view of the relationship between corporate fiduciary principles and
acquisition markets. In this view, a robust equitable tradition is constitutive of a wellfunctioning “M&A” market – it instantiates the range of legitimate possibilities and
expectations that collectively shape deal making. In this mode, the seminal mergers
and acquisitions cases prescribe steps that buyers and sellers (and their advisers)
should take to accommodate both the parties’ legitimate pursuit of financial selfinterest, as well as other social welfare objectives, including longer-term wealth
maximization.45 Indeed, in recommending the employment of special committees and
independent legal and financial advisers, and other “steps” that deal principals and
planners should take, judges adjudicating freezeouts and other acquisition
transactions have taken on the status of "transactional choreographers."46 In
prescribing various safeguards and procedures to be followed in high stakes M&A
deals, the equity courts have sought to promote "fairness," “candor,” “consent” and
“independent” decision making in order to foster the integrity of the free market
framework.47 Equitable constructions such as special committees of independent
directors,48 and their employment of independent financial and legal advisers49 are
highly influential in determining the standards courts will apply in reviewing a
disputed M&A transaction; they therefore warrant scrutiny in deals where conflicts of
interest are rife and the stakes are high, as they are in freezeouts.50 Accordingly,
“minimalist,” deferential, business judgment review has not been the norm in
freezeouts or the broader M&A jurisprudence.51
As interpreted herein, the transactional choreography for freezeouts reflects
different judicial responses to three interrelated problems. These are (i) the scope of
controllers’ obligation to pay no less than a legally determined "fair price,” (ii) the
public stockholders’ capacity either to consent to or reject the freezeout offer and (iii)
the potential for controllers to coerce the target directors and the public investors into
agreeing to a bad deal. As elaborated in the analysis that follows, in order to
encourage controllers and other deal principals to adhere to the transactional
choreography for freezeouts, the courts have promised them more favorable treatment
as defendants if they follow the established equitable prescriptions and the transaction
nevertheless becomes subject to litigation.
Most significantly in freezeouts, the courts have encouraged controllers to submit
their cash out mergers to a vote of the target's independent directors or public
stockholders. To encourage controllers to condition their freezeouts on receipt of such
disinterested approval, the courts have provided that so long as the deal receives
either form of approval, the plaintiffs cannot recover unless they prove the freezeout’s
unfairness. This is exceptional because defendants ordinarily have the burden of
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proof in self-dealing cases.52 The recent cases, and Cox in particular, rightly endorse
unifying the doctrine governing freezeouts so the law will become more authoritative
and coherent. However, Cox endorses too relaxed an approach to controllers'
capacity for overreaching and too easy a faith that private bargaining will lead to fair
outcomes for minority investors in freezeouts.
This Article proposes, instead, that the Entire Fairness standard should govern
freezeouts in both formats, with one exception. In addition, defendants should be
able to obtain the beneficial burden shift only upon receiving approval of both the
independent directors and a majority of the disinterested stockholders. The proposed
exception is that deferential, business judgment rule review should apply only where
a controller has allowed the target’s independent directors to conduct an auction or
market check to ascertain the company’s going concern value, and the controller has
agreed to be a seller if an offer emerges that is superior to its own. But the business
judgment rule should only apply in this circumstance -- only where there’s been an
auction or market check should a freezeout enjoy a presumption of fairness in a
stockholder suit.
Publicly listed companies should not have any difficulty establishing a Committee
of independent directors to conduct such an auction or market check. Changes to
stock exchange and NASD listing standards inspired by SOX mandate that even
where there's a controller that owns a majority of the stock there will still be at least
three independent directors on the board to oversee such an auction or market
check.53 And in companies where there's a de facto controller – that is, one who
dominates voting but does not own the shares constituting voting control – a majority
of the full board must meet the new listing standards' criteria for independence.54
(Where the distinction is relevant these are described as “True Majority Controllers”
and “De Facto Controllers,” respectively.)55 On this basis, there shouldn't be any
structural impediments to establishing a Special Committee of at least three
independent directors to conduct an auction or market check of the controller's bid.56
Delaware's freezeout doctrine should reflect these federally inspired changes to board
independence requirements.
In addition, in contrast to Cox’s endorsement of the business judgment rule for
freezeouts, Revlon is the more obvious fallback standard.57 Indeed, where the
freezeout offer comes from a De Facto Controller, “Revlon duties” would presently
apply to the target directors’ response to the offer, and mandate they withhold their
consent until they had canvassed the market to ensure the freezeout offered “the best
price reasonably available.”58 And even in a freezeout offer from a True Majority
Holder, the directors’ duty of care would require them at least to canvass the market
to ascertain if there are better alternatives to the controller’s bid.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the doctrinal framework for
freezeouts established by the landmark cases of Weinberger v UOP, Kahn v Lynch
and Solomon v Pathe. Part II focuses on tender offer freezeouts, providing a critical
analysis of the doctrine from Solomon to Pure to Cox. This Part II specifically
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focuses on the new equitable conditions Pure and Cox endorse for tender offer
freezeouts to receive deferential review under the business judgment rule in a suit.
Part III analyzes the equitable standards applied in cash out mergers. It focuses on
Cysive's and Cox's claims about the negative byproducts arising from the Entire
Fairness standard, as well as their arguments in favor of applying the business
judgment rule in suits over freezeouts. Part IV takes a deeper look at the implications
of applying business judgment rule deference to freezeouts, especially as it would
eliminate a fair price duty in controllers’ offers. Part V presents the Article’s
suggested reforms for freezeout doctrine, consistent with the proposals briefly
described above.

I. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FREEZEOUTS
A.

Weinburger’s Entire Fairness Standard

The Delaware merger statute, like most, provides for cash out mergers by the
vote of a majority of the directors on the board and a majority of the outstanding
voting stock.59 On this basis, the minority shareholders’ voting rights afford them no
authority to stop a merger proposed by a controller, since the controller has the votes
constituting the necessary shareholder approval.60 Just as importantly, the controller
has the votes necessary to control the outcome of director elections, as well as the
votes necessary to remove directors from the board. In most instances the controller
can accomplish the removal of directors “without cause” virtually at any time.61
As suggested above, it is the controller’s power over the board that makes cash
out mergers classic self-dealing transactions. If the board could operate with genuine
independence from the controller in a freezeout, then functionally speaking the
controller would only be on the “buy side” of the transaction. Instead, since the
controller can remove directors who oppose its plans, the controller is able both to
manipulate the terms of the sale and profit as a purchaser from so doing. Fiduciary
law mandates that the directors owe duties of care and loyalty to all the shareholders
equally, notwithstanding the controller’s power and influence over the board, but
once a controller is present the directors are in a difficult, inherently conflicted
situation. Despite their fiduciary duties, if they act in ways that conflict with the
controller’s desires, they are likely to find themselves off the board.
Whether and under what circumstances controllers could use mergers to
eliminate minority stockholders from the corporation has always been a controversial
matter within corporate law.62 Prior to Weinberger, equity had imposed a “business
purpose requirement” on cash out mergers as a way to limit controllers’ pursuit of
their private, self-interest.63 Weinberger rejected the business purpose requirement
(which was considered so subjective as to be useless), and endorsed a different set of
equitable criteria to rein in controllers’ use of cash out mergers to pursue their selfinterest.64 In Weinberger v UOP the Supreme Court held that “Entire Fairness”
would henceforth be the governing standard for controllers’ conduct in these

NY1:#3400474v18
10/5/06 11:14 AM

7

transactions.65 As the measure of “fair price,” the Entire Fairness standard requires
controllers to pay the public stockholders no less than their pro rata share of the
company valued as a going concern. And because fair price is a range, rather than an
easily observable or finite sum, Weinberger also requires controllers to demonstrate
the fairness of the proceedings in the cash out merger.66 Importantly, despite the
controller’s formal power to compel the transaction, Weinberger placed heavy
emphasis on their equitable obligation to allow independent directors to negotiate on
behalf of the minority investors in establishing the price or other basic terms of the
deal.67 Thus, under Weinberger, vigorous judicial review for fair dealings and fair
price – that is, "Entire Fairness" – was validated as the standard applicable to
controllers’ conduct in cash out mergers.68
In addition, beyond providing a benchmark for liability, Weinburger’s
admonitions have influenced controllers' planning in cash out mergers (consistent
with the concept of transactional choreography described in the Introduction).69 For
example, in furtherance of the fair dealing requirement, the Court encouraged
controllers to establish special committees of independent directors to represent the
public stockholders’ interests in the negotiations -- as a method of simulating arms’length dealings. In so doing Weinburger established what is still the formative
transactional choreography for cash out mergers.70 Weinburger also encouraged what
is now the accepted practice of having outside, independent financial and legal
experts advise Special Committees representing public investors.71 And Weinburger
laid heavy emphasis on controllers’ duty of candor,72 and thus encouraged controllers
to facilitate the flow of accurate information among the parties during the
negotiations.
Yet, because Entire Fairness imposes demands on controllers and courts, it at
times becomes controversial. This is evident in the recent freezeout cases, but was
true also earlier in the evolution of freezeout doctrine.73 In particular, in the early
1990’s a split evolved in the Chancery Court over whether approval of cash out
mergers by independent directors was a sufficient indicia of fairness so that the courts
should afford deferential review to the transaction, consistent with applying the
business judgment rule.74
B. Kahn v Lynch and the Problem of Coercion in Cash Out Mergers
In 1994 the Supreme Court resolved this question in the negative in Kahn v
Lynch.75 Lynch held that Weinburger intended independent director approval to
operate merely as “evidence” of fair dealings, rather than disposative proof of
fairness. As described by the Supreme Court in Lynch, this concept has come to be
known as “inherent coercion.” The working concept is that even the independent
directors on the target’s board and also the disinterested, public minority shareholders
may be cowed into approving a suboptimal freezeout offer out of fear that the
controller could take even more aggressive actions in its private self-interest if they
blocked the freezeout. 76 (“Coercion,” as defined therein, refers to being disabled
from considering the merits of an offer on account of threats or conditions exogenous
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to the proposed transaction.) Lynch affirms that this inherent form of coercion
undermines the Court’s ability to presume the legitimacy of the consents to the
freezeout, and that it operates even if the controller hasn’t expressly signaled an
intention to “retaliate” (financially speaking), if its desired transaction is thwarted.
Accordingly, in Lynch the Supreme Court held that in stockholder complaints against
cash out mergers, controllers would bear the burden of demonstrating the deal’s
fairness. Thus, Lynch refused to give either the independent directors’ or minority
investors’ consent the full “exonerating” effect it would otherwise have in selfdealing transactions of lesser financial magnitude, or where no controller was present.
Nevertheless, to furnish some incentive for controllers to submit their cash out
mergers to the independent directors or the public stockholders for their approval (or
rejection), Lynch held that either form of ratification would provide controllers a
beneficial shift in the burden of proof. Instead of the usual situation in the
adjudication of self dealing transactions (where the defendant must demonstrate the
inherent fairness of the challenged deal), Lynch provides that where a cash out merger
has received approval by either the independent directors or majority of the public
shares, the plaintiffs must show the freezeout was unfair in order to obtain a recovery.
(Because Lynch validates and expands upon the criteria elaborated in Weinberger,
their fiduciary mandates are referred to collectively herein as the "Lynch doctrine.”)
In sum, in light of controllers’ significant power advantages, and their duties as
fiduciaries, the Supreme Court has imposed substantial equitable safeguards on
controllers’ cash out mergers. It has given force to these safeguards by allowing
aggrieved minority shareholders to sue in equity if they allege a genuine claim of
unfairness in a cash out merger, and it has limited the usual effect of disinterested
ratification in providing for dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaints on the pleadings.
C. Controllers’ Tender Offers and the Issue of Consent
The statutory and equitable standards relevant to controllers’ tender offer
freezeouts present a fundamentally different picture than those relevant to controllers’
cash out mergers.
In taking account of these differences it is important to note the very different
history behind cash out mergers and tender offer freezeouts. Although cash out
mergers were not expressly validated in Delaware until 1967, as part of the
comprehensive statutory modernization that occurred then (and elsewhere around this
time),77 they had already been occurring for decades. As described above, in the early
years, equity endorsed tremendous “protectionism” against cash out mergers in the
interest of minority investors.**
In contrast, tender offers are a far more recent phenomenon, with a very different
legal complexion. The Williams Act, which governs tender offers in Exchange-Act
listed securities, was enacted only in 1968.78 Tender offers, as they are presently
understood, were uncommon prior to that time. The Williams Act imposes certain
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elementary, procedural safeguards against unfairness in tender offers – including proration,79 minimum timing,80 withdrawal81and “best price” requirements.82 However,
the principal focus of federal law is ensuring the completeness of the offeror’s
disclosures and prohibiting fraud therein.83 Furthermore, although the SEC’s tender
offer rules require the target’s directors to state their views regarding the merits of the
tender offer, the board may satisfy this obligation by declaring it is unable to reach a
conclusion about the offer’s merits.84 In a similar vein, the cases interpreting the Act
and the rules follows a principle of neutrality in respect to bidders and targets. The
SEC’s Rule13e-3 mandates an additional layer of disclosure for going private
transactions (in both structural forms, in fact but once again the focus is on ensuring
the ability of the offerees to make informed judgments, rather than on promoting the
substantive fairness of controllers’ offers.85 There is no form of “merit” regulation in
the federal tender offer scheme, in relation to controllers’ offers or otherwise; nor do
the federal cases (or other federal regulations) provide a role for target directors in
negotiating on the public stockholders’ behalf.
The states’ approach to controllers’ tender offers mirrors the federal approach in
assuming a posture of relative “neutrality.” Consistent with the fact that the bidder’s
offer to purchase is made directly to security holders, there is no statutory
requirement in corporate law that directors must consent in order for a tender offer to
proceed. At a formal level, the omission of a board approval requirement reflects the
fact that the company, as a legal entity, survives any change in ownership effectuated
by a tender offer.86 That is, no corporate-level act or transaction occurs in a tender
offer, formally speaking, and this has influenced the case law’s approach to tender
offer freezeouts.
Although director approval is not required under the state statutes, directors’
fiduciary duties encompass discretionary authority to oppose “outside” (noncontroller’s) hostile bid. Equity has afforded target directors authority to employ a
variety of defensive tactics to inhibit third party tender offers the directors regard as
inadequate or coercive.87 Functionally speaking, this defensive, equitable authority is
effectively a “reverse, partial, implied” board approval condition as applied to hostile
tender offers. Crucially, however, a parallel grant of defensive authority has not been
recognized by equity in relation to directors of a controlled company – although this
provocative logical inconsistency was noted by the Chancery Court in its decision in
Pure.88
In sum, the federal regulation of controllers’ tender offers has not preempted state
regulation of these transactions, but it appears to have influenced equity to adopt an
uncharacteristically laissez faire posture towards controllers’ tender offer freezeouts,
as compared both to controllers’ cash out mergers and third parties’ hostile tender
offers. In the absence of misrepresentation, or other forms of overt, objectively
defined forms of coercion, controllers can bypass the target directors and make their
offer to purchase directly to the target’s minority stockholders, without concern that
the Courts or the independent directors will intervene on the minority investors’
behalf.89 This approach was validated in 1996 in Solomon v Pathe Communications
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("Solomon").90 In Solomon the Supreme Court held that absent an affirmative
showing of fraud or coercion, equity would not intervene to protect minority
shareholders’ welfare in controllers’ tender offers.
Until recently, controllers rarely relied on tender offers as a primary vehicle for
going private transactions. For one thing, it is impossible to consummate a freezeout
exclusively through a tender offer, because there will always be some “holdout”
stockholders who choose not to or simply fail to tender their shares. In order for a
tender offer to become a full fledged freezeout, controllers typically execute a “short
form merger” after the tender offer is consummated. Delaware’s section 253
provides that a controller may execute such a short form merger unilaterally and
almost instantaneously if it has acquired 90% or more of the outstanding voting stock
of the target company.91 No agreement or negotiation with the target directors or
outstanding stockholders is required to effectuate a short form merger. When this fact
is combined with the fact that no negotiation or agreement with a Special Committee,
the full board or the target stockholders themselves is required for controllers to go
forward with tender offers, it becomes evident that controllers can effectuate these
freezeouts more rapidly and with lower transaction costs than they can cash out
mergers.92
The final piece of “good news” for controllers’ seeking to engage in tender offer
freezeouts was delivered by the Delaware Supreme Court in 2001 in In re
Glassman.93 Although the Court did not address tender offer freezeouts per se, in
Glassman the Court held that equity would not apply any fiduciary criteria to short
form mergers. Because controllers use short form mergers, commonly, to
consummate their tender offer freezeouts, this was interpreted as a “green light” for
these transactions.
Equity’s less protective stance towards minority investors in tender offer
freezeouts would seem to make them the preferred route for controllers planning on
going private. And since the Glassman decision, the relative number of tender offer
freezeouts compared to cash out mergers has increased, as predicted. Commentators
assumed that controllers would nearly always prefer tender offer freezeouts to cash
out mergers, since the former are likely to involve lower transaction costs and even
less opportunity for litigation. However, the most recent empirical evidence suggests
that the shift to tender offer freezeouts has not been as pronounced as commentators
expected.94 The more traditional cash out merger route is still more prevalent,95 as
exemplified, in fact, by the going private transaction in Cox. The most logical
explanation for this is that controllers starting with a relatively lower stock holdings
would perceive a tender offer freezeout as involving greater risk of
nonconsummation, because of the 90% ownership requirement attendant to
completing the short form merger.96
D.
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The inconsistency between the fiduciary standards endorsed in Lynch and
Solomon has invited bidders to employ sharply different tactics, even to offer
proportionally different premiums depending on which structure is employed for the
freezeout.97 More specifically, there are three bodies of law that define public
stockholders’ financial entitlements in freezeouts – the law governing appraisals, the
law governing cash out mergers and the law governing tender offer freezeouts.
Because controllers have the opportunity to select among freezeout structures, they
shape their deals to take advantage of the different legal requirements, especially the
differences regarding “fair price” that pertain to different structures.
The appraisal statutes can be read as the legislatures’ acknowledgment that
they’d afforded controllers a legal power analogous to eminent domain in the cash out
merger provisions.98 From this perspective, appraisal rights can be construed as the
legislatures’ attempt to rectify the power imbalance they created in favor of
controllers. The appraisal statutes afford public investors subject to a cash out merger
the right to go to court to obtain the legally determined measure of the fair price of
their shares – that is, the cash value of their stake in the company measured as a
going concern. In their affirmation of going concern value as the legal measure of the
fair price minority stockholders are entitled to, appraisal rights are unambiguous.
In practice, however, appraisal’s efficacy is compromised by the existence of
various statutory caveats and practical impediments.99 These hurdles inhibit public
investors’ ability to rely on appraisal rights to obtain the full value of their shares in
cash out mergers. For example, there is only a short time period in which investors
can commence appraisal proceedings. The plaintiff-stockholders must await the final
conclusion of the appraisal proceedings to receive any financial recovery – and they
do so in a situation where they must decline any of the merger consideration. There
are limits tied to the form of consideration offered by the controller – appraisal is
unavailable, normally, where the merger consideration is widely traded stock. And
appraisal is unavailable to public investors who sell to a controller in a tender offer.
In addition, the statutes don’t create a mechanism for investors to bring appraisals as
class-actions, so that the legal costs of appraisal are prohibitive in most cases for
ordinary (non-institutional) investors. In addition, because the quantitative methods
for calculating going concern value are highly complex, the public investors’ receipt
of an ultimate recovery is always speculative.100 In sum, despite the formal clarity of
the promise of going concern value as part of appraisal rights, the risks and
impediments attaching thereto have sent mixed signals about the value that minorities
can obtain -- and thus the price that controllers should offer to pay -- in cash out
mergers.
In assessing Weinburger’s implications for minority investors’ ability to demand
a fair price in a freezeout, Professors Gilson and Gordon have described the cause of
action arising there under as a class-based, equitable equivalent of an appraisal
action.101 Indeed, both the equitable cause of action and appraisal actions incorporate
going concern value as the legal measure of fair price in cash out mergers. In a sense,
then, the Lynch doctrine represents equity’s judgment (among other things) that
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appraisal's promise of going concern value is excessively constrained by statutory
caveats and practical impediments, as described above. Under the Lynch doctrine,
minority shareholders’ equitable fair price claims in cash out mergers have not been
circumscribed in the way actions for appraisal are.102
And yet the standards defining minority investors’ ability to obtain a fair price in
tender offer freezeouts present a wholly different. Based on the assumption that the
public investors can freely choose whether or not to tender to a controller, the
Supreme Court in Solomon declined to impose a fair price duty on controllers’ tender
offers. Solomon rejected the fair price duty expressly and without equivocation.
And Solomon did so, furthermore despite the fact that an earlier decision of the
Supreme Court, Lynch v Vickers' Energy, had endorsed going concern value as the
benchmark for damages where controllers had engaged in fraud or coercion in a
tender offer.103 The different approaches to minority investors’ financial entitlements
in Vickers Energy and Solomon reflects Solomon’s assumption that the public
stockholders are free to decide whether or not to tender, absent misconduct by the
controller. In effect, both the cash out merger and the tender offer freezeout doctrines
place great emphasis on minority investors’ freedom of choice in setting the legal
standards for price. But the Lynch doctrine imposes a fair price duty on controllers
going forward -- assuming coercion operates and limits minority investors’ free
choice. In the alternative, Solomon forbears imposing a fair price duty on controllers’
tender offers, presuming coercion is normally absent and investors can make a free
choice about the freezeout.
To summarize, each of these three bodies of law reflects a distinct approach to
defining “fair price” and affording public investors a legal means to obtaining it in a
freezeout. Equity has endorsed a fair price duty (as going concern value) in
controllers’ cash out mergers, but not in controllers' tender offers. In tender offers,
the law provides that “fair price” will be whatever the public stockholders accept in
tendering to the controller, so long as there’s been no affirmative showing of express
misconduct on its part. And while both appraisal actions and equitable causes of
action under the Entire Fairness standard validate controller’s duty to pay a “fair
price” (as going concern value), the practical utility of appraisal actions has been
compromised by myriad limitations and practical impediments.
E.

Controllers Benefit from Structural Arbitrage

Unlike other major corporate transactions, it is the controller rather than the board
that will initiate a freezeout offer. As part of this authority, the controller will have
discretion over the selection of the formal structure for the freezeout. Although other
structural alternatives are available,104 in most cases controllers select between cash
out mergers and tender offer freezeouts, as described above. The different statutory
and equitable standards applicable to these different structures (and especially the
differences pertaining to the fair price duty, as described above) have become
apparent to controllers considering a freezeout, especially since they cannot go
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forward in complex M&A transactions like freezeouts without expert legal counsel.105
A further crucial feature of controllers’ power to select the freezeout’s structure is
that they are not wed entirely to either choice. That is, controllers “mix and match”
mergers and tender offer structures in going private deals to their advantage. For
example, in negotiating a cash out merger agreement with the representatives of the
target, the controller will frequently provide that it can launch a “clean up” tender
offer after the agreement is signed (and prior to the shareholder vote thereon). The
advantage of such a tender offer is that it may lessen the controller’s total financial
exposure in the freezeout, because stockholders who tender surrender their right to
bring an appraisal action. The merger agreement will also commonly afford the
controller discretion to abandon the ordinary cash out merger, which requires a
shareholder vote (and thus the solicitation of proxies in compliance with federal law)
in favor consummating the freezeout through a short form merger if it obtains the
minimum 90% target stock ownership threshold. By switching to the short form
merger, the controller can avoid a shareholder vote, and thus the solicitation of
proxies in compliance with federal laws and regulations. Switching to a clean up
tender offer and short form merger – even after there is a signed, negotiated cash out
merger agreement, may help the controller to reduce its transaction costs overall.
Importantly, however, under the case law as it stands, so long as there is a merger
agreement signed by the controller and the target, as the controller goes forward in
the freezeout, the minority shareholders are protected by the Entire Fairness standard.
That is, even if the controller abandons the long form merger and consummates the
transaction through the short form merger (after a successful tender offer), Lynch’s
Entire Fairness standard will apply to the process, and not the more lenient standards
applied under Solomon.
If the Cox Reforms become authoritative, however, controllers would not be
governed by the Entire Fairness standard as they negotiate the process of a freezeout,
at least until the independent directors or the majority of the public investors
officially disapproved of the transaction. (A duty to pay no less than going concern
value, under the Lynch doctrine, would apply as a measure of damages if controllers
were found, after the fact, to have engaged in coercion or other forms of unfairness.)
But under the Cox Reforms, until the freezeout was officially rejected by either the
independent directors or a majority of the public shares, controllers would not be
negotiating in the presence of a fair price duty or a duty of fair dealings. The
representatives of the minority stockholders would not have the leverage they have
presently where controllers negotiate under a duty of Entire Fairness.
The dual track approach to the regulation of freezeouts in different formats has
allowed the courts to play close attention to the different structural dynamics that
apply in different transactional contexts. This context-sensitive approach has been
beneficial in many areas of law, consistent with the notion of transactional
choreography developed herein. Indeed, the various corporate actors and the markets
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have been able to adjust their expectations to the risks attendant to different deal
contexts as equity has refined the pertinent transactional choreography.
However, as the Chancery Court has recognized in Pure and Cox, it’s most
probable that the differences in the structural dynamics between controllers’ tender
offer freezeouts and cash out mergers are more superficial than substantive, more
formal rather than practical and concrete. The different bodies of case law have
therefore done more to obscure this similarity than to illuminate it, so that the parties
could respond thereto. In addition, if the differences are more apparent than real, then
the courts are expending an unwarranted amount of resources maintaining the two
bodies of case law for freezeouts.
But there is an even more problematic feature of the dual track case law for
freezeouts: this is that it has not truly done justice to the complex patterns through
which controllers execute freezeouts. In reality, controllers can tailor make, mix and
match and change deal structures in mid-stream. This degree of power and discretion
affords controllers the ability to arbitrage the advantages of the different structures in
their interests. Furthermore, this is the kind of legal complexity and uncertainty that
would appear difficult for the markets to price, and thus it’s reasonable to believe that
minority investors are coping with some measure of market failure in relation to the
trading price of their shares and that they may be overpaying for their securities.
Furthermore, if the price of minority shares was systematically downgraded to take
into account the maximum degree of potential overreaching by controller, this would
make it difficult for companies where there were controllers to raise capital in the
public markets at reasonable prices.
The remainder of this Article lays out the case for judicial reform intended to
unify freezeout doctrine consistent with the Entire Fairness standard. One of the
features that makes this unification more feasible, from a legal process perspective, is
the fact that the tender offer freezeout case law is not as legally coherent, not as
conceptually sound, as are other areas of Delaware’s corporate fiduciary law.

II. THE EQUITABLE STANDARDS FOR TENDER OFFER FREEZEOUTS
In Pure and then Cox, Chancellor Strine departs from the established tradition of
laissez faire towards controllers' tender offer freezeouts. These are the first decisions
in the tender offer freezeout case law to take stock of the bias that had developed in
controllers’ favor. They are also the first decisions fully exploring this case law’s
relationship both to the standards applied to controllers in cash out mergers and to
target directors in defending against hostile tender offer bids. As Pure and Cox
suggest, the conceptual framework underlying the tender offer freezeout case law
does not hold up well in this comparison.
A. Solomon’s Approach to Controllers’ Tender Offers
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For the past ten years, Solomon has been respected as the landmark opinion
governing controllers' duties in tender offers. This is surprising in several respects.
First, most simply, the opinion is only an affirmance (by Delaware’s Supreme Court)
of the Chancery Court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Thus, the issues
of fiduciary duty addressed in the case did not receive the full airing of a trial.
Second, even more powerfully, Solomon's discussion of controllers’ fiduciary
duties in tender offers is very limited. Most of the opinion focuses on the pleading
standards applicable in shareholder class actions, as a general matter. The Court
analyzes when stockholder complaints in class actions may be dismissed for failure to
state a claim. The plaintiffs in the appeal argued that the Chancery Court had
erroneously applied a heightened pleading standard, but the Supreme Court disagreed
and ruled against them.106 Importantly, Solomon's lengthy discussion of pleading
standards does not add any refinement or precision on the matter of how they apply in
controllers’ tender offers.
Thirdly, although the case is treated as authoritative precedent regarding
controllers' duties in tender offers, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleged breaches of
fiduciary duty on the part of the target’s directors. The complaint alleged that the
target directors had breached the duty of care and fair dealings they owed the
minority investors, on account of their passivity in response to the controller’s
offer.107 Although it goes to the heart of the plaintiffs’ complaints, Solomon devotes
very little discussion or analysis to the directors’ conduct in the controller’s tender
offer.
Adding to the strangeness of the opinion's stature in going private doctrine, the
transaction under scrutiny did not actually involve a going private transaction,
precisely speaking. The controller, Credit Lyonnais Bank, was conducting the tender
offer for the small slice of public equity while it was simultaneously foreclosing on an
89.5% interest in the stock it held as a creditor.108 On the day the tender offer was
announced, the controller also initiated a public auction for the stock subject to the
pledge.
Even the small section of Solomon that does discuss the fiduciary duties of target
directors responding to controllers’ tender offers is problematic. After reciting the
breach of care and fair dealings allegations against the target directors, the opinion
makes a leap of logic. It observes that controllers don't have a duty of fair dealings or
duty to pay any particular “fair" price in a tender offer. But this is a non sequitur,
analytically speaking. Whether the target directors breached their duty of diligence in
responding (or failing to afford an adequate response) to the controller’s tender offer
is not logically dependent on the nature of the controller’s duties. 109 Indeed, the
target directors’ duty to be active advocates for the minority investors would appear
to be most crucial precisely where the controller’s duties were minimal.
Solomon’s conclusion that controllers are not under a fiduciary duty to offer a
fair price is also puzzling. The opinion seems to imply that the matter is resolved by
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precedent. The Court cites Lynch v. Vickers Energy, a Delaware Supreme Court
decision from 1976,110 as well as Weinberger for the principle. But this is very odd
since Weinberger says nothing at all about whether a fair price duty exists in
controllers' tender offers. In Weinberger the Supreme Court validated the fair price
duty in relation to controllers’ cash out mergers; the Court was silent about the role of
equity (and thus the application of a fair price duty) in other going private structures.
Nor is the Vickers' Energy opinion cited in Solomon truly germane.111 On the subject
of price, Vickers’ Energy states merely that it "... cannot be one which would induce
the acceptance of an unconscionable bid by an unwary stockholder at a price below
the market.” This seems to be, essentially, a prohibition on coercion by controllers in
cash out mergers; and where the opinion goes on to state that the price cannot be
“otherwise unreasonable under the facts and circumstances” this hardly affirms the
absence of a fair price duty in controllers’ tender offers. Indeed, to the contrary, this
language from Vickers Energy suggests that controllers must offer at least a
“reasonable” price for the minority shares.112 In any event, Vickers Energy certainly
does not affirm the absence of a fair price duty in controllers’ tender offers. Solomon
thus cites Vickers Energy and Weinberger too broadly, if not inappropriately. Instead
of taking the principle that controllers do not have a fair price duty in their tender
offers from these opinions, it seems that the Supreme Court in Solomon arrived at this
conclusion largely on its own.
Strangely, despite these stunning shortcomings in its legal analysis, Solomon has
been respected as the principal authority governing controllers’ tender offers.
Perhaps this largely reflects the brief elapse of time since the case was decided. More
concretely, since the Solomon opinion issued only in 1996, the Supreme Court has
not had an occasion since then to enunciate rules for controllers or target directors in
tender offer freezeouts. Given the idiosyncrasies in Solomon, when the Supreme
Court does have this opportunity, it should feel confident in electing to chart a new
course for tender offer freezeouts, including endorsing the application of the Entire
Fairness standard in these transactions.
B.

In re Glassman – No Fiduciary Requirements in Short Form Mergers

As described earlier, in tender offer freezeouts, controllers usually employ a
short form merger to eliminate the remaining equity investors who failed to tender
(assuming the controller reached the 90% ownership threshold). Through the end of
the twentieth century, there was uncertainty regarding whether equity would apply the
Entire Fairness standard in short form mergers, as it does in regular (“long-form”)
cash out mergers. For decades, the Supreme Court’s Schnell v Chris Craft opinion
was understood to allow equity’s imposition of fiduciary mandates over and above
any express statutory requirements applicable in a corporate act or transaction.113
Schnell has frequently been held to be relevant in settings where the power of the
board has been employed to the detriment of some or all of the stockholders.114 This
suggested that although the short form merger statutes allowed controllers to
circumvent the target board entirely, this tactic might prove unacceptable to equity,
on account of its negative implications for minority shareholders’ interests. Thus,
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consistent with Schnell, there had been considerable lingering uncertainty about the
nature of the fiduciary duties and requirements that attached to controllers and target
directors’ conduct in short form mergers.
Adding to the uncertainty, in Kahn v Lynch the Supreme Court had stated that
Entire Fairness was the "exclusive" standard of review for parent companies’ cash out
mergers of subsidiary companies – that it, the Court made no distinction between long
form and short form mergers in Lynch.115 Because of cash out mergers’ crucial
importance in tender offer freezeouts, the issue of whether and what form of fiduciary
obligations applied in short form mergers was a hotly contested issue when it came
before the Supreme Court in 2001.116 In that year, in In re Glassman the Supreme
Court affirmed the Chancery Court's ruling that no fiduciary criteria would be applied
by equity in short form mergers.117 Reviewing the opinion, it is apparent that the
Supreme Court did not consider the question simple or the answer self evident, since
it reviewed five decades of equitable decision-making in cash out mergers prior to
enunciating its holding. But in Glassman the Supreme Court finally held that equity
would not imply an fiduciary criteria in short form mergers, seemingly on account of
the Court’s impression that the legislature had intended for equity to abstain from so
doing. The Glassman opinion suggests that the Court felt precluded from applying
fiduciary criteria to short form mergers on account the Delaware Legislature's express
validation of controllers' power to effectuate these transactions unilaterally – that is,
without target board or target shareholder consent.118 The court held that the
legislature had in effect preempted equity's authority to impose a fair dealings
requirement in short form mergers.
Although Glassman is interpreted as resolving that the Entire Fairness standard
is inapplicable in short form mergers, it's important to note that the decision leaves
open the potential for the equity holders eliminated through the short form merger to
pursue claims of misrepresentation, "fraud" or illegality therein. Specifically, in
reiterating that the equitable action for misrepresentation applies to controllers even
in short form mergers, Glassman validates the fiduciary duty of "complete candor"
endorsed in Vickers Energy and its progeny.119 Nevertheless, Glassman has been
accepted as resolving that equity should have a limited role in overseeing short form
mergers.120
But Glassman's relevance to tender offer freezeouts is a actually a separate
question. The distinction arises from the fact that Glassman did not involve the
Supreme Court in reviewing a premeditated, combined tender offer and short form
merger of the kind that became more common after the decision itself. Indeed, the
Glassman decision nowhere states or even implies that the Supreme Court considered
the impact of its decision for controllers planning tender offer freezeouts (as these
involve short form mergers). Because controllers had rarely combined tender offers
and short form mergers as a structure for going private, Glassman's relevance to
future freezeouts may not have been apparent to the Supreme Court at the time of its
decision..121 Furthermore, as was true in relation to Solomon, in the years since
Glassman was decided, the Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to revisit the
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equitable standards pertinent to short form mergers in tender offer freezeouts, per se.
Therefore, once again, should the Supreme Court wish to endorse Entire Fairness as
the norm for tender offer freezeouts, it can do so without significantly disturbing the
existing legal precedents.
C.

In re Siliconix – A True Tender Offer Freezeout

1. The Siliconix Facts
In Siliconix the Chancery Court had the opportunity to review a full fledged
tender offer freezeout – that is, a going private deal self consciously structured as a
combined tender offer and short form merger.122 Siliconix Incorporated was a
NASDAQ listed technology company that had suffered through the market correction
that occurred in the early months of 2000.123 At the time of the buyout, its stock price
and performance in the product markets were showing signs of a rebound, but
Siliconix’s price was not far advanced from its historic low. The controller, Vishay
Intertechnology Inc. was closely aligned to Siliconix’s product line and owned 80%
of Siliconix’s stock. It was clearly seeking to take advantage of what it apparently
feared was a fleeting market opportunity to acquire the minority stock at a favorable
price, as evidenced by the records amassed by the Court. In February of 2001,
without prior notice to Siliconix or its minority investors, the controller announced a
proposed cash tender offer for all of Siliconix’s shares.124 As part of its offer, it
declared its probable intention to effectuate a back end short form merger (at the
same, tender offer price) but it reserved discretion to decline to do so. The
controller’s disclosures to the minority investors informed them that Siliconix would
probably be delisted from the NASDAQ at the conclusion of the tender offer. The
controller was somewhat equivocal in stating its reasons for effectuating the tender
offer freezeout. Even more problematically, the controller’s disclosures failed to
enunciate the basis for the price it was offering to the minority.
The controller appears to have done the minimum necessary to claim “good faith”
compliance with the prevailing transactional choreography for freezeouts. It declared
a desire to negotiate with a Special Committee of target directors, but the Committee
it negotiated with was clearly biased in its favor, and intentionally so. It was
composed of two directors, each of whom had substantial connections to the
controller. One of the Committee directors had been the controller’s lawyer until
shortly before the transaction. The other Special Committee director “had been active
in providing banking services to Vishay” in prior years. In addition, both of these
directors “were friends of Vishay management,” including, specifically, the
controller’s chief negotiator in the tender offer freezeout. The lawyer-director had
been appointed to the target’s board and Special Committee at the express suggestion
of this individual who would be “negotiating” on the controller’s behalf with him.
(The controller was also allowed by the Committee to vet its selection of
“independent” financial advisers.) There was evidence that the Committee directors
would receive a “special fee” if the freezeout was consummated; and there was no
question that the Committee’s financial advisor’s fee was contingent on the closing of
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the freezeout. Finally, the Committee was cautioned that “Vishay could not be
compelled to sell its stake in Siliconix” (and could thus block third party offers) and
that it could also “commence a unilateral offer at any time.”
In its favor, the controller agreed to a majority of the minority shares minimum
tender condition, which gave the minority investors some limited capacity to thwart
the freezeout if they viewed it as genuinely unfair and were able to act in concert.
However the minority investors’ ability to arrive at a considered evaluation of the
controller’s price was hindered by several factors (in addition to the arguably
conflicted nature of the Committee). As stated previously, the controller did not
enunciate the rationale underlying its offering price or the circumstances of its buyout
proposal. The Committee did not obtain, indeed appears not to have attempted to
obtain a fairness opinion from its financial adviser in the transaction. And the
Committee itself failed to provide any guidance to the public equity holders by taking
an official stance of “neutrality” in the Schedule 14D-9.
With respect to the merits of the price, the opinion seems to indicate that the
controller lowered its final offer in comparison to its opening bid. The controller set
its opening cash bid at a 10% premium to the then market trading price of Siliconix
stock. (This offering price was, however, still twenty percent below the average
trading price of the stock in the six months previous to the bid.) The value actually
being offered to the public equity holders became more difficult to evaluate once the
controller switched from cash to stock consideration. Furthermore, the opinion states
that in setting the conversion ratio for the exchange offer, the controller made no
allowance for a premium to the Siliconix public equity holders. In addition, the
switch to stock, and the finalization of terms for the freezeout were effectuated
unilaterally by the controller without notice to the Committee.
2. The Standards for Coercion and Valid Disclosure
The minority stockholders in Siliconix were seeking a preliminary injunction to
stop the controller’s exchange offer. This made it somewhat more difficult for them
to recover, in light of the higher standards that apply to the grant of an injunction.
Apart from this matter, however, the Siliconix Court appears to have applied a
heightened standard to Solomon’s prohibition on coercion by controllers. The Court
reviewed the facts, instead, for coercion it would deem “actual” or “serious” or
“substantial” – implicitly accepting that some “normal” amount of coercion was
ordinary and to be tolerated by the courts and public investors. Thus, although it
refers to Solomon as authoritative precedent on this matter, in Siliconix the Chancery
Court appears to have upped the ante in evaluating what forms of coercion by
controllers would merit the Court’s intervention.
As described above, there were many features of the Siliconix freezeout that
would appear to have been coercive in their intention or in their effect or both. These
include the conflicted Committee, the tainted process of selecting the financial
adviser, the question of the Committee’s and financial advisers’ incentives being
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skewed by contingent fee arrangements, the failure of the Committee to obtain a
fairness opinion, the controller’s silence regarding crucial features of the transaction,
the controller’s equivocation about whether it would consummate the short form
merger (which would determine whether appraisal rights would exist), and the threat
implicit in the discussion about delisting. In fairness to the Chancery Court, Solomon
had provided no justiciable contours to the definition of coercion that it validated as
being of central importance. Nevertheless, the tender offer freezeout in Siliconix
doesn’t look like a close case. Rather, the Court appears to have ignored the
avalanche of worrisome facts relating to the controller’s and target directors’ conduct,
as being inadequately coercive to merit equitable relief.
In addition, rather than inquiring whether the controller had satisfied its duty of
complete candor, consistent with Lynch v Vickers Energy and its progeny,125 in
Siliconix the Court parsed through the many questionable aspects of the controller’s
disclosures inquiring whether the plaintiff minority stockholders had proven the
existence of material misrepresentations therein. The difference between a standard
of “acceptable” disclosure (disclosure that eschews material omissions and
falsehoods) and “entirely candid” disclosure -- as required by equity in controller’s
tender offers pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Lynch v Vickers Energy, is
thus an important and well established one. But in Siliconix the Chancery Court
appears to have ignored the distinction; and it applied the more lenient standard, to
the advantage of the defendant-controller.
In sum, although the Court went to great lengths to describe conduct by the
controller that it appears to have regarded as problematic, it also appears to have gone
out of its way to conclude that this conduct was not actionable under the prevailing
equitable standards. In so ruling the Chancery Court appears to have been
particularly impressed by the controller’s acceptance of a majority of the minority
minimum tender condition -- which the Court took as evidence that the minority
investors could stop the freezeout if they were sufficiently displeased. But viewing
the number of worrisome aspects of the controller’s bid revealed in the Siliconix
opinion, in conjunction with the case’s holding, minority investors and counselors
would have to wonder if Courts would ever find coercion sufficiently “actual” for the
Courts to intervene in their favor.

3. The Standards for Target Directors in Tender Offer Freezeouts
Indeed, as was true in Solomon, in Siliconix the Court appears somewhat confused
about the intermingling of the fiduciary standards applicable to controllers and those
applicable to target directors in freezeouts. In Solomon, the Court deflected the latter
question by validating that controllers do not have a fair price duty in a tender offer
(as previously discussed). In Siliconix, the Court faced the issue of the target
directors’ fiduciary duties more squarely; indeed the opinion gives more lengthy
consideration to the target directors’ duties than it does to the controller’s duties,
interestingly.
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As part of the discussion of the target directors’ duties, the Siliconix Court noted
that the state statutes do not afford directors an explicit role in tender offers. (This fact
is noted, subsequently in Pure as well.) In Siliconix the Court interpreted this silence
as leaving less room for equity to impose fiduciary duties on target directors in
controllers’ tender offers. The Court also reasoned that because no sale of corporate
property is involved in a tender offer, as opposed to a sale of the stockholders’
property, the authority of the board is less immediately implicated in tender offers
than in other transactions – most significantly, cash out mergers. (This question is
also revisited in Pure). Perhaps the Court’s impression in Siliconix was that the target
directors had little choice other than to take the passive approach that they did, so that
finding them liable under fiduciary law would simply be unfair. In any case, the
inconsistency between the Siliconix Court’s recitation of the facts (where it expresses
substantial dissatisfaction with the parties’ conduct) and its conclusion to exonerate
the target directors is striking.
4. The Comparison with Target Directors’ Conduct in a Recent Cash Out
Merger
The greatest hurdle to the Court’s exonerating the target directors and denying the
plaintiffs’ requested injunction, however, appears to have been the recent decision by
the Delaware Supreme Court in McMullin v Beran. McMullin involved a sale of a
controlled company through a cash out merger with a third party – the controller had
arranged the deal so that the subsidiary’s public shareholders would take cash as
consideration in the merger. Consistent with the wishes of the controller, the
directors of the target (the subsidiary) abdicated their role in the merger negotiations
in favor of allowing the controller (the parent company) to pursue the transaction and
decide its terms. The parent company was interested only in selling the subsidiary for
cash. The Court held that in limiting the financial alternatives affecting the minority
investors of the subsidiary in this fashion, the controller had benefited itself to the
disadvantage of the minority investors. Furthermore, most relevantly, the Supreme
Court held that the target directors in the cash out merger process had breached their
fiduciary duties by abdicating their role as advocates for and advisers to the minority
investors. McMullin held that the target directors could not merely leave it up to the
minority investors to decide whether or not to go along with the transaction proposed
by the controller. The crucial issue for the Court in Siliconix, therefore, was whether
the cash out merger structure mandated a different result, on the issue of the target
directors’ duties, than would a tender offer freezeout.
The parallels between the situation of the minority investors in the McMullin
merger and the tender offer freezeout before them in Siliconix were palpable to the
Chancery Court, and they are discussed at length in the opinion. The opinion states
that the public investors’ need for guidance in these two contexts appears equivalent.
It also states that the financial effects for the public investors in both transactional
settings were largely analogous. They were each faced with taking the consideration
approved by the controller or holding out in the hope of getting better value in an
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appraisal. In Siliconix the Court went so far as to refer to the different equitable
standards applicable to cash out mergers and controllers’ tender offers as an
“anomaly.” And the Siliconix Court, although it denied the injunction in the end,
affirmed that target directors have fiduciary duties to the public investors in
controllers’ tender offers.
However (as was true in Solomon), in Siliconix the Court appears to have been
unready to give affirmative content to the target directors’ fiduciary obligations in the
face of controllers’ tender offers. In Siliconix the Court expressed the view that it
would have to endorse “a new approach to assessing the conduct of directors of a
tender target” if it were to rule in the plaintiffs’ favor. Although this would arguably
not be correct, in Siliconix the Court said that it would have to overrule cases such as
Solomon in order to validate an active defensive role for the target directors. It’s
apparent in Siliconix that the Chancery Court was not then prepared to make such a
bold move. Hence, no injunction issued against the tender offer freezeout, and the
legal bias in favor of controllers in tender offer freezeouts persisted, indeed acquired
greater momentum.
D.

Pure -- New, Affirmative Protections Against Coercion

Pure was decided by the Chancery Court in October, 2002 – only fourteen months after
Siliconix. It's apparent from the tenor of the Pure opinion that the Court had become

increasingly sensitized to the strongly pro-controller bias that had grown up in the
case law governing controllers’ tender offers.126 Pure is also the first occasion in
which the Chancery Court expressly examined, at length, the combined effect of
Glassman's holding that no equitable criteria apply in short form mergers and
Solomon's relaxed attitude towards controllers’ capacity for coercion in tender offers.
Against this backdrop, Pure charts the beginnings of a more minority-protective
posture towards controllers’ tender offers.127 In the Pure opinion, the Court appears
intent on raising the level of protection afforded public equity holders by enunciating
further fiduciary safeguards applicable controllers’ offers. But it is also apparent that
the Court is seeking to accomplish this objective in a way that will avoid providing
minority stockholders greater room to sue controllers.
1. The Factual Setting of Unocal’s Bid for Pure Resources
In Pure the minority shareholders sued for a preliminary injunction to stop the
tender/exchange offer by Unocal Corporation, the controller of Pure Resources, Inc.
Unocal was a True Majority Controller; it owned 65% of Pure's stock and thus
possessed the votes required unilaterally to control the composition of Pure's board, to
approve a cash out merger if the tender offer failed, and to block third party offers for
Pure if any appeared. In fact, Unocal had declared its unwillingness to participate in
a sale to a third party if one surfaced in the course of the freezeout negotiations.
Like Vishay in Pure, and Unocal agreed to abide by a majority-of-the-minority
shares minimum tender condition, but Unocal (the controller in Pure) was more
straightforward in committing to the short form merger (which would trigger
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appraisal rights on the minorities’ behalf). There was also a big distinction in the
quality of the Special Committees. At Pure Unocal negotiated with a Special
Committee consisting of two non-management directors unaffiliated with the
controller or its senior managers. It was given full discretion to select its own
financial and legal advisers, and it availed itself of this freedom. On the whole, Pure's
Special Committee appears to have been far more effective in advocating for the
public investors than were the Committees in Solomon and Siliconix.128
Most dramatically, Pure's independent directors sought affirmation from the
controller of their authority to pursue financial and transactional alternatives to
Unocal's offer. But was where the controller drew the line: it denied the Special
Committee’s authority to do so. And it appears that this is where the Committee’s
defensive efforts ended. The Committee directors did nothing further to seek
alternatives to the controller’s tender offer freezeout or to thwart the buyout. But they
were not wholly cowed: in the Schedule 4D-9 they refused to recommend in favor of
the public’s tendering to the controller.
In Pure the Court ultimately ruled in favor of granting the plaintiffs the
requested preliminary injunction, in contrast to Solomon and Siliconix. The Chancery
Court found curable defects in the structure of the majority-of-the-minority tender
condition and the controller's disclosures.129 The controller cured these defects and
was able to proceed to consummate the freezeout (at a slightly higher price than
originally contemplated).
2.

Structural Coercion Benefiting Controllers in Tender Offers

In Pure the Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the several strands of
fiduciary doctrine relevant to freezeouts. Based on the changes it endorses, it is
apparent that the Court found the tender offer case law unsatisfactory. Specifically,
Pure compares the underlying principles and assumptions in the Solomon line of
cases to the Lynch doctrine (which applies to controllers’ cash out mergers) and
Unocal and its progeny (which apply to third parties’ tender offers). In comparison to
these bodies of fiduciary law, Pure ruled that case law proceeding from Solomon was
too lax in its fiduciary mandates and thus excessively biased in favor of controllers.
For instance, in comparing Solomon’s influence in deals to the fair price duty
pertaining to controllers in cash out mergers under Lynch, Pure observes that the
Solomon tradition has provided minority investors only enough leverage to stop
grossly unfair bids and not “merely inadequate” ones.
In Pure the Court begins by noting the litigants’ disagreement about the
applicable standard of review. The plaintiff claimed it was Entire Fairness, consistent
with Lynch; the defendants—who ultimately succeed in their argument -- claimed it
was the more deferential fiduciary standards contemplated by Solomon. The opinion
explains that the selection of the standard of review has been dictated by formal
structure: essentially, it’s Lynch for cash out mergers and Solomon (in combination,
now, with Glassman) for tender offer freezeouts. (In this regard, consistent with the
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earlier discussion, the Court misses the “patchwork quilt” dimension of freezeouts
where controllers incorporate tender offers into cash out mergers and short form
mergers into tender offer freezeouts.)
But rather than merely accepting this duality in the case law, in Pure the Court
ambitiously explores whether it’s been efficacious (and for whom). And it also
considers whether the doctrines should be unified consistent with the higher fiduciary
standards of Lynch or the more lower standards of Solomon. In the end, in Pure, the
Chancery Court attempts to split the difference.
In considering the rationale and merits of the Lynch doctrine, Pure notes that
doctrine’s concern for “inherent coercion.”130 The opinion acknowledges that tender
offer freezeouts don't conform to the classic structural paradigm of self dealing
transactions, because the controller does not visibly operate through the board on the
“sell” side of the transaction.131 Instead, in a tender offer the controller speaks to the
minority investors directly as a potential purchaser. The departure from the ordinary.,
paradigmatic self-dealing structure is deemed relatively unimportant by the Court,
which finds that the controller has many other possibilities for profiting from the
structural dynamics that operate in its favor in tender offers. For example, as in the
tender offer in Pure itself, the controller can use its access to the target's board and
senior management to obtain nonpublic information that it can use to its advantage in
planning and negotiating the bid. In terms of timing, there is always the danger that
the controller will take advantage of a short term dip in the public stock's trading
price to buyout the minority at temporarily depressed prices.132 And the controller's
superior organizational clout is assured in light of the public investors being dispersed
geographically and, potentially, in regard to their particular investment objectives.
Even if there are a substantial percentage of institutional investors within the
public equity holders, these institutions only individually possess a small fraction of
the company’s outstanding stock. As the recent financial scandals illustrated,
institutional investors’ capacity to self-protect is impaired by a variety of institutional
and organizational costs and conflicts. will each possess a very small percentage of
the entity’s overall outstanding stock. Certainly, compared to action taken by the
controller, the action taken by the institutional investors is far more costly, less swift
and less cohesive. And they will have to act through intermediaries, which will add
to their proportionately higher transaction costs.133 Pure also observes that controllers
cannot compel the minority’s elimination as they can through a cash out merger. But
once again the Court finds a mitigating factor that argues in favor of equal protection
in the tender offer context. That is, shareholders who vote "no" in a cash out merger
may still accept the merger consideration if the deal succeeds; they would be swept
along with the majority of the minority unless they elect appraisal. In comparison,
shareholders who do not tender are likely to be left in a worsened situation if the offer
closes, they would not have an “after the fact” opportunity to elect the tender offer
consideration and no appraisal rights apply. In this respect, tender offer freezeouts
impose more “coercive” pressure than to cash out mergers, where Lynch applies
higher fiduciary safeguards as a reflection of this concern. In addition, in Pure the
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Court acknowledges that the combined effect of Solomon and Glassman means that
aggrieved stockholders will have little opportunity to present a claim of unfairness in
equity, since most claims would be dismissed upon the controller’s motion. And
Pure concludes that inherent coercion would operate with equal force in tender offers
– that there’s no basis for minority investors to have less to fear from thwarting a
tender offer freezeout than a cash out merger.134 For the above reasons, in Pure the
Court concludes that the difference between the protective approach embodies in the
Lynch doctrine and the laissez faire approach embodies by Solomon are unwarranted.
Indeed, Pure opines that they represents a “potential incoherence” in Delaware law.
The Court observes that tender offer freezeouts even appear to be "the more
dangerous form of going private deal" 135
Pure next compares the fiduciary mandates affecting target directors in
controllers’ offers and those affecting target directors facing third parties’ bids under
Unocal. That is, in attempting to make sense of the relative absence of equitable
protections in controllers’ tender offers, Pure asks whether Delaware’s general focus
on activist boards is simply irrelevant in the tender offer context – whether tender
offers represent a distinct doctrinal “space” where target directors’ fiduciary duties
are simply inapplicable. But this potentiality is flatly contradicted by the Unocal line
of cases which afford target directors substantial defensive authority against third
parties’ unsolicited tender offers.136 Once again, the Solomon line of cases are
dismaying because controllers’ tender offers would appear to represent “the more
dangerous” kind of tender offer in comparison to outsiders’ unsolicited bids.
The Court’s dissatisfaction with the Solomon line of cases’ implications for
controllers’ duties naturally leads it to question whether this case law should be
folded into the Lynch doctrine. This result would seem warranted, since Pure
concluded that minority investors face equivalent dangers of coercion and unfairness
both freezeout structures. However, at this point in the analysis, logical or doctrinal
analysis and precedent have run out as a basis for decision-making.
The Chancery Court therefore turns to an analysis of the policies underlying
these bodies of equitable doctrine. It openly espouses the view that the objective of
fiduciary doctrine in the corporate area is to reinforce the strength of the capital
markets and the creation of financial wealth.137 The opinion queries whether this
objective is better advanced by endorsing robust fiduciary safeguards (which inspire
investors to trust), or more porous ones that put a damper on suits and stimulate
transactions that might otherwise have been discouraged by the fear of litigation. In
Pure the Court concludes that Lynch is too “rigid” and has inspired too much fruitless
litigation. Pure claims that this as a valid rationale for refusing to endorse the Lynch
doctrine for controllers’ tender offer freezeouts. Instead of recommending that Lynch
be extended to controllers’ tender offers, Pure endorses four new equitable criteria for
determining whether a controller has exerted impermissible coercion in a tender offer
freezeout. In regard to the “potential doctrinal incoherence" arising from there being
two different levels of scrutiny addressed to freezeouts, Pure suggests that the
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problem should be resolved by “easing” Lynch – bringing it into line with this more
“flexible” variation on the Solomon approach.
3.

New Pre-Conditions for Business Judgment Deference

As previously described, Solomon had affirmed that in the absence of the
plaintiff demonstrating affirmative coercive conduct by the controller, its tender offer
would be presumed voluntary – and the minority investors would be regarded as
capable of making a free choice whether or not to tender. Pure upends this
presumption. After observing that coercive pressures inhere in the structural and
organizational dynamics of controllers’ tender offers, Pure endorses four objective
tests for determining whether the controller has exploited or, alternatively, minimized
these coercive pressures.
First, Pure provides that controllers must have refrained from making any
express threats about taking retributive action if the tender offer freezeout is
thwarted.138
Second, Pure endorses the kind of majority of the minority minimum tender
condition that was present in the tender offers in Solomon, Siliconix and in Pure itself.
The rationale for this, obviously, is to enhance the public stockholders' capacity to
thwart an unsatisfactory tender offer if they act in concert.
Third, in order to limit the pressure to tender arising from fear of being left
worse off on account of other investors tendering (the classic “prisoner’s dilemma”),
Pure provides that controllers must commit to do a short form merger if they obtain
the shares necessary. This would ensure that the holdouts from the tender offer at
least are afforded the option of taking the merger consideration, and would more
often have appraisal rights. On this basis, Pure attempts to lessen the pressure to
tender into bids perceived as inadequate.139
Finally, in order to counter the controller's superior informational status, Pure
provides that controllers must allow independent directors on a Special Committee
the time, freedom and access to independent advisers they require to arrive at an
informed recommendation to guide the minority investors’ decision making.
Pure contends that only where controllers have adhered to these standards, will
they have ensured that the public stockholders can make a free choice in deciding
whether or not to tender into the freezeout. Thus, Pure contends that only in this case
should courts presume that the controller’s tender offer is voluntary. Pure is a
landmark case in its reversal of the presumption about voluntariness in controllers’
tender offers, so that controllers have to do something for their deals to meet this
expectation. Nevertheless, its proposals are ambiguous and incomplete in important
respects.
4.
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First, it is important to observe that even where controllers allow for a
nonwaivable, majority-of-the-minority approval condition, this doesn't make the
controller's consolidation of power through the tender offer "voluntary" for the
shareholders who do not tender. Once the controller appears intent on closing the
offer, the shareholders cannot preserve the status quo. Rather, those who tender must
live with the value conferred by the controller. As for the shareholders who elected
not to tender, their shares are likely to be less liquid and less valuable upon the
success of the controller's tender offer. In this sense the concept of “voluntary”
tender offers is equivocal.
Pure provides for a minimum tender condition of a majority of the minority
shares. But this can only be partially equated to the minority shares consent provision
that operates within the Lynch doctrine. This is because there are dynamics within
tender offers that favor tendering. Chancellor Jacobs makes this point in his opinion
in Emerging Communications.140 As stated above, controllers' timing, informational
and organizational advantages are exacerbated in tender offers. Because no proxies
must be circulated or votes returned and tabulated, tender offers usually proceed on a
more accelerated time frame than do cash out mergers. And brokers’ financial
incentives may generate pressure for investors to tender to the controller.
Furthermore, as Pure observes, shareholders who vote “no” in a merger have the
opportunity to benefit from taking the deal consideration if the transaction closes –
but shareholders who do not tender have no credible alternatives to the (now even
more depressed) market price. For these reasons, the forces operating to effectuate
tenders by at least a majority of the outstanding public shares represent a distinct
phenomenon, noncomparable to shareholder voting. And, in any event, under the
Lynch doctrine, the (voting) consents by a majority of the public shares have been
efficacious only to shift the burden of proof; Pure would tie the “easier to obtain”
minority shareholder tenders to the adoption of the more defendant-friendly “business
judgment” standard of review. This is an example of Pure’s attempt to establish a
middle ground between Lynch’s rigor in favor of minority’s and Solomon’s laissez
faire in favor of controllers. But it appears incorrect to interpret Pure as establishing
a true middle ground (even accepting that a middle ground was satisfactory).
Pure's "90%-short form merger" provision is less efficacious for minority
investors than it might first appear. Pure provides that coercion operates (and will be
presumed) where a controller fails to commit to liquidate the non-tendering “stub”
investors through a short form merger (at the same price as the tender offer) if it
obtains the shares necessary to do so. Read squarely, however, this provision would
allow controllers to creep up close but remain just below the 90% level and avoid the
application of Pure’s provision. Controllers could effectuate the final purchases to
obtain the 90% share ownership requisite for the cash out merger at a later date and
potentially at a lower price than was offered in the tender offer.141 In effect, this kind
of minute, tactical calculation is “fair game” for controllers in a world where equity
has eschewed a fair dealings requirement in favor of more manipulable objective
requirements. Of course, where the controller’s commitment to effectuate the short
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form merger is indefinite, this generates substantial pressure on the public investors to
tender into the controller’s offer.142 This is, in fact, the basic problem identified but
not resolved by Pure’s “90% provision.” In a world where Pure’s “90% provision”
applies, controllers would simply avoid committing to a 90% minimum tender, going
forward and so the minority investors facing the tender offer would never be assured
the “back end” short form merger would materialize. Therefore, a “cost” attendant to
holding would be the possibility of finding oneself in a delisted state of financial
“limbo.” This is a particularly scary kind of limbo since under Glassman, no
equitable fair price or fair dealings requirements apply even if the short form merger
eventually occurs.
But the most problematic feature of Pure’s responses to controllers’ capacity for
overreaching in tender offer freezeouts (as a result of the coercive pressures inherent
therein) is revealed in what the opinion declines to do. In Pure the Court afforded no
separate significance to the Special Committee’s disapproval of the controller’s offer
in the Schedule 14D-9. Consistent with Solomon, in Pure the Court focused on the
conduct of the controller and generally eschews attributing separate significance to
the actions or inactions of the independent directors in regard to defending the
minority investors’ interests. (Even more significantly, as in earlier decisions, the
Court declined to validate independent directors’ defensive authority in responding to
controllers’ offers. And it did so expressly in Pure, since the Special Committee
sought such authority.143) But even sticking with the Committee’s more limited role
in opining about the offer, the Court declined to shape the standard of review to take
account of a Special Committee’s disapproval of the controller’s tender offer. By
declining to give the Committee’s opinion about the offer independent significance in
affecting the standard of review, the Court denied that the Special Committee’s
disapproval mandated a judicial presumption that the offer was unsatisfactory. In
effect, Pure’s criteria for controllers’ tender offer freezeouts endorses a legal standard
that expressly disregards the judgment of disinterested, independent directors charged
with acting in the best interests of the public investors. This is a remarkable omission
from a Court that has expressly embraced the concept that the judgment of
independent directors is of paramount importance in the construction of corporate
law. And for this reason, as described hereinafter, Cox recants this feature of Pure’s
Special Committee provision.
E. Cox Adds Another (Ambiguous) Committee-Related Safeguard
Cox expands upon the four equitable requirements for deferential review in tender
offer freezeouts enunciated in Pure. In particular, Cox proposes that where a
Committee has disapproved of the controller’s offer, and the controller proceeds with
the buyout in any event, the transaction should not be presumed voluntary. If Cox’s
proposed reform are accepted, then in this circumstance the controller would have to
prove the deal’s inherent fairness in a suit.144 In this proposed reform, the Chancery
Court recants the part of Pure that gave no weight to a Special Committee’s
disapproval of the controller’s offer.
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Before continuing with the analysis of Cox’s proposal relating to a Special
Committee’s published opinion of the transaction (the Cox “Committee Opinion
Provision”), the discussion below surveys the capital market and legal developments
in this period that would have influenced the Court to give greater weight to the
judgment of independent directors in freezeouts.
1.

Legal and Capital Market Developments Immediately Preceding Cox

Pure was decided in October 2002, only a few months after the enactment of
SOX. The Cox opinion issued in June 2005 in a period in which the reforms
instigated by SOX were being assimilated into the system of corporate governance at
both the national and the state level.
In the period around Sox’s enactment and thereafter, the rate of going private
transactions accelerated. Some commentators attribute this increased going private
activity to the greater regulatory costs associated with Sox.145 It is equally plausible,
however, that the relative stagnation in the capital markets that produced discounted
stock market prices, as well as the ready availability of financing for going private
deals, influenced this trend. In addition, many of these controlling shareholders
seeking to go private had only recently taken their firms public during the heyday of
high stock market valuations in the 1990s. This phenomenon of controllers “going
public high” and turning around shortly thereafter to “go private low” -- when
“regular,” outside investors were often coping with substantial investment losses –
suggested the kind of insider opportunism that the Delaware Courts have tried to
discourage and remedy. The Delaware Courts’ sensitivity to insider self dealing by
corporate fiduciaries would have been accentuated, also, by the series of major
corporate looting, excess compensation and fraudulent accounting scandals that came
to light in this period – that is the period immediately after Pure and prior to Cox.
In this same period there was continued emphasis on corporate governance reform
at the national level, most saliently through SEC and SRO rule making.146 These
reforms particularly highlighted the salutary effects of promoting the service of
genuinely independent directors on corporate boards. In its proposed reforms for
freezeouts in both structures, Cox analogously validates reliance on independent
directors’ decision making in freezeouts, as a basis for deferential review.
Also in this period, Vice Chancellor Strine (who authored Pure and Cox) became
familiar with the data presented in the Harvard Law School working paper mentioned
earlier. This data emphasized the salutary role of Special Committees in garnering
enhanced premiums on behalf of minorities in cash out mergers.147 Finally, Cox cites
an influential law review article on freezeouts authored by Professors Gilson and
Gordon which had gently criticized Pure for not further endorsing the authority of
Special Committees in promoting minorities’ interests in freezeouts.148 These
contemporaneous legal reforms and sources of influence would have shaped the
Chancery Court’s renewed emphasis on the role of independent directors in
freezeouts.
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However, in this same period, certain opinions from the Chancery Court
expressed extreme frustration with the demands of deciding valuation-related cases of
the kind involved in Entire Fairness cases. And although Professors Gilson and
Gordon had criticized the Solomon line of cases' bias in favor of controllers, other
influential law review articles published in this period objected to Delaware's
fiduciary standards as favoring, promoting and prolonging meritless shareholder
suits.149 As stated in the Introduction, many of these complaints about class action
suits in freezeouts echoed the complaints which had been directed at federal securities
class actions prior to the enactment of the PSLRA. This gave these claims and
criticisms increased traction.
In sum, at the same time that it affirms target directors’ fiduciary duties and their
crucial role in freezeouts, Cox loudly echoes these complaints about Delaware law
promoting excessive stockholder litigation. By the time it was called upon to rule in
Cox, the Chancery Court was (i) concerned about the accumulated inconsistencies in
its freezeout doctrine and the bias in favor of controllers in the Solomon line of cases,
(ii) impressed by the argument in favor of giving independent directors greater
authority in freezeouts and (iii) alert to the dangers of corporate legal doctrine
facilitating stockholder suits. Cox attempts to reconcile these different concerns and
impulses in its proposed reforms to freezeout doctrine. This, in part, explains why its
Committee Opinion Provision for tender offer freezeouts is ambiguous and internally
inconsistent.
3. Ambiguities in Cox’s Special Committee Provision
a. What Does Cox’s Special Committee Recommendation Require?
As was true in relation to Pure’s Committee provision, it would be easy to
confuse or exaggerate what Cox’s Committee Opinion Provision says and does. First
(again like Pure), Cox does not provide that controllers have a fiduciary duty to
establish a Special Committee at the target to represent the minority investors in a
tender offer freezeout. Rather, like Pure, Cox merely assumes that a Special
Committee will be formed as a matter of “best” practice.150 (It’s not clear how far a
controller can go in thwarting the establishment of a Special Committee in a tender
offer freezeout without this being coercive; the bright line, objective standards in
Pure and Cox do not address the issue.) Taking this a step further, as in Pure, Cox
declines to validate a fiduciary duty on the part of target independent directors to
block a controller’s suboptimal bid or pursue alternatives in the market. Cox’s
Committee Opinion Provision is intended to affect only the applicable standard of
review as it relates to the controller’s obligations to the minority.
Second, the Cox opinion actually includes two very different versions of the
Committee Opinion Provision. In the early part of the opinion, the Court provides for
deferential review in a tender offer freezeout if the Special Committee has not
disapproved of the controller’s tender offer. Towards the conclusion of the opinion,

NY1:#3400474v18
10/5/06 11:14 AM

31

in contrast, Cox calls for deferential review where the Committee has approved of the
controller’s offer. The latter (required approval) provision is much more restrictive
than the disapproval provision. Because Committee’s can elect neutrality in the 14D9, and will have a great incentive to do so after Cox, these alternatives are not mirror
images of one another.151
b. Cox’s Committee Opinion Provision as Applied Tactically in Negotiations
In relation to how Cox’s Committee Opinion Provision is likely to operate in
practice, controllers will surely threaten to rescind their offer if the Committee
disapproves.152 This threat will have some bite since the Committee’s disapproval,
under Cox, would mandate that the controller prove the freezeout’s Entire Fairness in
a suit. The controller’s threat to rescind will put great pressure on Committees not to
disapprove of controllers’ freezeout offers. In addition, even if Cox’s proposed
reforms are all accepted, the Controller can tell the Committee directors that they
have no duty to defend the minority investors’ interests in the tender offer freezeout.
The Controller will remind the Committee, again accurately, that equity has always
emphasized minority investors’ capacity to make their own choices regarding whether
to sell to a controller in a tender offer. And the Controller will remind the Committee
that there is no legal fair price requirement in this setting. Each of the above factors
will weigh in favor of the Committee assuming a stance of neutrality, in the “worst”
case. For all these reasons, Cox’s Committee Opinion provision is a very loose,
foreseeably ineffective safeguard.153
c. Cox’s Committee Recommendation Provision in Broader Context
It’s not accidental, then, that the Co opinion does not present the Committee
Opinion Provision for controllers’ tender offers as a significant, additional protection
for minority investors. In this regard, the tenor of Pure is very different from Cox.
The Chancery Court in Pure expresses considerable concern about controllers’
capacity for coercion in tender offer freezeouts. This concern is expressed minimally,
if at all, in Cox. In Cox, the Committee Opinion provision comes into the discussion,
effectively, as an aside. (Cox involved a cash out merger and thus the discussion of
what standards should apply in controllers’ tender offer freezeouts was in essence
gratuitous therein). It appears in the Court’s discussion of its proposed reforms for
freezeouts as a byproduct of the plan to unify the two bodies of case law. Cox’s
Committee Opinion Provision is intended to complement the reform proposals
envisioned in Pure, but the objective of protecting minority investors is not first and
foremost on the Court’s agenda in Cox. The Cox opinion’s principal preoccupation
appears to be creating a unified doctrinal framework for freezeouts that will provide
some support for minority investors in their negotiations with controllers while
minimizing stockholder litigation in freezeouts.
F. Summary – Residual Ambiguity in the Standards for Tender Offer
Freezeouts
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As the above discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court has considerable
leeway to depart from the existing and proposed doctrinal framework and chart a new
course for controllers’ tender offer freezeouts. The existing legal standards for tender
offer freezeouts, as described above, are thinly rooted in precedent, ambiguous and
disconnected with the broader outlines of Delaware’s transactional choreography for
M&A deals involving conflicted corporate fiduciaries. They fail to do justice to
protecting the interests of minority investors in these deals. In particular, the largely
passive role accepted for directors in tender offer freezeouts is inconsistent with the
active role equity envisions for independent directors in third party tender offers.
This inconsistency exposes the infirmity in Delaware’s tender offer freezeout
doctrine.
Cox’s attempt to reform the tender offer freezeout case law founders as it runs up
against the Chancery Court’s larger objectives of unifying freezeout doctrine and
minimizing stockholder litigation. Equity’s commitment to protecting public
investors’ interests in freezeouts is undermined in the process. As outlined in Part V,
the better course to “easing” Lynch is endorsing Entire Fairness for both freezeout
structures, and allowing deferential review upon a bona fide auction or market check
only.
III. CYSIVE’S AND COX’S CRITIQUES OF ENTIRE FAIRNESS REVIEW
This Part III analyzes the deficiencies in the Lynch doctrine that are discussed in
the Chancery Court’s opinion in Cysive and Cox; it demonstrates that these criticisms
are largely exaggerated. Neither Cysive nor Cox present persuasive reasons for the
Supreme Court to endorse a departure from the Entire Fairness standard in cash out
mergers. Indeed, the benefits of applying Entire Fairness, which are also described
hereinafter, suggest that it should be applied to tender offer freezeouts as well.
A.

Cysive's Critique of Entire Fairness Review

1.

Overview of the Opinion and Cash Out Merger in Cysive

Cysive exaggerates several problems it attributes to the Lynch doctrine and the
Entire Fairness standard.154 To illustrate Cysive’s hyperbole, this section reviews the
Court’s reasoning as it applies to the transaction disputed by the parties. As
demonstrated herein, in Cysive the Court could have resolved the dispute through a
motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, had the defendant so desired. It
could have done so, moreover, without departing the fundamental tenets of the Lynch
doctrine.
The Cysive opinion recites the findings of the Chancery Court in a disputed cash
out merger after a full trial on the merits. Mr. Nelson Carbonell, the controller of
Cysive, Inc. was seeking to acquire the remaining public equity of Cysive through a
cash out merger. Cysive had become financially distressed as a result of technology
market changes and a failed business reorganization plan.155 Cysive’s board – both
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the independent and management directors, agreed that fundamental change was
required if Cysive was to avoid a liquidation. Accordingly, the controller, the board
and a financial advisory firm all searched for an outside buyer. No credible offers
were received, however. Although the search for a third party buyer was ongoing,
Carbonell offered to acquire the outstanding public equity.
His proposal
contemplated a premium over the public equity’s trading price and Cysive’s
liquidation value.156 Carbonell’s plans were being impeded by the minority investors’
request for a preliminary injunction against the freezeout; for this reason he sought an
expedited, full trial to resolve all the outstanding issues and finalize his financing.
2.

Cysive on Lynch’s Inefficiency

As was true in Pure, the Cysive opinion begins by noting the parties’
disagreement over the applicable standard of review. The parties’ disagreement was
based on different views about whether Carbonell fit the definition of being a
“controller” for purposes of the Lynch doctrine. The plaintiffs, of course, argued that
he was, so that Entire Fairness was the appropriate standard of review.
In Cysive the Court proposes that the answer was not self-evident on account
of the fact that Carbonell owned approximately 40% of the shares, liberally
construed, and thus did not possess outright voting control. However, in addition, he
was an active executive, indeed Cysive’s CEO, as well as its founder. Combining his
stock ownership with his actual, hands-on managerial authority, it was clear that
Carbonell had the kind of power of importance to a Court’s application of the Lynch
doctrine – that is, the power to coerce or compel a freezeout if he so choose. On this
basis, the Court ruled that Entire Fairness applied in the trial.157 Cysive reflects an
expansive approach to the scope of the Entire Fairness standard, but not a truly
unorthodox one.
Far more unusual is Cysive’s statement that determining whether a controller is
present (which will determine the standard of review) is a matter of such complexity
under Lynch that it cannot be resolved on the pleadings (that is prior to a full trial or
at least extensive discovery in anticipation of a full trial).158 The Chancery Court
also states, in Cysive, that this is true also of the burden of proof – that it cannot be
resolved on the pleadings.159 More broadly, Cysive states that the Lynch doctrine
inevitably “entangles” the Court’s analysis of threshold questions with matters
pertinent to the resolution of the merits of the case.
On this basis, the Chancery Court in Cysive contends that the Lynch doctrine is
fatally flawed; that it generates gross inefficiencies. As stated by the Court: “our law
has so entangled the standard of review determination with the ultimate decision on
the merits that the two inquiries are inseparable.” The opinion contends that the
parties to the dispute, facing this conundrum, have declined to make duplicative
presentations of the facts of their case – that is, to do so in motions and again at trial.
Instead, Cysive states, they have been forced to elect the paradoxical but pragmatic
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approach of awaiting the conclusion of a full trial in order to learn what standard of
review applied and who possessed the burden of proof.
As support for this observation, Cysive points to the fact that neither party in the
case requested that the standard of review or burden shift issue be resolved pre-trial.
But in doing so the Court failed to note that the procedural posture of the case was
highly unusual because the defendant did not seek an expedited resolution of the
claims. Again, it was the controller himself who sought a full trial in order to resolve
the outstanding claims and accelerate his ability to obtain financing. For this reason,
Cysive hardly stands as a model of Lynch’s dysfunctionality.
3. The Importance of Who Has the Burden of Persuasion
At the same time that Cysive complains that Lynch makes consideration of the
burden of proof issue inseparable from consideration of the merits of the case, it also
contends that the allocation of the burden of proof between the parties is of trivial
importance. According to the Court, the “practical effect of the Lynch doctrine’s
burden shift is slight.” If the allocation of the burden of proof were indeed of trivial
importance, then the Court’s antipathy towards Lynch would be more comprehensible.
However, it’s very unclear that there is widespread agreement that the allocation of the
burden of proof is a trivial matter.160 In Cysive, the Court expresses the view that
“shifting the burden of persuasion under a preponderance standard is not a major
move, if one assumes, as I do, that the outcome of very few cases hinges on what
happens if the evidence is in equipoise.”161 In stark contrast to this view, in a recently
published retrospective of Delaware Supreme Court decisions, former Chief Justice
Norman Veasey writes that "... burdens and standards of review are often outcome
determinative."162 And more broadly, a fundamental tenet of corporate fiduciary
loyalty doctrine is that once self-dealing has been established, the defendant has the
burden of demonstrating the challenged transaction’s fairness.163
As a matter of actual litigation practice, furthermore, Cysive’s presumption that
Courts objectively weigh each individual fact in isolation and then proceed to “total”
the results to see who has won seems unrealistically formalistic. It isn’t even apparent
that this is what the equity courts are supposed to do; it certainly seems inconsistent
with the more intuitive analysis of the overall complexion of the facts that is equity’s
hallmark. It seems more realistic that the Court’s background, starting assumption
about the burden of proof, and standard of review, shapes the Court’s analysis overall.
On this bases these determinations would be highly important to the case.
4.

The Entanglement Criticism against Lynch

It isn’t clear in Cysive that the Court could not legitimately have resolved that
Carbonell was a controller based on the pleadings. The Court possessed clear
information about his stock holdings, as well as his role in management. On this basis
it had the information to resolve that Carbonell was a controller as a matter of law.
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This should have constituted adequate evidence to resolve that the Entire Fairness
standard applied.
There was also undisputed evidence that the directors on the Special Committee
conformed to the accepted legal standard of being “independent.” There was similarly
dependable evidence demonstrating that they actively and effectively negotiated with
the controller and sought market alternatives to his freezeout proposal at the same
time. The Court had evidence that the independent directors met twenty one times,
contacted thirty-seven potential buyers and hired two different, reputable, unaffiliated
(“independent”) financial advisers to do valuation analyses of the company. In
addition, the Committee several times negotiated down the controller’s requested
termination fee, refused his preliminary bids and denied his request to cut off third
party offerors. Once this kind of objective evidence exists, the Courts should be able
to resolve whether there is prima facie evidence of fair dealings in order to assign the
burden of proof in Lynch cases. Indeed, the market check in Cysive is a nearly
textbook example of prima facie evidence of fair dealings and represents precisely the
scenario where this Article proposes that Courts should presume the freezeout’s
fairness and refrain from investigating the merits of the complaint in a stockholder
suit.
In regard to the general validity of the entanglement critique,164 it seems
unreasonable to assume that the Lynch doctrine is far more complex than other bodies
of civil law. The bite of the entanglement critique comes from Cysive representing
Lynch as an outlier in this regard. But there are many areas of civil law in which the
Courts engage in substantial pretrial hearings to resolve preliminary questions such as
the appropriate standard of review, the allocation of the burden of persuasion and the
relevance of affirmative defenses.165 These determinations would often require the
parties to litigate pretrial motions and, thus, necessitate some duplication in their
presentation of the facts of their case. And yet in other contexts, this has not given rise
to widespread criticisms of the law as being grossly inefficient. In the alternative, it is
reasonable to assume that by progressing through a suit in foreseeable increments (that
is hearings, motions, etc.) the parties can gradually take stock of whether they are
better off continuing to litigate or deciding to settle or drop their claims.166 Assuming
the operation of reasonable limits on attorneys’ fees, there would not seem to be
anything grossly inefficient or abusive about this process.
Cysive states that “few defendants have sought a pre-trial hearing to determine
who bears the burden of persuasion on fairness.” This is a broad, empirical
generalization, of course. But it isn’t clear what the evidence for this generalization
is, beyond the Cysive case itself. The Court does not cite other decisions where
there’s been a full trial prior to an adjudication of the burden shift and standard of
review issues.
To bolster its legal conclusion about Lynch’s “entanglement” problem, Cysive
cites a recent Supreme Court decision, Krasner v Moffett. Quoting from Krasner,
Cysive states: “[r]ecently the Supreme Court expressly held that defendants could not
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meet their burden to prove a valid special committee process at the pleading stage and
that a full factual record had to be developed.” The language from Krasner cited by
the Court is ambiguous. As presented in the opinion, it almost seems like the
Supreme Court in Krasner resolved, as a matter of law, that it is impossible to resolve
whether a Special Committee’s approval passes muster on the pleadings. But this
conclusion is tenable only if the language from Krasner is read out of context.
Interpreting the statement in context, it is clear that the Supreme Court did not intend
to make such a generalization. Thus, Krasner does not provide support for Cysive’s
claim that Lynch forces full trials on account of entangling threshold questions with
the substance of the merits of the case. doctrine. It therefore seems that Cysive is at
least premature in its conclusion that Lynch has distorted the system of equitable
adjudication by forcing full trials in states of absurd uncertainty or forcing grossly
inefficient, duplicative presentations of the same evidence in a disputed freezeout.167
6.

Pleadings Requirements under Lynch

Cysive presents another provocative, contestable assertion about freezeout
doctrine – one that becomes critical to Cox’s criticism of Lynch. In Cysive the Court
contends that plaintiffs can always go forward with a full trial so long as they
“produce evidence creating a genuine dispute of fact regarding the economic
unfairness of the transaction.” The controversiality of the statement depends on how
one interprets what constitutes a “genuine dispute of fact" regarding economic
fairness. It is hard to argue with the idea that plaintiffs should be allowed to go
forward where they present a genuine issue of economic unfairness.
At other times, however, Cysive contends that plaintiffs can always present
enough of a claim of economic unfairness in order to proceed to a full trial because
economic fairness is always contestable. But it simply isn’t clear that the Court
would allow a complaint to go forward under Lynch on the basis of any allegation of
financial unfairness. Neither Weinberger nor Lynch provide for this.
And separate from the pleading issue, where financial fairness is the sole claim
alleged by the plaintiff, it isn’t entirely clear that an equitable action would be
available under Lynch. The point has never been squarely addressed by the case law.
Weinberger expressly held that a plaintiff was required to demonstrate some basis for
invoking the fairness obligation – and as the Court did so it was addressing the
subject of unfair dealings. The Courts have never precisely addressed whether a
claim can go forward in equity where there is no credible claim of unfair dealing, but
merely a dispute about valuation.168
B.

Cox’s Arguments Against Entire Fairness

1. The Cash Out Merger in Cox
The cash out merger in Cox exemplifies many features of modern freezeouts. The
Cox family proposed a buyout of the public shares in Cox Communications, Inc., a
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Delaware company in the broadband communications business. The company's
public equity was traded on the New York Stock Exchange at the time the family
announced its freezeout proposal. The controlling family had previously taken the
company public and then private and then public again, consistent with its interests.169
As stated in the opinion: "At various times, the Family has found it convenient to take
Cox public, in order to raise money from the public capital markets. At other times,
the Family has found it preferable to run Cox as a private company." At the time the
family announced the recent freezeout bid, in the fall of 2004, it held 74% of the
voting power and had representatives filling a majority of the board's seats, including
the Chairmanship. The family was thus unequivocally a controlling shareholder as
defined under the Lynch doctrine.
The family's initial $32 bid represented a 14% premium over the average trading
price of Cox's listed shares (measured over the previous thirty days); the final price
agreed to by the Special Committee and the minority shareholder plaintiffs counsel
was $34.75. In the minority's interest, the family had agreed to consummate the
freezeout only if it reached agreement with the Special Committee over final merger
terms and if the Committee obtained a fairness opinion from its financial advisor.
Less favorably for the minority, the family announced that it was unwilling to allow a
market check or sale of the company, which would have tested its bid against going
concern value.170 This limited the Special Committee's ability to evaluate the real
merits of the controller's offer, of course.
Consistent with the established transactional choreography for cash out mergers,
the Special Committee was aided by independent legal advisers (Fried, Frank) and
financial advisers (Goldman Sachs). Once the controller and Special Committee
arrived at final terms, the merger was also ratified by the full board, on behalf of the
company. After the merger agreement had been signed, the Cox family initiated a
tender offer for the minority's shares, consistent with minimizing the potential costs
of appraisal proceedings.171 After it owned in excess of 90% of the company's shares,
the family completed the freezeout through a short form merger.172 The Stipulation
of Settlement reflecting the final $34.75 price per share had been ratified as
reasonable by the Chancery Court a month earlier.
2.

The Goal of Reshaping Freezeout Doctrine

Coming two years after Cysive, Cox deepens and expands the Chancery Court's
vitriolic criticisms of the Lynch doctrine.
In Cox the Chancery Court was called upon to resolve an objection to the
plaintiffs' attorneys' fee request in the settlement of a cash out merger governed by
Lynch. From the outset it's apparent that the Court is ill-disposed towards the
plaintiffs' lawyers, who it describes disparagingly, on several occasions, as having
filed "premature, hastily-drafted makeweight complaints.” Notionally, the Court’s
survey of the several strands of equitable doctrine pertinent to going private serves as
background to its determination over whether or not to approve the fee – but it
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becomes apparent almost immediately that there are broad law reform objectives at
stake in Cox.
Cox surveys what it describes as the general characteristics of suits and
settlements in cash out mergers announced as negotiable deals. In particular, it attests
to a pervasive pattern of contemporaneous, triangular negotiations between
controllers and Special Committees and controllers and attorneys representing the
public stockholders. At one point Cox does observe that its criticisms of the
"perverse incentives" generated by Entire Fairness review are relevant almost
exclusively to cash out mergers announced as negotiable offers. That is, the opinion
indicates that an entirely different pattern of suits and settlements applies when
freezeouts are announced after the freezeout’s crucial terms have been set. However,
this caveat is most frequently overlooked in course of Cox’s vituperation about forced
settlements and unearned attorneys’ fees under Lynch.
However, if Cox is correct that the routine payment of “forced” settlements and
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees accost controllers in cash out mergers announced as
negotiable offers, it's unclear why controllers wouldn’t be able to bypass these costs
and problems. Consistent with Cox’s description of the problem, controllers could do
so simply by waiting to announce their deals publicly until they’d reached an
agreement in principle with the Special Committee. This would appear to represent
an optimal, private solution to the litigation agency costs that are Cox’s chief
complaint against Lynch.
It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that Cox’s attention goes elsewhere because
"self-help" by controllers won't effectuate doctrinal reform. It won’t unify the case
law for both freezeout structures and establish the business judgment rule as a routine
bar to most stockholder claims in freezeouts. Nor will private solutions by controllers
solidify Delaware’s position at the forefront of corporate governance reform while
signaling Delaware’s support for the popular opposition to class action suits. This is
to say that like Cysive, the Cox opinion reflects a sweeping ambition to effectuate law
reform for freezeouts.173
Nevertheless, to its credit, in Cox the Chancery Court had an unusual
opportunity, procedurally speaking. Despite equity’s tradition of deciding only the
case before it,174 because the fee dispute involved the Court in reviewing a settlement
of a class action, the Court had substantial leeway to enunciate its vision for
reforming freezeout doctrine.
Cox's Committee Opinion Provision for tender offer freezeouts was discussed
earlier. This Part of the Article focuses on Cox's criticism of the Entire Fairness
standard (which has applied only to cash out mergers to date).
3.

Lynch & Dismissals on the Pleadings

One of Cox's most frequent criticisms of Lynch is that it prevents even vacuous
unfairness claims in freezeouts from being resolved in an expeditious manner – that
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is, on motions to dismiss (“Nondismissability”). Cox is adamant about this. It states,
for example, "Unlike any other transaction one can imagine ... it was impossible after
Lynch to structure a merger with a controlling stockholder in a way that permitted the
defendants to obtain a dismissal of the case on the pleadings." In addition, for
emphasis, Cox describes a hypothetical cash out merger in which a controller offered
a 25% premium to the market price and allowed for every conceivable procedural
protection for the public investors, only to have its motion for a dismissal denied.
The Court states that Nondismissability is inevitable under Lynch because "financial
fairness is always a debatable issue."175 Cox contends that contends that even
"premature, hastily-drafted, makeweight" complaint go forward and operate, in effect,
as a tax on controllers’ freezeout bids. The opinion explains that because complaints
under Lynch are Nondismissable, controllers settle them rather than pay the additional
cost of defending against further protracted litigation. The deplorable result of this
abusive litigation, Cox contends, is that it chills some controllers from ever proposing
a freezeout bid. According to Cox, the Lynch doctrine has “deterred the procession
of [freezeout] offers that provide valuable liquidity to minority stockholders and
efficiency for the economy in general."
Cox also describes how plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee incentives favor their settling
early. According to the opinion, the plaintiffs’ lawyers can score a quick, low risk fee
by settling at the same improved price endorsed by the Special Committee. The
plaintiffs’ lawyers defend their decision to settle on the rationale that some premium
is better than none176 – even if it isn’t close to going concern value. On a sense, it’s
difficult to fault the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ because they are not under a fiduciary duty to
obtain going concern value for their minority investors – as are controllers. In sum,
it’s apparent that the Court believes that the Lynch doctrine is undermining the
creation of value in the acquisitions market and distorting the integrity of the
litigation system.
But the doctrinal basis for the belief in Nondismissability is not as clear;
Cox never explains it in detail.177 Perhaps, as a variation of the entanglement concept
in Cysive, the Court in Cox is assuming that the issues relating to fair price and fair
process under the Lynch doctrine are too complex and fact-intensive to be resolvable
pretrial. In that case, the same objections to this line of reasoning discussed earlier in
relation to “entanglement” in Cysive apply here.
Or, perhaps the Court interprets the Lynch doctrine as mandating, as a matter of
law, that any allegation of unfairness can go forward. However, nothing in the
doctrine – in Weinberger or Lynch or related cases suggests that plaintiffs are relieved
of demonstrating a genuine issue of triable fact. To the contrary, Weinberger
expressly endorses the principle that a plaintiff must make an initial showing of
unfairness to proceed. What is palpable, however, from the opinion’s harangue
against Lynch is that it is frustrated by the demands of resolving valuation-related
suits, like those that arise under the Entire Fairness standard in freezeouts.178 This
burden isn’t going away if Lynch is dismantled, however, since the Chancery Court
also hears appraisal actions. And the Court’s frustration with not being able to get
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valuation “perfect” shouldn’t become a rationale for minimal judicial oversight
without the Court being satisfied that the minority investors were put in a position
meaningfully to bargain with the controller. And even the Entire Fairness standard,
as it has operated, has not given target independent directors to unleash real market
forces in the process, for the minority’s benefit.179
It’s also troubling that the Cox opinion never entertains the possibility that
controllers settle Entire Fairness claims because they obtain a genuine, net financial
benefit from so doing. The benefits for controllers of settling early in state cases
come more fully into view in light of the holding in Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co., Ltd v Epstein.180 In Matsushita, the United States Supreme Court affirmed that
the settlement of claims in state court can also bar the future litigation of federal
disclosure claims, so long as the claims would relate to the same overall
transaction.181 Settlements and plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees paid by controllers in
federal securities law claims tend to be significantly larger than those in Entire
Fairness claims under Lynch, 182 so that controllers would have a significant financial
incentive to preempt the potential for litigation in federal court. In addition, the
approvals of independent directors and minority shareholders are irrelevant to
defendants’ ability to obtain a dismissal of disclosure claims under the federal
securities laws, as are charter exculpation clauses. Finally, indemnification
agreements are considered unenforceable under the securities laws as contrary to
public policy. In sum, in light of Matsushita, it’s entirely plausible that controllers
enjoy a net financial benefit from offering lower prices, anticipating suits and
reaching a comprehensive settlements in state court that will bar future federal claims
against the freezeout.
There is a further paradox in Cox’s description of Nondismissability under
Lynch. Cox maintains that claims under Revlon are not uncommonly dismissed on
the pleadings, but Lynch claims cannot ever be.183 Even allowing for some
hyperbole, the disparity is difficult to comprehend at the level of doctrine. Under
Revlon, in a stockholder suit the Court is called upon to ascertain if the directors
exerted their maximum best efforts to obtain the highest price reasonably available
for the public stockholders.184 The doctrine further complicates matters by providing
that there is no one blueprint for determining how directors should act to obtain the
best price for the company in a sale. Thus, stockholder claims under Revlon seem to
involve a similar mixture of substantive, economic issues (“best price reasonable
available”) and process based safeguards (“best efforts,” “good faith”) as do Lynch
claims. So it’s difficult to distinguish a doctrinal basis for why Revlon claims would
be dismissable on the pleadings, but Lynch claims “would not ever be.”
Rather than what is inherently at stake in the two doctrines, the salient difference
seems to be that Revlon claims are typically brought against target company
independent directors individually, whereas controllers under Lynch are most
commonly parent companies or other corporate entities. Although there are
frequently independent directors who are named in Entire Fairness suits in freezeouts,
they almost always manage to avoid the imposition of direct, personal liability.185
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Delaware’s fiduciary law evidences a deep reluctance to find independent directors
liable for breach of duty.186 If Revlon claims are commonly dismissed and Lynch
claims less so, as Cox indicates,187 this may say very little about the merits of
complaints under Lynch and the incidence of overreaching by controllers, but a great
deal about Delaware’s concern for attracting and retaining nonmanagement directors
on corporate boards. Read in this way, the disparity would not indicate any
shortcoming in the Lynch doctrine.
4. Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees under Lynch
The Cox opinion goes to great lengths in describing how Lynch forces controllers
to pay unearned, excessive fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers.188 Indeed, Cox states that the
“incentive system that Lynch created for plaintiffs' lawyers is its most problematic
feature." Cox disparages the conduct of plaintiffs’ lawyers in freezeouts under Lynch
on the whole; it represents suits filed in these cases as being, essentially, an
expression of plaintiffs’ lawyers’ venality.”189
However, logically speaking, if the principle problem the Court attributes to the
Lynch doctrine is that it encourages the payment of excessive or unearned attorneys’
fees, the Chancery Court has ample judicial authority and practical means to remedy
the situation directly. Certainly it can do so without overhauling equity’s approach to
going private transactions, moreover. Indeed, because the Chancery Court is already
required to review all settlements in class actions to inhibit abuse,190 it should not be
difficult at all for the Court to adjust the relevant fee doctrine (which is not governed
by the Lynch doctrine) to limit the fees paid by controllers to plaintiffs’ lawyers.191
In regard to the specifics of the fee doctrine applicable to Lynch claims, Cox
notes that the Courts have discretion, in reviewing plaintiffs' lawyers' fee requests in
Entire Fairness claims, to apply either the Chyrsler v Dann standards192 or the more
traditional "Sugarland" standards. In Cox, the Chancery Court validates the more
conservative Sugarland standards, as being appropriate for freezeouts.193 The opinion
states that “complaints challenging fully negotiable, all cash, all shares merger
proposals by controlling stockholders are not meritorious when filed under the
Chrysler v. Dann standard.” It continues to act to limit abusive fees by ruling that
“no risk premium should be awarded in fee applications in cases [...] when a plaintiff
suing on a proposal settles at the same level as the special committee. Even further, if
a controller and a special committee ignore a prematurely filed suit and conclude
merger terms, there should be no presumed entitlement to a fee by the plaintiffs."
Thus, in Cox, the Court robustly employs its equitable authority to adjust the doctrinal
standards for fees. In so doing it limited the incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to file
claims in freezeouts.194
In effect, by endorsing the Sugarland standards for fee awards in cash out
mergers, Cox extends the transactional choreography for freezeouts to encompass the
plaintiffs’ lawyers. After Cox, plaintiffs’ lawyers can anticipate that if they file
claims in cases where the cash out merger is announced as a negotiable offer, they
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will not receive a risk premium but merely a reasonable hourly wage. More
disappointingly, they must risk receiving no fee at all if the Special Committee and
the controller elect to “ignore” their suit and are able to conclude terms for the
freezeout. In regard to the fee request in Cox, the Court determined substantially to
reduce the fee award requested by the plaintiffs’ lawyers. It did so, moreover,
although the controller’s fee to the plaintiffs’ lawyers did not reduce the award to the
plaintiff stockholders in the settlement of claims in the freezeout. In ruling to
approve an award of only $1.275 million to the plaintiffs’ lawyers (instead of the
$4.95 million dollar fee the controller had agreed to)195 the Cox opinion provides a
dramatic example of the Court’s competence to rein in “excessive” plaintiffs’
attorneys’ fees in freezeouts.
Cox’s suggestion that the Lynch doctrine is defective because plaintiffs can
systematically obtain outrageous fees by exploiting it is also undercut by the existing
empirical data about fee awards in these cases. Evidence presented in a 2004 Article
by Professors Thomas & Thompson indicates that plaintiffs' attorneys receive
monetary awards in only one third of the freezeout claims filed under Lynch.196 Thus,
in two thirds of the cases the fee awards to the plaintiffs’ lawyers are either "nominal"
or nonexistent. The study also indicates that these fees conformed to criteria of
reasonableness both when they are assessed on an hourly and a percentage of
recovery basis.197 Furthermore, Thomas and Thompson’s article indicates that fees in
Lynch litigation are substantially smaller than those paid to plaintiffs’ counsel in the
settlement of federal securities class actions (as measured on both of the bases
described above)198 At one point the Cox decision itself notes that plaintiffs’ lawyers
in claims under Lynch have reined in their fee requests to a moderate size.199 In sum,
while Cox cites the lawyers’ fee problem as the gravamen of its complaint against
Lynch, the problem does not appear to be a very serious one, but rather one that the
Chancery Court can address directly without fundamentally changing the doctrine
governing freezeout transactions.
5.

Lynch Benefits Public Stockholders

As an extension of its views about fee opportunism in freezeouts, Cox suggests
that the filing of claims under Lynch adds little if any value to what Special
Committees would obtain from controllers in bilateral negotiations – that is, without
the filing of the claims.200
a. Evidence of the Value of Lynch Filings
It seems that the views espoused by Professors Weiss and White -- who have
written extensively about the abuses of meritless class action suits and who also
served as the objectors in the Cox litigation -- were influential in influencing the
Court’s conclusion that Entire Fairness claims are largely vacuous and subversive of
investors’ best interests.201 This negative view of filings under Lynch is undercut,
however, by the empirical data and analysis presented to the Court by Harvard Law
School Professor Guhan Subramanian. 202 Subramanian's data supports the
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conclusion that Entire Fairness standard has afforded independent directors on
Special Committees greater leverage to obtain enhanced premiums from controllers in
cash out mergers. Indeed, in an affidavit submitted to the Court, Subramanian
concluded, to the expressed frustration of the Court, that greater premiums were
obtained in cash out merger negotiations where claims had been filed under Lynch
than in cash out merger negotiations where no claims had been filed.
But the Court discounts the data and analysis presented by Professor
Subramanian. Although it goes to great lengths to do so, the Court essentially
dismisses the credibility of the data indicating that higher premiums are realized in
cash out mergers where Entire Fairness claims have been filed. Instead, to the extent
that it acknowledges that relatively greater premiums are realized in cash out mergers
(where the Entire Fairness applies) than tender offer freezouts (where it does not), the
Court surmises that the result is attributable to the superior bargaining stature of
Special Committees in comparison with disaggregated stockholders in negotiating
with controllers. Most importantly, the Court appears to go out of it way to minimize
the role played by law and emphasize the role played by nonlegal, organizational
factors in affecting bargaining outcomes between the parties in these deals.
b. A Concession that Lynch Affords Special Committees Bargaining
Leverage
Except, in fact, at one point in an attenuated invective against the evidence that
the Entire Fairness standard has increased the size of premiums paid to minority
stockholders, Cox suddenly, momentarily, concedes the point – albeit begrudgingly.
The opinion states that Lynch might "charitably" be understood to provide “special
committee members with additional clout that they wield to get good results, and that
gives lawyers for controllers leverage to get their clients to pay a higher price to
ensure deal closure and the utmost reduction of litigation." But in the overall arc of
Cox’s invective against the Lynch doctrine, this begrudging acknowledgment of the
doctrine’s efficacy in promoting public stockholders’ welfare simply doesn’t gain any
traction at all.
And yet from the data reported in Professor Subramanian’s Harvard Working
Paper the point seems irrefutable: the “early” filing of Lynch claims in cash out
mergers promotes Special Committees' negotiating leverage with controllers and
incites the latter to pay higher premiums than they do, on average, in deals where
Entire Fairness does not apply. The filings of complaints in these cash out mergers
allows Special Committees representing the public investors a legal basis to claim,
with credible force, that the controller has an enforceable, fiduciary duty to pay no
less than the full going concern value attributable to the public’s stock. With the
Lynch filings in the background, the Special Committee can assert that if the
controller does not act in accordance with this fair price duty, and its duty of fair
dealings, the public investors will vindicate their rights in court – indeed, in suits that
have already commenced.
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c. The Simultaneous-Settlement Phenomenon
In dismissing Lynch’s importance as leverage for Special Committees
negotiating with controllers, furthermore, Cox many times points out that plaintiffs'
lawyers commonly settle their claims in cash out mergers on the same terms and at
the same time as do Special Committees negotiating on the minorities’ behalf.203 Cox
contends that once the controller’s agents in the negotiation communicate to the
plaintiffs’ lawyers that they have reached final terms with the Special Committee, the
plaintiffs' lawyers immediately “cave” and settle their Entire Fairness suit on the
same terms as has the Special Committee. Cox seizes upon this "simultaneity-ofsettlement" phenomenon as proof of the vacuous, nonmeritorious nature of filings
under Lynch.204 As further proof of this, Cox states that these Lynch claims do not
involve any actual "litigation conflict."
Over and over Cox points to the simultaneous-settlement phenomenon and the
absence of “real litigation conflict” as proof of the wasteful, defective nature of the
Lynch doctrine. But viewing the matter in perspective, it isn't at all obvious that the
simultaneous-settlement phenomenon compels a conclusion that the filings are
nonmeritorious, in essence, gratuitous. It would seem to prove, only, that in the
triangular “game of chicken” played between controllers and Special Committees and
controllers and minority shareholders' attorneys in cash out merger negotiations the
plaintiffs’ lawyers typically defer to the independent directors about when “enough is
enough.”
d. “Early” Filings Aren’t Necessarily Abusive
Furthermore, the fact that the filings are made by the plaintiffs’ lawyers while
the cash out mergers are still represented as “negotiable” offers also doesn’t prove
that the filings are specious or abusive. It would indicate, only, that at the time the
plaintiffs file their complaints, it isn’t yet clear which freezeout offers would
eventually be at or near fair value and in conformity with the requirements of fair
dealings. In fact, it’s more reasonable to presume that where controllers announce
freezeouts as “negotiable” offers, they do so at the lowest credible price – far below
going concern value – in anticipation that they may be forced to negotiate some price
increase. From this perspective, claims of unfair price in negotiable cash out mergers
are probably all legitimate when filed.
And to the extent that Cox emphasizes that “no actual litigation conflict” occurs
in these suits,205 rather than furnishing further evidence of Lynch’s dysfunctionality,
this would seem to demonstrate that these cases don’t consume a disproportionate
amount of judicial resources. Furthermore, the “early" filing of Lynch claims in cash
out mergers allows the plaintiffs’ lawyers time, early on, to sort out who will act as
lead plaintiff and lead counsel. This might prove especially important if the
freezeout’s timing were suddenly to accelerate -- for example, if the controller
determined to proceed unilaterally to effectuate the merger or switched to a tender
offer freezeout.

NY1:#3400474v18
10/5/06 11:14 AM

45

e. Fiduciary Claims Against Target Directors in Lynch Filings
Further evidence of the efficacy of “early” filings under Lynch can be surmised
from the fact that the Special Committee directors will probably be named
individually in filings claiming unfairness under the Lynch doctrine. This is likely to
promote the caliber of these directors’ efforts on behalf of the public investors.
Although Lynch itself would not be a basis for holding them liable, 206 the Special
Committee directors have a duty of care to inform themselves of all information
reasonably available to them prior to accepting the controller’s freezeout bid. This
duty is illustrated by the landmark case of Smith v Van Gorkom (in relation to a third
party merger)207 and the recent decision in McMullin v Beran (in relation to a merger
of a controlled entity with a third party where there was overreaching by the
controller).208 These cases affirm that in a cash out merger, the target directors have
no ability to remain neutral and allow the stockholders to decide for themselves
whether to approve the transaction. To do so, according to these decisions, would
violate the directors’ statutory and fiduciary duties in cash out mergers.
The evidence presented in Professor Subramanian's Harvard Study supports this
phenomenon. It confirms that Special Committees that have represented minority
investors in freezeouts structured as tender offers -- which are governed by the
Solomon standards and thus present less opportunity for the Special Committee
directors to be named in freezeout filings as individual defendants -- have not
obtained the same positive price increases from controllers than have independent
directors on Special Committees negotiating in the shadow of Lynch. Subramanian’s
evidence doesn’t prove that directors are more vigorous advocates for minority
investors where there is a suit for breach of duty pending against them – this concept
is supported mostly by common sense. But Professor Subramanian’s evidence is
entirely consistent with this common sense intuition.
f. The Utility of Discovery for Public Investors
Finally, it’s possible that the discovery process associated with claims under
Lynch also serves to promote the best interests of the public investors in freezeouts.
Cox represents shareholder plaintiffs' legal power to go forward with discovery as
being merely a form of extortion. As represented in Cox, the prospective costs of
discovery exert significant pressure on controllers to settle even nonmeritorious cases.
But the discovery process may in fact be the public stockholders’ form of due
diligence in respect to the value of their firm. In this sense it may further the process
of arms'- length dealings that Weinberger declared should operate for the benefit of
minority investors in cash out mergers.
To elaborate, in the context of an acquisition offer, even the seller will have a
need to conduct extensive due diligence (which would be the equivalent of the
discovery process, outside of litigation) in order to evaluate the merits of a bid. This
was graphically illustrated in the sale-through-merger analyzed in the landmark Smith
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v Van Gorkom case -- where the directors failed to undertake the kind of intensive
analysis of their firm that would have furnished an informed basis for their approving
the sale of the company. Moreover, in freezeouts it is ideally independent directors
who will negotiate on the minority’s behalf with the controller. But the independent
directors are at a significant informational disability in comparison with the
controller. In addition, consistent with Lynch's concern about inherent coercion, the
target's independent directors may be reluctant to, or even hindered from obtaining
the full range of company-specific information that would be intrinsic to a fully
informed analysis of it value. The independent directors on the Special Committee
might reasonably fear that such a comprehensive and time consuming due diligence
analysis of their own firm would provoke the controller and encourage it to deploy its
various tactical advantages to the public stockholders’ detriment.
In sum, the plaintiffs’ discovery requests may operate as a surrogate for the kind
of due diligence that would ordinarily properly be conducted by the board of the
seller in a third party merger. On this basis, Cox’s unqualifiedly negative view of
plaintiffs’ lawyers’ discovery requests, as being nothing more than a form of
extortion, appears too biased in favor of controllers.
6. Reducing Litigation through the Business Judgment Rule
a. The Purported Problem and the Plan
As indicated above, one of Cox’s principal criticisms of Lynch is that it has
promoted fruitless litigation – litigation that has deterred wealth-enhancing
freezeouts. Accordingly, a crucial objective of Cox’s proposals is to reduce the
incidence of shareholder suits in freezeouts, in order to encourage more deals and
increase shareholder wealth.209 Implicit in Cox is the belief that litigation would be
reduced, and the economy enhanced, if the business judgment rule was the normal
standard of review for freezeouts.210 Once the business judgment rule applies in
corporate suits, the Court will not investigate the underlying merits of the
transaction.211 Cox proposes that the public stockholders’ welfare will be protected
adequately by Dual Ratification, so that judicial review of the substance of a
freezeout is inefficient, wasteful and institutionally suspect.212
Cox is probably correct to presume that once controllers understand that obtaining
Dual Ratification will confer the protection of the business judgment presumption on
their freezeouts, in the event of litigation, they are likely to seek Dual Ratification in
almost all instances. If one accepts Lynch’s belief in the operation of inherent
coercion (as this Article does), then controllers are likely to obtain Dual Ratification
in almost all cases when they seek it. This means that the business judgment rule will
almost always apply to claims brought in freezeouts, and will block judicial inquiry
into the fairness of these transactions.213
If reducing litigation were an absolute good in itself, Cox’s program of law reform
would be an astonishingly impressive one. Indeed, as stated in the introduction, there
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are schools of thought and public policy relevant to corporate law that endorse the
imposition of severe limits on private civil suits. However, Delaware’s equitable
tradition has historically embodied a far more modulated approach to balancing the
potentially abusive aspects of shareholder litigation with the enforcement of otherregarding duties on corporate fiduciaries, in the interest of public stockholders. In
order to promote the reasonableness of trust on the part of public investors, and the
long term financial welfare that it supports, fiduciary litigation imports some of the
values associated with the public law into the corporate context. Within corporate
legal doctrine, this value has competed with the objective of reducing litigation
overall. Cox would make the latter value of primary importance, and thus upend the
fiduciary tradition in relation to controllers’ self dealing transactions.
b. Reducing Litigation at the Cost of Ignoring Tainted Consents
Even on their own terms, it’s not apparent that the Cox Reforms will successfully
reduce stockholder suits against freezeouts.
First of all, as described in Part III, Cox actually increased the equitable
safeguards that controllers must adhere to in order for their tender offer freezeouts to
receive deferential treatment in equity. It did so, moreover, by imposing conditions
which are not obvious in what they require – Cox’s two versions of the Committee
Opinion Provision being only the most salient of these.214 Given the procedural
importance that Cox attributes to the Special Committee’s recommendation, this
ambiguity will inspire litigation, as will the intersection/intermingling of the four or
five equitable criteria enunciated by Pure and Cox as applied in particular tender offer
freezeouts, in combination.
Furthermore, the Dual Ratification requirement proposed by Cox will be (and as
explained below should be) susceptible to litigation. In Cysive the Court argued that
it was essentially impossible to verify the validity of disinterested informed consent
on the pleadings. If this complaint against Lynch was valid, then with after the Cox
Reforms the Court will need to be involved in scrutinizing the quality of the consents
that constitute Dual Ratification upon a shareholder’s complaint. If this complaint
against Lynch was invalid, then the argument against Entire Fairness review loses
even more of its force.
Finally, if it is impossible for the Court to verify the quality of Dual Ratification
that is a predicate to deferential review without some reasonable judicial inquiry, but
the Court do not devote attention to the matter or too easily presume the regularity of
the consent that trigger judicial abstention from an inquiry into the merits, then
controllers’ capacity for overreaching in freezeouts will have become nearly
unlimited as a result of the Cox Reforms. The standards for going private will have
“gone private” – to the great advantage of the more powerful parties in these deals –
that is, controllers. But if the Court is conscientious in taking the Cox Reforms’ Dual
Ratification requirement seriously, then it will have to analyze whether there has been
dual, disinterested informed ratification by both independent directors and a majority
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of the public stockholders prior to applying deferential review. In this regard,
effectively, the Cox Reforms would recapitulate a variation on Lynch fair dealings
requirement. Complaints that alleged a genuine issue of fact showing unfair dealings
in relation to either form of consent would go forward in equity. Under the Cox
Reforms, once Dual Ratification was established, claims that instead primarily
alleged unfair price would be split off, to be brought as appraisals if the litigants
could sort out the process and avoid the “rabbit holes.” But even sorting out which
complaints were of which type would involve litigation. In conclusion, the plan to
reduce stockholder litigation through the Cox Reforms seems unrealistic and
misguided.
c. Factoring in Suits Against Target Directors
At one point in the opinion, Cox suggests that its proposals are not radical because
plaintiffs can still sue the target directors on the Special Committee if they believe
there is unfairness in the freezeout. In the words of the opinion: "[p]laintiffs who
believe that a special committee breached its fiduciary duties in agreeing to a merger
would continue to have the practical ability to press a claim; they would just have to
allege particularized facts demonstrating a breach of fiduciary duty." The Court’s
suggestion about suing the target directors personally is easy to miss because it is
quite brief, and because its substance is surprising, given the broader context of
corporate fiduciary law.
As described earlier, corporate fiduciary law has always resisted expanding the
personal financial liability of independent directors. The rationale for this restraint is
that independent directors serve a crucial function in contributing to reasoned,
unbiased corporate decision making and would be discouraged from so doing if they
were subject to significant liability exposure. Also influential has been the idea that
qualified independent directors are uncommon and that that they are not fully
compensated for their service as independent directors. Substantial personal liability
exposure has always been rejected by equity on grounds that it would make recruiting
and retaining talented independent directors on corporate boards far more difficult.
Consistent with the above, Cox’s assertion that aggrieved stockholders would have
recourse against the target’s independent directors even if its proposed reforms were
accepted is truly surprising, if not inexplicable. And Cox’s suggestion is more
puzzling because if public stockholders can go forward in a suit against a freezeout
merely by suing target directors instead of the controller, then Cox will not have
accomplished its expressed intention of reducing shareholder suits or “litigation
agency costs” in significant measure.
d. Factoring In Increased Appraisals
If equitable actions against controllers were significantly limited by the
application of the business judgment rule, furthermore, it seems likely that there
would be an attendant increase in appraisal actions.215 Since Lynch was decided, the
equitable cause of action for unfairness it established has been more attractive than
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appraisal actions. But this would change if the Cox Reforms became binding.216
Many suits that would have challenged fair price in equity would go forward as
appraisal actions. Indeed, like equitable actions for fair price under Lynch, appraisal
actions come before the Chancery Court. Thus, even if fair price claims could not go
forward as equitable actions under Lynch, the Chancery Court’s docket of valuation
cases might be reduced very little, if at all. Hence, even accepting Cox’s contention
that a certain number of freezeout bids have been deterred by the threat of litigation,
controllers would be unlikely to conclude that the threat of litigation was substantially
diminished even if the Cox Reforms are accepted as binding.
In addition, if the equitable action for fair price were effectively eliminated, as
would be the case if Dual Ratification became prevalent under the Cox Reforms, it is
likely that there would be increased calls for reforming the appraisal statutes to
enhance their practicability. It’s entirely probable that Delaware’s legislature has
been able to resist calls to modernize the appraisal statutes because the equitable
cause of action under Lynch has been efficacious. But if the equitable cause of action
under Lynch was substantially circumscribed, as Cox proposes, it’s foreseeable that
calls to reform the statutory appraisal process would intensify and prove successful.
Additionally, because both appraisal actions and Entire Fairness claims employ going
concern value as the measure of fair price, controllers would not enjoy any overall
financial savings from the transformation of equitable claims against freezeouts into
appraisal actions. This is further reason that even if Cox’s proposals are accepted,
they are unlikely to effect an overall reduction in the incidence of shareholder
litigation against freezeouts, and thus unlikely to promote wealth enhancing
transactions that would otherwise have been deterred by the threat of suit.
e. Slowing the Development of the Transactional Choreography for
Freezeouts
There is a further, “hidden” cost implied in the objective of reducing equitable
actions in freezeouts. If the Chancery Court takes a more “hands-off" approach to
freezeouts (especially if it fails to scrutinize the quality of the consents constituting
Dual Ratification) this will limit the development of the transactional choreography
for going private deals. In this transactional choreography, the Court has had the
opportunity to survey innovative transactions, as well as creative proposals from
commentators, to develop an authoritative body of best practices for freezeouts and
other M&A deals. This is not the type of innovation that is well suited to legislation.
Rather, it reflects what is most advantageous about the common law process (as
reflected in what Delaware’s Chancellors do in equity). Were the transactional
choreography for freezeouts to atrophy, established market power and entrenched
positional advantage would systematically favor controllers and disadvantage the
public investors in freezeout transactions, and more broadly. These negative effects
should be considered by the other courts, and especially Delaware’s Supreme Court,
when they review Cox’s calculations about the benefits to be achieved from reducing
stockholder suits in freezeouts.
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7.

Empirical Claims Against Entire Fairness

Cox makes a variety of broad empirical claims about why the Entire Fairness
standard has become superfluous and the concept of inherent coercion outmoded.
a. Independent Directors’ New Ability to Say “No”?
In Cox the Chancery Court claims that experience has demonstrated that the
concept of inherent coercion is erroneous or out-moded because “by now” we see that
both independent directors and public stockholders are able to say “no” to freezeouts
that are less than fair.217 Cox cites a transaction or two to support this assertion, but it
does not cite broad based empirical data for supporting independent directors’ and
public investors’ “no” votes in freezeouts. In fact, it isn’t clear that such evidence
exists. It’s not clear whether there are statistical accounts of controllers dropping
their bids on account of actual or anticipated resistance from independent directors or
minority investors. Of course, it would be difficult to get an accurate count the bids
that disintegrate. But there wouldn’t appear to be a substantial number of cash out
mergers in which controllers have proceeded notwithstanding the disapproval of the
independent directors or minority investors (as evidenced by the Court’s failure to
cite them at least). Hence, as an empirical matter it is highly contestable that there is
widespread evidence of independent directors’ and public investors’ capacity to
thwart unfair freezeouts.
However, although it isn’t based on counting freezeout transactions or
disapprovals, there is a growing body of academic research that would reinforce the
idea that independent directors and minority investors have a limited capacity to
withstand the kinds of pressure and coercion exerted by controllers. Research in
social and group psychology and “behavioral finance” reinforces the belief that
controllers are capable of wielding great social and professional and organizational
clout to sway even “independent” directors and minority investors to say “yes” to
their proposals. The insights developed in this literature are increasingly respected in
corporate law and entering mainstream corporate and securities law scholarship (and
even corporate legal decisions).218 This research reinforces the basic insight that
gave rise to Lynch’s insistence on review for Entire Fairness. That is, it suggests the
continued validity of the inherent coercion concept.
In addition, the widespread corporate wrongdoing that has come to light in recent
years undercuts the reasonableness of putting blind faith in the ability of independent
directors to limit self dealing on the part of powerful corporate insiders.219 The new
independence criteria adopted by the exchanges and the NASD as part of their listing
standards should promote independent directors’ capacity for impartial, objective
decision-making, and independent directors’ capacity for opposing, finding and
putting a stop to insiders’ self-dealing. But no one expects that these changes will be
transformative, certainly with respect to the power exerted by controlling
stockholders.220 Without greater support from equity, independent directors will
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continue to inhabit a “conflicted space” in the corporate governance world once a
controller is present.
b. Institutional Investors’ New Ability to Say “No”?
Cox implies that the increased proportion of institutional investors within the class
of public stockholders subject to freezeouts serves to protect the public investor class
in these transactions, as a whole. But because it’s widely acknowledged that no
single institutional investor owns more than a tiny percentage of the stock of a
publicly listed company, Cox is not suggesting that any individual institutional
investor’s “no” vote could stop the controller. Indeed, many institutional investors
would need to coordinate their voting in opposition to a freezeout in order to derail a
controller’s bid. Even all the institutional investors added together in a public
company with a controller present might not constitute a majority of the minority
shares – so that the institutions, banding together, could block Dual Ratification. And
it’s also notable that different types of institutions have different investment
objectives and would have different investment histories in the company subject to
the freezeout. This would hinder the institutional investors’ capacity to act in concert
to block a controller.
Corporate legal professors used to be more optimistic about institutional
investors’ capacity to coordinate in their actions in their common interest. But over
time it became apparent that institutional conflicts of interest, professional norms,
transaction costs associated with collective action (chiefly free rider problems) and
forms of risk aversion have hindered institutional investors from taking a strong stand
against management in most instances. These disabilities would also apply in
freezeouts, and promote controllers’ ability to sway a majority of the minority
stockholders to endorse a merely adequate bid. The limits that hinder institutional
investors from serving effective advocates for public stockholders’ interests is
illustrated also by the losses they suffered, alongside regular retail investors in the
recent financial accounting and self dealing scandals. Providing for a vote of a
majority of the minority in a freezeout is a credible supplement to the safeguard of
independent director consent. But the limits and disabilities that affect institutional
investors choices and capacity for coordination mandate in favor of limiting their
authority to block judicial review for fairness.
c. Diversification
As further evidence that Entire Fairness review can be eliminated without adding
to the jeopardy of public investors in freezeouts, Cox points to their power to
diversify their investment capital in the markets.221 However, if the equitable
protections for freezeouts provide for judicial abstention (on account of the
application of the business judgment rule) upon Dual Ratification, then controllers
may succeed in consummating freezeouts that involve coercion and overreaching in a
large number and broad spectrum of companies. The increased availability of
funding for going private would contribute to this. Once there was any enhanced
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possibility of a controlling stockholder appearing on the scene, the price of the public
equity would be discounted substantially to reflect the controller’s potential for selfdealing. This could affect a large number and broad spectrum of companies, so that
diversification would be of limited efficacy as a safeguard.
But in its reference to diversification, Cox’s appears to be claiming, more
precisely, that losses public investors suffer in freezeouts are offset by the gains they
enjoy in other freezeouts as part of a controlling shareholder group. However, it isn’t
clear that the same class of investors are likely to appear at both sides of freezeout
transactions, even over “the long run.” For example, the minimum capital
contribution rules in most private equity funds would preclude many “ordinary”
investors from being included as part of a controlling shareholder group at company,
through an investment therein. Furthermore, it isn’t clear that investors are as
interested in or as successful at diversifying their capital as commentators would like
them to be. Once again, the losses suffered by employee shareholders in recent
corporate scandals are evidence of this. And there are transaction costs attendant to
diversifying (either directors or through a fund) that might alter Cox’s calculation
about whether diversified stockholders’ gains and losses in freezeouts are likely to
offset one another.
Finally, if overreaching by controllers represents a subversion of the system of
corporate governance,222 then fiduciary law should provide some reasonable recourse.
This is part of the work done by the Lynch doctrine’s insistence on review for Entire
Fairness. Seen from this perspective, it’s unseemly for the courts to propose that
investors should seek to benefit from overreaching along with a controller in order to
offset the instances where they suffer losses because of overreaching by controllers.
d. Better Information Flow
Another practical argument Cox makes against the Entire Fairness standard is that
modern technology has enabled greater and faster information flows. This argument
appears twice, although it isn’t well spelled out in the opinion.
It’s possible that Cox is alluding to institutional investors’ capacity to
communicate more quickly and inexpensively with one another on account of
improved information flows – that this supports endorsing Dual Ratification as
adequate protection in freezeouts. However, just because institutional investors can
transmit information among each other with relative ease and speed, does not mean
that they can arrive at decisions about what to do in a freezeout with ease or speed.
It’s also possible that Cox is suggesting that controllers will have less room to
engage in propaganda or even misrepresentation on account of improved information
flows. But if this is the improved information flows argument, it isn’t a strong basis
for “easing” Lynch. The technological ability to transmit more corporate data and to
do it faster doesn’t correlate with whether the information is accurate or useful to
investors. Research in behavioral finance further supports the view that there is a
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meaningful gap between companies’ disclosure and transmission of information to
investors and how and when that information is digested by investors and the public
markets. Complex corporate information of the kind that would be relevant to a
freezeout proposal appears to be “lumpy.” It isn’t neatly incorporated into investors’
decision-making, so that improved information technology would equate with
quicker, smarter decisions.
In addition, for corporate data to be useful, it has to be not only accurate but also
transparent – that is, presented in a format that lends itself to comparison with other
firms’ disclosures, Better information technology is of limited efficacy in promoting
accurate and usefully transparent disclosure – this facet of disclosure has been
supported by laws and regulations more than technology. If Lynch is diluted,
especially if the Courts become inattentive to the quality of the disclosures underlying
Dual Ratification, this will loosen the structure supporting accurate, transparent
corporate disclosure.
Lynch provides public investors to bring claims of
misrepresentation in freezeouts as part of the Entire Fairness (fair dealings)
requirement. Better information flows are not an argument for loosening legal
safeguards. Instead, better information flows will only benefit investors if the law
supports the accuracy and transparency of disclosure, including controllers’
disclosure in freezeouts.223
8. More Legal Arguments for Junking Entire Fairness
a. The Analogy to Aronson
At several points, Cox notes that the judgment of independent directors is
respected where they elect to terminate a shareholder’s derivate action.224 Cox
expresses dismay over the difference between the deference afforded independent
directors in their choice to terminate a derivative suit and the limited deference
afforded Special Committees in freezeouts, under the Lynch doctrine. To support the
contention that independent directors’ consent should go far in preventing the courts
from scrutinizing the merits of the freezeout, Cox specifically points to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Aronson v Lewis. In Aronson the Supreme Court affirmed the
propriety of independent directors’ termination of a stockholder suit challenging the
board’s award of a special compensation package to the company’s former CEO and
controlling stockholder. Most pertinently, the Court held that notwithstanding the
controller’s voting rights and potential influence over the board, the decision of the
independent directors to terminate the derivative suit would not be respected by the
Court. Indeed, Cox is correct that equity is applying a different standard under
Aronson and Lynch.
But Cox fails to note a simple but profound factual distinction between the two
contexts. While both doctrines relate to judicial treatment of self dealing transactions
by controlling stockholders, in suits where Aronson is relevant the financial stakes for
the public stockholders are not as high as they are in freezeouts. Aronson is applied
to derivative suits involving “ordinary” self-dealing transactions,225 whereas freezeout
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transaction are a financial “endgame” for the public shareholders. Equity has
traditionally taken account of the financial magnitude of the disputed transaction in
the application of fiduciary standards, including the weight and significance to be
afforded disinterested approvals of the disputed transaction. For example, for many
years there was controversy surrounding the question of whether independent
directors or minority investors could ever “ratify” breaches of loyalty, so that the
business judgment rule would apply.226 In essence, for many years the Courts applied
an analog of Entire Fairness in all instances of self dealing by corporate fiduciaries –
not just controlling stockholders. Ratification by disinterested parties was effective
only to shift the burden of proof. As in Lynch, it would not work to reinstitute
deferential review.
Another example of the context-specific application of fiduciary duties is
provided by the Courts’ interpretation of the duty of care. Where the financial
magnitude of the transaction is higher, greater diligence, a more thorough-going duty
of inquiry has been expected of directors approving a transaction. This was visible in
Smith v Van Gorkom, where the Court applied a relatively heightened version of
fiduciary care on the directors charged with authority to approve or decline the sale of
the company through a merger with a third party. The Revlon standard is also similar
– given the financial consequences of a change of control transaction, the directors
are not automatically entitled to the usual deference of the business judgment rule.
Instead, they have to earn it through conduct that attests to their effort to get the “best
price reasonably available.” These cases and doctrines are closer to the Lynch
doctrine than is Aronson – consistent with the heightened financial magnitude of the
transactions involved..227
For this reason Cox’s frequent references to the
inconsistency between Lynch and Aronson are misplaced; they misses the underlying
factual distinctions that warrant greater judicial scrutiny in freezeouts.
b. Applying the Business Judgment Rule in Freezeouts Would Be A Big
Change
Cox frequently makes light of the implications of the changes it proposes –
suggesting that it intends only to “ease” Lynch. Near the opening of the opinion,
Cox describes its proposals a “reforming and extending Lynch in modest but
important ways.”228 Nevertheless, the proposal to allow Dual Ratification to forestall
judicial inquiry into the merits of the transaction would be a major doctrinal change.
Nevertheless, there are points in Cox where the Court is ambiguous about the
proposed effect of Dual Ratification. At one point the Court states that with Dual
Ratification, the complaint would be dismissed unless: 1) the plaintiffs plead
particularized facts that the special committee was not independent or was not
effective because of its own breach of fiduciary duty or wrongdoing by the controller
(e.g. fraud on the committee); or 2) the approval of the minority stockholders was
tainted by misdisclosure, or actual or structural coercion.” As discussed above, Cox
is proposing that the Court must validate the legitimacy of the consent constituting
Dual Ratification if a genuine issue fairness has been stated in relation thereto. But
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this would, in substance, allow many claims for unfair dealings to go forward.229
Read this way, Cox would not allow the usual scope of judicial deference associated
with the business judgment rule. A more traditional application of the business
judgment rule would limit the Court’s role in scrutinizing the consent and consent
process constituting Dual Ratification. But as stated previously, this would involve a
level of laissez faire towards freezeouts that would represent a radical change.
c. Sales Through Mergers with Third Parties and Cash Out Mergers by
Controllers Are Fundamentally Different
At several instances the Cox opinion presses the analogy between cash out
mergers involving controllers (where there has been Dual Ratification) and mergers
with third parties. Cox correctly describes how mergers with third parties require
consent of the board and a majority of the shareholders at the target corporation.
After noting this, Cox describes how Dual Ratification would involve the same kind
of protective consent process that characterizes cash out mergers with third parties.
The argument continues with the contention that because the business judgment rule
is the “normal” standard for mergers with third parties, the business judgment rule
should apply to cash out mergers with controllers where both forms of consent were
obtained.
The first problem with this analogy is that it ignores the inherent coercion concept
that is the cornerstone of the Lynch doctrine. Towards the end of the Cox opinion, the
Court directly expresses its view that inherent coercion is an exaggerated and
outmoded idea. Nevertheless, to accept the validity of the comparison between cash
out mergers with third parties and cash out mergers with controllers, the inherent
coercion problem must be disregarded.
The analogy between cash out mergers with third parties and cash out mergers
with controllers misses an even more salient distinction that increases the risks of
unfairness in the latter context. In the third party merger setting, before approving the
transaction, the target directors must inform themselves of “all information
reasonably available to them,” to satisfy their duty of care. To do so they normally
obtain extensive valuation data. As part of this, or as a further step in evaluating the
merits of the merger proposal before them, the independent directors will almost
always canvass the market for third party offers. The Cox Reforms do not provide the
target directors authority to pursue an auction or market check in a freezeout. And
yet they still argue in favor of giving full fledged effect to Dual Ratification, as if it
were the same as the approvals obtained in third party merger, and allowing them to
trigger deferential judicial review. In sum, the differences between the approval
process in third parties’ merger offers and controllers’ mergers offers calls for
different rather than common legal treatment.
d. An Apocryphal Intellectual History of the Lynch Doctrine
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As part of its argument for rejecting Lynch’s validity, Cox presents a strange,
seemingly apocryphal account of the origin of the inherent coercion concept. Cox
states that Lynch’s refusal to give deference to the business judgment of independent
directors (in controllers’ cash out mergers) was linked to equity’s rejection of the
business purpose requirement (for controllers’ cash out mergers). In the words of the
Court: “Lynch’s decision on this score seemed to turn on a vestigial concept from a
discarded body of case law; namely, that because there no longer needed to be a
‘business purpose’ for a merger with a controlling stockholder, it was somehow not a
‘business judgment’ for independent directors to conclude that a merger was in the
best interests of the minority stockholders.” The Court is correct that this would be a
strange conflation of ideas, an “odd and unsatisfying rationale”230 for a court’s
refusing to defer to the decision making of independent directors. And Cox is correct
that Weinberger both overruled the ‘business purpose’ requirement for cash out
mergers and provided that independent directors’ consent to a freezeout would serve
merely as evidence but not proof of its fairness.231 But neither Weinberger nor the
decisions following it ever implicitly or explicitly linked these two ideas – that is, the
abandonment of the business purpose requirement for controllers’ cash out mergers
and the limited deference afforded independent directors’ approvals in controllers’
cash out mergers. Cox is correct that these ideas don’t fit together, but it isn’t correct
that they were supposed to, or that the fact that they do not undermines Lynch’s
validity.
This portion of Cox’s reasoning does hit upon an important insight however -specifically a further important distinction between freezeouts and mergers with third
parties. The distinction is not developed in Cox, which, instead, focuses on the
parallels between the two types of transactions. The difference is that controllers
initiate freezeout proposals and they have discretion, within the law, to do so in their
private interest. There is no requirement, even under the Entire Fairness standard,
that the public stockholders obtain a benefit from the freezeout. The fair price prong
of the Entire Fairness standard merely requires that the public stockholders be paid
the full value of the stock they surrender in the freezeout transaction. The directors at
the target will be expected to approve the freezeout transaction so long as the public
stockholders are not left worse off by it (that is, so long as they receive their pro rata
share of the company’s going concern value). Again, the Entire Fairness standard
allows the controller to profit from the freezeout so long as the public stockholders
receive full value for the stock they surrender (willingly or not).
The deference afforded the board under the business judgment rule rests on the
idea that the board initiates fundamental corporate transactions, not the shareholders.
Under corporate law, the board has authority to approve transactions that will benefit
all the stockholders equally (or at least leave no shareholders worse off than others).
Arguing that controllers’ deals should be afforded business judgment rule deference
therefore involves a kind of “category” mistake or “institutional” confusion, because
the controller is not under a duty to benefit all the stockholders equally, even under
Lynch. And under the Cox Reforms, the controller would not even operate under a
duty of fairness in going forward with the transaction (at least until either the
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independent directors of shareholders disapproved of the transaction). From this
perspective, the argument for affording the freezeout “business judgment” deference
rests on a profound mistake.
e. Has the Supreme Court Already Precluded Deferential Review If Both
Forms of Approval Are Obtained?
Cox asserts that its reforms address an unsettled, open question of law. That is, it
contends that in Weinberger and Lynch the Court only held that Entire Fairness would
apply if there was either disinterested director or disinterested (minority) stockholder
consent to the freezeout. Cox is correct that neither decision expressly precluded
deferential judicial review for cash out mergers which had received both forms of
approval.232 That possibility was simply not addressed explicitly by either opinion.
From this silence Cox extrapolates that the issue is unsettled. From this perspective,
the Cox Reforms would not overrule Lynch, but clarify its limits. The relevant
question is therefore whether Weinberger or Lynch implicitly reject deferential review
for a freezeout where both forms of consent had been obtained.
Cox extrapolates that the deficiencies of one form of approval are made up for by
the strengths of the other. It describes how independent directors are more organized
negotiators than are disaggregated public stockholders. It then explains that because
directors’ choices and personal interests may not align perfectly with the
stockholders’ own, providing for approval by a majority of the minority shares is a
check on the integrity of the directors’ conduct in the freezeout.233 But this logic (as
before) makes sense only if one disbelieves in inherent coercion.
The better “collective action,” bargaining situation of the independent directors on
the Special Committee does not free them from feeling compelled to approve an
inadequate offer out of fear that the controller would act even more aggressively in its
self interest if its preferred deal were derailed. And precisely the same kind of
structural coercion infects the minority shareholder consent process. Cox’s reasoning
in relation to Dual Ratification is something like “two halves make a whole.” But if
one accepts the logic of inherent coercion, the two approvals are not complementary
to one another. Rather they each suffer from the same, profound infirmity; so
combining them wouldn’t resolve the problem.
C. Using Rhetoric to Undermine the Inherent Coercion Concept
The Cox opinion represents the most comprehensive contemporary treatment of
the law governing going private transactions. It is the work of a brilliant, ambitious
and prolific Delaware Judge active in many of the most contentious and high profile
contemporary contests for corporate control. The Cox decision is likely to exert a
substantial influence on the development of judicial thinking about freezeouts. This
will be true whether it’s proposed reforms are adopted in full, in part or hardly at all.
For this reason, it’s important to evaluate all the arguments presented in the opinion –
both those which are presented explicitly and those which are presented implicitly
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through the use of colorful language and other forms of rhetoric. Much of this
rhetoric is employed to discredit the inherent coercion concept. Before proceeding to
analyze the various forms of rhetoric artily employed in Cox, the concept of inherent
coercion is further explored immediately below.
1. The Inherent Coercion Concept, In General
At various points in the Cox opinion it becomes clear that the Court has implicitly
rejected the inherent coercion concept. To reiterate, the inherent coercion concept
posits that because controllers can withhold dividends while still enjoying the private
benefits of control, and can at will switch to a nonnegotiated cash out merger at a
lower price, for instance, the independent directors and public stockholders are
inhibited from evaluating the merit of the freezeout offer on its own terms. They may
consent to the freezeout only because they fear worse from the controller.
The Cox opinion does not discuss the broader relevance or importance of the
inherent coercion concept.234 Implicit in Lynch is the notion that equity should not
stand by while public stockholders are fooled or cowed into surrendering their stockas-property. In mandating vigorous judicial oversight in this context, Lynch suggests
that there is something more at stake in freezeouts than ordinary private, commercial
dealings. That is, the Lynch doctrine takes into account that controllers’ power is
partly legal in nature, partly enabled by the legal framework of corporate governance.
In this sense, the law cannot legitimately leave the “private” parties to work out their
bargain. Because legal structures and forms of legal authority cannot be separated
from financial dealings in complex M&A transactions like freezeouts, Lynch’s
commitment to the Entire Fairness standard imports a variation of “due process” into
the freezeout setting. This due process analog is expressed through equity’s
transactional choreography for freezeouts, as it informs the planning and execution of
these deals, as well as their adjudication in equity. Consistent with this idea,
controllers cannot seize the public stockholders’ stock-as-property without complying
with minimum conditions of fairness.
The inherent coercion concept may also reflect concern that unfairness in
freezeouts reduces allocative efficiency overall. Much of the force of the contract law
paradigm in corporate governance arises from the idea that in the absence of fraud,
private parties will only agree to transactions that are beneficial. (One party may
benefit more than the other, but absent fraud, in truly voluntary transactions, neither
party should be worse off.) However, if the consent is not truly voluntary, as may be
the case in a freezeout even where Dual Ratification has been obtained, overall wealth
may not be increased by the transaction. The controller’s gains may essentially
reflect the public stockholders’ losses.
Of course, private values and public values eventually converge. This has
become more obvious recently as countries attempting to transition to market
economies founder in the absence of sound cultural, social and legal institutions that
would inhibit corruption and other forms of abuse. A strong civil society framework,
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including a dependable legal system, is an economic resource; where these
institutions do not exist, all forms of social transacting become more risky, including
financial transacting. If equity’s robust commitment to fairness in freezeouts were
substantially diluted, this would vastly increase the risk associated with being a
minority investors and eventually make it impossibly costly for companies with
controllers to raise public equity. Controllers would come to be seen as private
raiders.
Cox makes certain empirical arguments against inherent coercion, as reviewed
above. But the appeals to the capacity of Special Committees and public shareholders
to act competently in their self interest and the salutary effect of improved
information flows are not entirely convincing in themselves. They are claims but not
proofs that inherent coercion is misguided and out-moded. In addition to these
empirical rationales, therefore, Cox uses several powerful rhetorical devices to
undermine the seriousness and validity of the inherent coercion concept.
2. Parody (Funny But Disturbing)
One example of this is Cox’s use of parody. Cox describes the operation of
inherent coercion by comparing it to a contest for control between larger and smaller
apes. In particular, Cox describes gorillas and chimpanzees sparring over bananas –
the idea being that the chimpanzees know that resistance is futile. As described in
Cox: “Facing the proverbial 800 pound gorilla who wants the rest of the bananas for
himself, chimpanzees like independent directors and disinterested stockholders could
not be expected to make sure that the gorilla paid a fair price.”235 This story about the
apes appears as an explanation of inherent coercion early in the Cox opinion. It is
presented as an illustration of how those who believe in inherent coercion perceive it
to work and how it became the rationale for heightened legal protections. But as an
explanation or illustration, the story about the apes and bananas is jarring – a parable
that is ambiguously savage or comic, but clearly outside of the usual discourse of
corporate legal analysis.236
It’s possible that Cox’s monkey story is presented merely as a trivial illustration
of the power imbalance in freezeouts. But to a careful reader, Cox’s comparison
between inherent coercion and the story of battling apes suggests that the inherent
coercion concept fails to take account of the parties’ higher capacity for reasoned
decision making and peaceful dispute resolution. In addition, Cox’s story suggests
that the concept of inherent coercion mistakenly analogizes controlling shareholders
to brutish gorillas. Cox’s story implies that by endorsing the operation of inherent
coercion, rather than acknowledging that controlling shareholders are entitled to the
outcomes they achieve in freezeouts, Lynch presumes that controllers win these
favorable outcomes through force. By telling the story of inherent coercion and the
genesis of the Lynch doctrine through the parable of contending primates, Cox is
suggesting, in effect, that the Courts should realize that independent directors and
public stockholders are not monkeys, and controllers not brutish gorillas. The jarring
reference to gorillas and chimpanzees in Cox is intended to point out the fundamental
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error in Lynch’s conceptual structure. Cox uses the irony implicit in analogizing
investors and directors to primates to make a point – that these are intelligent
commercial actors who do not need extraordinary legal protections.
Cox’s parodic narrative about apes and bananas also deflates the seriousness of
the concept of inherent coercion and the doctrine governing freezeouts. The
implication of the monkey story is that Courts are mistakenly preoccupied with issues
of fair process and truth in freezeouts, when what is at stake, metaphorically
speaking, is nothing more serious than the division of a bunch of bananas.
Another instance of Cox’s use of colorful language to suggest the absurdity of the
Lynch doctrine and its byproducts appears in the opinion’s description of the
triangular negotiation process that occurs in cash out mergers. Cox describes the
“ritualistic” negotiation process as “almost invariably resulting in the simultaneous
bliss of the three parties – the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the special committee, and the
controlling stockholders.”237 The opinion ups the ante in describing the settlement of
claims in freezeouts governed by the Lynch doctrine as involving “a jurisprudential
triumph of an odd form of tantra.”238 The references to “bliss” and “tantra” are
shocking in this context, and there’s every reason to think they are intended to be.
They suggest that the Lynch doctrine is unreasonable and excessive; that it has caused
the rule of law to spin out of control. As represented by Cox, Lynch has given rise to
a bizarre kind of legal decadence, a surfeit of legal proceedings that is orgiastic in its
effect.239 In its references to “bliss” and “tantra” Cox implies that if lawyers and law
professors and judges are still thinking that the Lynch doctrine and the Entire Fairness
standard are really about ensuring fairness, they have “missed the party.”
3. Inherent Coercion – a Suspect ‘Sociological’ Inference
A further example of Cox’s deft use of rhetoric to undermine and marginalize the
Lynch doctrine is where the Court refers to the inherent coercion concept as a
“sociological inference.” By associating the inherent coercion with sociology, rather
than law, Cox is implying, again, that it is illogical and non-essential. Lynch and the
inherent coercion concept are the product of “soft science,” rather than legal doctrine.
Until recently, sociology has been disparaged by corporate law professors, and other
academics in the “hard” sciences. In developing depth outside of the law, corporate
legal academics have largely been inspired by economics, as a frame of reference for
analyzing corporate governance and market dynamics. Traditionally, the working
assumptions have been that law is logical, economics scientific and sociology at best
conjecture. Good law should not be based on conjecture. So by associating the
inherent coercion concept with sociology, Cox is implying that it cannot be a basis for
good law.
4. A Pointed Rhetorical Question
Cox also uses a very pointed rhetorical question to undermine the inherent
coercion concept. Rhetorical questions are not real questions of course; they are
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masked declarations of absolute certainty. In contrast to real questions, rhetorical
questions end discussion, by implying that there can be only one intelligent answer.
In this mode, Cox asserts, “If both the independent directors and the disinterested
stockholders are given the ability to say no and do not, ought we not presumptively
assume that the transaction was fair?” Read in context, where this rhetorical question
is surrounded by other criticisms of the inherent coercion concept and the Lynch
doctrine, the answer is obvious. We are supposed to think: “Yes! Of course! The
consents should resolve the matter and preclude harassing litigation!” Like all
rhetorical questions, this one suggests that it would be foolish to think otherwise – in
this instance, not to agree that the heightened protections afforded by the Lynch
doctrine are unnecessary and wasteful.
However, examining this rhetorical question closely, it becomes evident that it
has assumed away the heart of problem – that is, the operation of inherent coercion in
undermining the parties’ capacity for free choice. Cox’s rhetorical question states
that both the independent directors and the disinterested stockholders “are given the
ability to say no and do not.” The inherent coercion concept denies that the
independent directors and public stockholders are given a genuine opportunity to say
no. In essence, Cox’s rhetorical question is tautological – it assumes the answer (free
choice) to the question it poses (fairness). In merely assuming the answer to the allimportant questions of choice and fairness, rather than truly addressing the situation
of independent directors’ and public stockholders’ limited capacity for choice (and
how the law should respond to the problem), Cox’s rhetorical question exposes its
inherent limits as a form of legal argument.

5. Corporate Law as Commercial Law
In another brief, highly suggestive statement, Cox makes a claim about the true
nature or scope of corporate law -- and thus its appropriate concerns. Cox states:
“This is corporate law, after all, a species of commercial law having to do with
stockholders ...” Again, the statement is very brief – but it communicates a great
deal. It’s brevity is part of what makes the claim about the inherent boundaries and
limits of corporate law highly persuasive. Commercial law relates the buying and
selling of goods, it focuses on transactions rather than institutions. Commercial law
assumes that parties seek to maximize profit in each exchange, and they commit to
exchange (in the absence of fraud) only when doing so is mutually beneficial. In
contrast, the basic unit of corporate law is institutional rather than transactional.
Corporate law focuses on institutions -- companies themselves, and then the
institutions of power within them, such as the board of directors, rather than
individual, basically bilateral transactions. Corporate law’s “value added” is this
broader institutional dimension that addresses the structures, justifications and limits
of decisional authority. Describing corporate law as a “species” of commercial law
obscures, in effect rejects corporate law’s broader concern for institutions and the
ways they mediate commercial power. By adopting the language of biological
taxonomy (a “species” fits into a larger “genus”), Cox is implicitly asserting that
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commercial law is corporate law’s natural place in the order of things -- that it cannot
be otherwise.
6. Creating Urgency through Hyperbole
The Cox opinion is also rife with hyperbolic language that creates a sense of
urgency around the project of limiting review for Entire Fairness. The opinion’s use
of heightened language suggests that the Entire Fairness standard is destructive to the
economy and the corporate legal system. There are many examples of this
throughout the Cox opinion.
For example, Lynch is described as having generated “perverse incentives” for
both defense and plaintiffs’ counsel that “cast doubt on the integrity of the
representative litigation process.” Cox describes the Lynch doctrine as having made
it “impossible” for controlling stockholders, even the most-well meaning ones, “ever”
to structure a going private deal "in any fashion” that would avoid a suit for Entire
Fairness.240 Instead, these suits are “unavoidable” under the Lynch doctrine.241 Cox
explains that this is because the plaintiffs’ claims “always” have settlement value
irrespective of their merit.242 These examples illustrate Cox’s use of superlatives and
other heightened adjectives that are intended to communicate the urgency and validity
of the law reform plan it proposes.
Furthermore, at the same time that Cox exaggerates the urgency of eliminating the
Entire Fairness standard, it minimizes the effects that largely eliminating review for
Entire Fairness would have on minority investors.243 This is evident at many points
in the Cox opinion. For example, early on Cox contends that: “Delaware law would
improve the protections it offers to minority stockholders and the integrity of the
representative litigation process by reforming and extending Lynch in modest but
important ways. The reform would be to invoke the business judgment rule standard
of review when a going private merger with a controlling stockholder was effected
using a process that mirrored both elements of an arms-length merger...”244 Indeed,
Cox proposes that the switch to the business judgment rule upon Dual Ratification
would actually improve the protections afforded minority investors, rather than
minimize them.
7. Damning with Faint Praise
Cox includes an example of the rhetorical device of “damning with faint praise.”
The opinion describes Lynch as “a well-motivated” decision. In the approximately
one hundred pages that make up the Cox decision, this is the only complimentary
thing said about the Lynch doctrine. Of course, by stating that the doctrine was
“intended” to do good, Cox is affirming that it has proven dysfunctional -- that it has
not worked to benefit investors or the legal system.
D. Non-Obvious "Side-Effects" of Minority Shareholder Approvals
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There is a further troubling feature to Cox’s Dual Ratification proposal. Cox
proposes that Dual Ratification (which includes approval by a majority of the
disinterested shares) should “trigger” judicial deference towards the freezeout – that
the private approvals go far enough in ensuring the transaction’s fairness and the
protection of the public stockholders’ rights therein. Cox also notes, correctly, that as
applied, Dual Ratification would mean adding the stockholder approval, since
controllers presently, in general, obtain only disinterested director approval prior to
going forward with a cash out merger. Thus, Cox describes the addition of the
minority shareholder vote as an additional protection, an additional financial
safeguard in the public investors’ interest.245
But it’s also likely that where there is approval by a majority of the outstanding
public stock, that this may limit the stockholders’ financial recourse against the target
directors if they were sued for breach of fiduciary duty on account of their conduct in
the freezeout. This is an outgrowth of equity’s interpretation of the statutory
provisions relating to ratification of self dealing transactions under Section 144 of the
Delaware Code. This case law provides (as described in Cox itself) that informed
ratification by disinterested directors or stockholders can exonerate breaches of duty
on the part of corporate fiduciaries who have profited from the transaction.246 The
approvals, in effect, can “cure” the fiduciary breach – they can exonerate the
fiduciaries from financial liability for their fiduciary breaches. As applied in the
freezeout context, in particular, the disinterested (public) shareholders’ approval
could exonerate the target directors’ breaches of fiduciary duty.247 Such an
exculpatory vote can be given broad effect – it could cover both the directors on the
target's Special Committee and those on the full board.248 Cox advocates in favor of
the public stockholders’ approval in freezeouts as an additional safeguard in the
favor, but their approval could also hinder their ability to receive a recovery in a
breach of fiduciary duty suit – even if their claims were meritorious. Consistent with
the Cox Reforms, the disinterested, informed vote of the minority stockholders could
protect the target directors more than protects the public investors themselves.249

IV. SWITCHING TO THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. The Disappearance of a Fair Price Duty in Freezeouts
1. Recapping the Fair Price Construct
The Lynch doctrine mandates that minority shareholders have a legal right to be
paid their proportionate interest in the firm’s going concern value in a cash out
merger. Going concern value, rather than market value, has been the operative legal
standard and measure of fair price for these transactions (as described in Part I).250
Minority shares often trade at a discount to their stake in the firm’s full, going
concern value. This discount in the market trading price, in part, reflects the
expectation of self dealing by the controller.251 The Lynch doctrine’s fair price duty
backs out this “self-dealing” discount affecting the market trading price, consistent
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with the idea that equity should not permit a fiduciary to obtain a financial benefit
from its self-dealing.
The Solomon line of cases dealing with tender offer freezeouts, in contrast, has
eschewed imposing a fair price duty on controllers. This is not because these cases
are less disapproving of self-dealing by controllers. Rather, as Pure observed, they
simply failed to address the inherently coercive structural dynamics that operate to
benefit controllers in tender offers. Presuming the absence of these coercive
structural dynamics, equity reasonably declined to impose a fair price duty on
controllers therein. However, once the coercive structural dynamics of tender offer
freezeouts come into view, as Pure made clear, the basis for equity’s declining to
impose a fair price duty in tender offer freezeouts falls away.
2. Cox’s Implicit Elimination of a Fair Price Duty in Freezeouts
To unify freezeout doctrine, Cox would have to resolve the inconsistency in
between the presence of a fair price duty in cash out mergers and its absence in tender
offer freezeouts. Furthermore, there wouldn’t appear to be any middle ground.
Controllers either will or will not have a duty to offer a legally determined fair price
when they announce, negotiate and close their freezeout deals.
Perhaps because the matter is so controversial, the Cox opinion does not address
the fair price issue head on. It never explicitly rejects the propriety of the fair price
duty that has operated in the Lynch doctrine. Nor does Cox recant Pure’s affirmation
that coercive pressures inhere in controllers’ tender offers. Indeed, Cox’s rejection of
the fair price duty is nowhere expressed in the opinion. A hint of Cox’s rejection of a
fair price duty comes through where the opinion describes “good” prices as ones
incorporating a premium to market value. Cox states that minority investors are
“doing more than passably well” because they are receiving premiums to market
value in both forms of freezeout.252 Cox’s rejection of a fair price duty is also
apparent where the opinion enumerates the causes of action that would still be viable
under its proposed reforms, and it says nothing about a cause of action for unfair price
or inadequate value.
Mostly, the erasure of the fair price duty implicitly arises from the new, Dual
Ratification proviso Cox endorses for freezeouts in both formats.253 That is, Cox
proposes that with Dual Ratification the business judgment rule should apply. As
stated therein: “The reform would be to invoke the business judgment rule standard of
review when a going private merger with a controlling stockholder was effected using
a process that mirrored both elements of an arms-length merger: 1) approval by
disinterested directors; and 2) approval by disinterested stockholders.”254 That is, Cox
would make the Entire Fairness standard apply in a freezeout only if either form of
consent were withheld. In effect, the fair price duty would apply only where the
controller goes forward with the freezeout after the negotiations have broken down
(that is, either form of consent was conclusively withheld from the transaction).
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Unless and until either form of ratification were withheld, the fair price duty (and
even the fair dealing duty, presumptively) would be inapplicable.255
3.

Entire Fairness Only After Negotiations Have Broken Down

Crucially, Cox never proposes that Entire Fairness (and thus a legal fair price
duty) should apply unless there is Dual Ratification. Instead, Cox provides that
Entire Fairness would apply if the controller does not obtained Dual Ratification but
goes ahead with the freezeout in any event. For example, Cox states that “the
protections of Pure Resources should be supplemented by subjecting the controlling
stockholder to the entire fairness standard if a special committee recommended that
the minority not tender.”256 The difference is not merely semantic. Rather,
forestalling the application of Entire Fairness until either form of consent has been
denied would crucially affect the freezeout negotiations by altering their starting
point.257
Under the Cox Reforms, a controller would approach the negotiations relieved of
the burden of offering a legally determined fair price. Accordingly, in the course of
the negotiations, the Special Committee has no legal basis to demand going concern
value from the controller – the legal fair price duty does not apply at this point.
Under the Lynch doctrine, consistent with controllers’ duty to pay a legally set fair
price, Special Committees had a duty to refuse a bid that offered less than the legally
set fair price (going concern value). And where the independent directors concluded
the freezeout offered less than going concern value to the public investors, and
rejected it on this basis, they could point to the clear standard in the law as a basis for
doing so. The law gave the Committee leverage to bargain with the controller and
leverage to explain their conduct to the public investors. In the alternative, if the Cox
Reforms are accepted, Special Committees won’t be able to demand at least going
concern value from controllers. Nor will they be able to defend a decision to reject a
freezeout offer by explaining that it was less than the legal standard of fair price –
because equity will have taken away the public investors’ legal claim to receive at
least going concern value in a freezeout. (Again, the Entire Fairness standard would
apply only after the independent directors or public stockholders have rejected the bid
– which, in most cases, will mean that the controller will withdraw the proposal.)
Once market value becomes the benchmark of fair price, a premium to market
value makes almost any offer a “good” offer. A Special Committee’s refusal to
approve a freezeout bid offering a premium to market value would appear foolhardy,
irrational, potentially self-serving. In sum, by changing the applicable legal standard
so that a fair price duty applies only if and after the independent directors or majority
of the minority shares officially disapprove of the freezeout, the Cox Reforms alter
the starting point for freezeout negotiations. Under the Cox Reforms, controllers
would not be obligated to offer and pay at least going concern value – that
requirement would “kick in” only if the offer were rejected. Because Cox implicitly
validates market price as the starting point for the negotiations over price, it would
foreseeably alter, profoundly, the price at which the negotiations end.
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The elimination of the fair price duty for controllers’ offers is rendered more
consequential, furthermore, by equity’s failure to endorse Special Committees’ power
to go to the market to pursue financial alternatives to the controller’s offer. Cox not
only allows for deferential review of a freezeout, and hence the elimination of a fair
price duty, where Dual Ratification is obtained – it also affirms this lesser level of
equitable protection without affording Special Committees the power to test the
controller’s bid in the market. Under the Cox Reforms, Special Committees would be
negotiating with controllers in freezeouts in the absence of both strong legal
protections and bona fide market alternatives. This is not a situation that presents a
strong rationale for presuming the fairness of the transaction and barring a
stockholder’s claim from going forward.
B. Dual Ratification Doesn’t Substitute for a Fair Price Duty
Instead of “owning” its rejection of a legal fair price duty, Cox highlights the
efficacy of the Dual Ratification requirement in effectuating good outcomes in
freezeouts. Cox proposes that the Dual Ratification proviso allows for arms’-length
dealings between the parties. As described earlier, Cox analogizes cash out mergers
with Dual Ratification to arms’-length mergers with third parties. And Cox suggests
that its Dual Ratification proposal fulfills Weinburger’s promise of arms-length
dealings in the public stockholders’ interest. Cox might claim that Dual Ratification
would be sufficient leverage so that minority investors would receive a premium over
the market price, but it isn’t reasonable to believe that Dual Ratification, in the
absence of a fair price duty, would push premiums into the high range of fairness,
consistent with going concern value. This is because once the fair price requirement
is attenuated, public investors are largely captives to the discounted market price in
the presence of a controller. The controller stands as a bulwark against the public
investors’ ability to benefit from the market for corporate control. As described
earlier, the analogy to cash out mergers with third parties is inappropriate in a
situation where the target directors are hindered from seeking market alternatives, as
they typically are by controllers. Cysive was exceptional in this sense.
Cox describes the Dual Ratification proviso as if it is a proxy, a true equivalent of
a fair price duty, but this is misleading. This could be true, potentially, if the parties
were of roughly equivalent stature in their bargaining leverage and had full access to
market alternatives. Cox’s proviso that both forms of consent should be required in
order to forestall equitable review for fairness is intended to minimize controllers’
potential for coercion, and it may do so. But Lynch’s Entire Fairness encompasses
both a fair price and a fair duty standard and eliminating the latter necessarily changes
the situation dramatically. Minority stockholders’ ability to bargain with a controller
(either directly or through a Special Committee) would be affected fundamentally by
withdrawing the background fair price duty. (Making it apply only if the Special
Committee or minority investors have declined the controller’s offer is the equivalent
of withdrawing it for most purposes.) Once the fair price duty is withdrawn
consistent with the Cox Reforms, then the controller is bargaining against the market

NY1:#3400474v18
10/5/06 11:14 AM

67

price, rather than full, going concern value. The potentially greater safeguard of
requiring Dual Ratification (both forms of consent) doesn’t come close to making up
for the cancellation of the substantive fair price duty.
C. Business Judgment Deference Is Not the Norm in High Stakes M&A Deals
1. Simplicity Is Not an Unqualified Virtue in Law
At many points the Cox opinion appeals to what it contends is the relatively
pervasive application of the business judgment in corporate law. This is one of the
rationales for its disapproving of Lynch’s Entire Fairness standard for freezeouts. For
example, in its frequent references to the Aronson decision, Cox rightly notes that
corporate law commonly defers to the disinterested judgment of corporate boards in
determining the course of corporate affairs in the best interests of the company and all
the stockholders. 258
Cox defends its proposed reforms on the rationale that adopting the business
judgment rule for freezeouts (that receive Dual Ratification) would synchronize this
body of law with the broader architecture of corporate law. Cox endeavors to unify
both bodies of case law for freezeouts. Moreover, this project of unification is
pursued as a mode of simplifying the law. Indeed, in Cox, the project of streamlining
and simplifying the law (indeed, reducing the intrusion of law into corporate affairs)
is endorsed as being a virtue in itself.
Of course, in many areas of law and experience, simplicity has its virtues. But the
measure of the law, as Chancellor Strine himself has written, must be its function
rather than its form. The crucial question for equity has to be not merely whether the
law is straightforward and simple but whether it is adequate to do justice to the
situation. In reforming freezeout doctrine, equity must ask whether the proposed
standards do justice to the circumstances of the parties and the forms of legitimate
and illegitimate power being exercised therein. If the two transactional forms for
freezeouts involve substantially similar power dynamics, then a substantially similar
doctrinal framework is warranted. But that doesn’t resolve that the distinct features
of this case law should be collapsed into the business judgment rule.
2. Heightened Scrutiny in Corporate Sales and Change of Control Transactions
Cox is correct about the overall deference that corporate law shows to the
disinterested, informed judgment of corporate boards. But what Cox deemphasizes,
in fact ignores, in calling for the adoption of the business judgment rule in freezeouts
is the fact that the Delaware Courts have developed a richly complex body of
equitable doctrines for high stakes mergers and acquisitions. These heightened
standards take account of the operation of a variety of forms of conflicts of interest, as
well as the financial magnitude of these transactions. Equity has taken account of
these context-specific “reasons for concern” and balanced them against the value of
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deferring to the decision making of disinterested boards. This is part of the essence of
the concept of transactional choreography developed herein.
There are many examples of this context-specific approach -- these heightened
standards for M&A transactions within corporate fiduciary law. For example, in the
context of reviewing a board’s decision to sell the company through a merger in
Smith v Van Gorkom, on account of the financial magnitude of the transaction (from
the perspective of the selling stockholders), even though there was no conflict of
interests impairing the board’s judgment, the Supreme Court applied what has been
recognized as a heightened duty of care.259 Under the line of case law established by
Unocal v Mesa Petroleum, the Court allows that incumbent directors discretion to
defend the corporation from threats (including coercive and inadequate tender
offers).260 But at the same time equity enforces limits on the scope of the directors’
defensive authority in this context. Under the Blasius standard, in light of the signal
importance of stockholders’ voting rights within corporate law, fiduciary law requires
the board to demonstrate a compelling justification for interfering with the
stockholder franchise. And under Revlon, corporate directors are under a duty to
ensure they are getting the best price reasonably available in the stockholders’ interest
prior to approving a sale or break up of the company.
Freezeout transactions, in either format, are more closely analogous to these high
stakes acquisition transactions than they are to ordinary corporate transactions that are
handled with deference by the Courts in a stockholder challenge, consistent with
business judgment rule. Cox’s claim, in effect, that the business judgment rule should
apply in freezeouts because it “usually does” is off the mark. It ignores controllers’
significant capacity for overreaching and the implications for corporate law of
allowing them to do so. It also ignores the broad and rich tradition of heightened
equitable safeguards in high stakes mergers and acquisitions transactions. Perhaps
most troublingly, the Cox Reforms envision a decreased role for equity – that is lesser
equitable safeguards – without allowing for a wider scope in which market forces
could operate. They would allow the application of the business judgment rule, based
on the rhetoric of arms’-length dealings, without allowing target directors to unleash
market forces to test the controllers’ bid. Without the latter, the promise of arms’length dealings is suspect and the reduction in legal safeguards unjustified. Under the
reforms proposed in Cox, public investors in freezeouts are left in a kind of limbo
between the market and the law. Neither one is properly available to serve their
interests.
V. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY STANDARDS FOR FREEZEOUTS

A. Unifying Freezeout Doctrine
Part I of this Article described the two doctrinal traditions governing freezeouts.
It described the relaxed standards applied to tender offer freezeouts and the rigorous
standards applied to controllers’ cash out mergers. As the Pure opinion notes, there
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are a variety of forces pressuring stockholders to sell in tender offer freezeouts. The
pressures and disabilities that affect public investors in tender offer freezeouts
undermine their capacity to consider the merits of the controller’s freezeout offer in
its own right. In this sense, tender offer freezeouts meet the Lynch doctrine’s
standard for being coercive – which would suggest that Lynch’s protections should
apply in tender offer freezeouts as well.
In addition, as Pure also observes, the problem of inherent coercion that presents
itself in cash out mergers is relevant to minority stockholders’ choices in tender offer
freezeouts. There is no reason that public investors would be less susceptible to
inherent coercion on account of the freezeout being based primarily on a tender offer
instead of a cash out merger. In addition, the fact that the law has not affirmed target
directors’ fiduciary authority to defend public investors against controllers’ tender
offers, while it affirms their duties to defend stockholders from third parties’ tender
offers, exposes the weak underpinnings of the tender offer freezeout line of cases.
Most fundamentally, by declining to impose either an Entire Fairness requirement or
an affirmative duty on target directors to protect minority investors’ interests through
an auction or market check, equity has left public stockholders in limbo in tender
offer freezeouts. Law reform in this area of freezeout doctrine is therefore crucial to
minority investors’ welfare.
The different approaches to whether controllers’ offers are subject to a fair price
requirement in tender offer freezeouts and cash out mergers has further undermined
public stockholders’ interests in going private deals. This problem has been
compounded by the erratic availability of appraisal rights. Given the comparability of
minority investors’ vulnerability in the two freezeout formats, the argument for
adopting a unified doctrinal structure for freezeouts is a strong one.
In sum, Cox rightly takes a strong stand in favor of unifying the jurisprudential
standards for freezeouts. However, Cox is less convincing in advocating that
unification should occur under the framework of deferential review, as conventionally
associated with the application of the business judgment rule.
B. Entire Fairness for Cash Out Mergers and Tender Offer Freezeouts
The tender offer freezeout case law is not nearly as sound or as well established as
is the Lynch doctrine and the Entire Fairness standard. The best approach for equity
would be to unify freezeout doctrine under the framework of Lynch’s Entire Fairness,
as described below.
Part II of this Article described the weaknesses in the tender offer freezeout case
law, specifically, its underestimation of controllers’ exercise of coercive power
therein. In the two Supreme Court decisions of relevance, Solomon and Glassman,
neither one explicitly considered a freezeout transaction. In addition, Solomon held
that no fair price duty applies in controllers’ tender offers without presenting
substantial legal analysis to support its conclusion, or even relevant legal precedent.
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Glassman addressed only a short form merger by a controller, without considering the
opinion’s implications for freezeouts. Furthermore, the Entire Fairness standard is
presently applied in freezeouts that end with short form mergers, so long as they
begin with long form, cash out mergers -- and no one has suggested that this approach
is inconsistent with Glassman or the will of the Delaware Legislature. That is, once
short form mergers become incorporated into complex, multi-segmented freezeout
deals, they take on a complexion different from the short form considered in
Glassman.
A careful reading of Siliconix clearly reveals that the Chancery Court was
troubled by the exercise of coercive power by the controller in the tender offer
freezeout disputed therein. However, the Court appears to have felt it would be on
uncertain legal footing in granting the preliminary injunction requested by the
minority investors. In Siliconix the Chancery Court invoked formalistic differences
between the structure of cash out mergers and tender offer freezeouts, and equity’s
treatment of controllers and independent directors’ duties in these different contexts.
It used these differences as a basis to retreat from a robust application of its equitable
authority in the minority investors’ interests.
The Pure decision is both more comprehensive and more bold in its approach to
addressing coercion in tender offer freezeouts. It affirms that coercive pressures
inhere in these transactions to the pervasive advantage of controllers. But Pure’s
concern for protecting public investors in tender offer freezeouts founders as it
encounters the Court’s other major preoccupation – reducing the incidence of
stockholder suits in freezeouts. In essence, in Pure the Chancery Court tries to
accommodate both concerns -- to afford public investors somewhat greater equitable
protection against coercion in tender offer freezeouts, while limiting stockholders’
opportunity to sue on a claim of unfairness in a freezeout. But ultimately, in Pure,
the concern for limiting stockholder suits in freezeouts takes precedence. (This is
even more graphically evident in Cox.)
But Pure gets it right that public investors face similar jeopardy in tender offer
freezeouts as they do in cash out mergers, and it is unfortunate that the Court’s
boldness did not result in its validating Entire Fairness as the applicable equitable
standard for all forms of freezeouts. As Pure noted, the problem of inherent coercion
applies equally in both settings. Shareholders’ collective action disabilities apply in
both settings, as do information asymmetries that favor controllers. (Consistent with
this analysis, Pure appears to come close to endorsing Entire Fairness as the rule for
freezeouts.) The Pure opinion also noted the disturbing doctrinal inconsistency
inherent in directors having a fiduciary duty to defend against third parties’
inadequate tender offers, but not controllers’ inadequate tender offer freezeouts.
Pure failed to resolve this inconsistency, however, as does Cox. That is, there is
no explanation in the case law for target directors having lesser defensive authority in
tender offer freezeouts than in relation to third parties’ hostile bids. It would seem
that equity has declined to afford target directors facing a controller’s tender offer
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such affirmative, fiduciary defensive authority because it would inevitably give rise to
a messy institutional conflict.261 That is, if equity required target directors’ to take
affirmative actions to defend public stockholders facing a controller’s inadequate
tender offer, controllers would inevitably object and take action to remove or at least
fail to reappoint these directors.262
In any event, leaving aside the concern over encouraging stockholder suits and
institutional conflicts between target directors’ and controllers’ authority, the
compromised situation of public investors facing controllers’ tender offers suggests
that heightened equitable protections are warranted in both forms of freezeout. The
Chancery Court in Pure and then Cox endorses a set of objective, bright line
safeguards and tests for ensuring that coercion has not compelled a result in a
controller’s tender offer. But the better approach would be to endorse a duty of Entire
Fairness consistent with Lynch (which comprehends both a duty of fair dealings and
fair price). This would have allowed equity to fill out the substance of the appropriate
equitable safeguards for controllers’ tender offers over time. This approach has
worked effectively in cash out mergers, consistent with the concept of transactional
choreography elaborated herein. As applied in cash out mergers, Lynch’s Entire
Fairness standard has encouraged the establishment of Special Committees and their
hiring of independent financial and legal advisers in the minority investors’ interest.
As described in Part III, the concern over excessive litigation reaches a fever pitch
in the Cox decision and becomes the basis for an all out assault on the inherent
coercion concept that is the cornerstone of Lynch. But many of Cox’s criticism of the
Lynch doctrine are exaggerated, as described in Part III. They can be resolved
without abandoning equity’s commitment to reviewing freezeouts for Entire Fairness.
In addition, Cox underestimates the benefit of applying Entire Fairness in freezeouts.
In particular, the Courts have discretion to adjust the fee doctrine pertinent to
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ awards in Entire Fairness litigation. In addition, it is
unreasonable to believe that the Courts are unable to develop workable standards for
dismissing Lynch claims on the pleadings where they fail to state a genuine claim of
unfairness. Nothing in the Lynch doctrine relieves plaintiffs from the requirement of
demonstrating a genuine issue of unfairness in a freezeout in order to go forward with
a suit. A mere declaration of financial fairness has not and should not be enough to
force a full trial in equity.
Perhaps most importantly, the fair price duty inherent in the Entire Fairness
standard has afforded Special Committees substantial leverage in negotiating with
controllers. This leverage has limited controllers’ capacity to buyout minority
investors at less than fair value. In addition, the improved operation of information
technology and the increased presence of institutional investors are inadequate
proxies for the Entire Fairness standard. Better information flows and the presence of
institutional investors are complements to the fair price duty that should apply in
negotiations with controllers, not substitutes for it. As a self-help strategy, moreover,
diversification is costly and, in any case, may not work to protect public investors if
controllers are given broad latitude to act opportunistically in freezeouts. Moreover,
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telling public investors that they can make up their losses in freezeout by becoming
part of an opportunistic controlling shareholder group is unrealistic and unseemly.
Given equity’s longstanding commitment to the principle that corporate insiders
should not profit from their self-dealing to the disadvantage of their company or the
other, minority stockholders, the fair price duty applied to controllers under Lynch
should be retained and expanded, also, to tender offer freezeouts. In addition, in
contrast to Cox’s proposed doctrinal framework for freezeouts, Dual Ratification
cannot work as an effective safeguard to protect public investors from unfairness once
it is unhinged from controllers’ duty to pay a fair price (or target directors’ authority
to seek market alternatives). For this reason, the Cox Reforms should not replace the
Entire Fairness standard. The ability of target directors to negotiate with controllers
at arms’ length is affected not only by the availability of information and unbiased
advisers, but also by minorities legal entitlements to receive a fair price for what
controllers can take from them through a freezeout. Though Cox obscures the
difference, a legal entitlement to receive fair value if negotiations have broken down
is not the same as a legal entitlement to receive fair value that informs negotiations.
In order for minority investors to obtain the benefit of the full value of their shares
from negotiations, controllers have to be under a duty to offer a fair price in these
negotiations.
C. The Questionable Objective of Reducing Stockholder Claims in Freezeouts
The proposal to abandon Entire Fairness for the purpose of reducing stockholder
litigation is suspect. Reducing stockholder claims in freezeouts is not an unqualified
good. Reducing stockholder claims at the cost of allowing an increased scope for
overreaching by controllers would not be a good result. A downward cycle of
unaddressed self-dealing by corporate insiders eventually harms the capital raising
process and investors broadly. Despite Cox’s rhetoric, the operation of inherent
coercion has not been disprove, nor is it less serious a problem than it was when
Weinberger and Lynch were decided. Indeed, modern financial theory suggests that
capital markets thrive where minority investors’ interests are protected by the legal
system, not where they are disregarded.
Furthermore, the business judgment rule does not make sense in application to
controllers’ freezeout offers. Controllers initiate freezeouts – rather than disinterested
corporate boards of directors. Because equity has not given target directors full
authority to pursue market alternatives to the controller’s bid, the target directors’
approvals in a freezeout cannot be equated to the full, unfettered decision-making in
other corporate contexts. In addition, the business judgment rule is not applied
without limit in the review of corporate change of control and other sale transactions.
Revlon duties require the board to take affirmative actions to obtain the best price
reasonably available in a change of control or corporate sale transaction – business
judgment deference is not the rule in this setting. Even where a board approves a
merger with a third party that does not involve a change of control, the Courts have
applied a heightened fiduciary duty of care in reviewing these directors’ conduct, for
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example. Given this tradition of heightened review in high stakes mergers and
acquisitions deals, the superior organizational and legal powers of controllers in
freezeouts and the collective action and informational disabilities that affect minority
investors therein, the business judgment rule should not apply to these transactions.
D. The Exception: Deferential Review Upon an Auction or Market Check
The Cox Reforms fail to take account of the fact that under the law as it presently
stands, Revlon duties “to obtain the best price reasonably available” would apply to
target directors in a freezeout proposed by a De Facto Controller. The freezeout by
the De Facto Controller would involve a change in voting control of the type of
concern in Revlon and its progeny.263 Although the case law under Revlon affirms
that there is no single blueprint for directors to obtain the best price available in a sale
of the company, it does affirm that independent directors would ordinarily conduct an
auction or at least a market check before approving closing a deal.264 Truly
independent directors in freezeouts should have a similar instinct, and similar
freedom and authority. Target directors facing a controller’s freezeout bid, in either
format, should have authority to go to the market to seek alternatives to the
controller’s proposal. Where they do not do so, this casts doubt on their
independence and suggests that presuming the fairness of the freezeout would be a
mistake.
In addition, if the controller wishes to avoid the Entire Fairness standard,
potentially, in a dispute over the freezeout, it should agree to be a seller as well as a
buyer. That is, if the controller would not agree to sell its stock for the same price it
offers to the minority, there is little basis to assume the offer is at full, fair value.
Controllers could still go forward with the freezeout under this regime, even if they
refused to allow the target directors to conduct an auction or market check and even if
they refused to sell their shares. But in these instances, equity should not afford the
controller’s transaction a presumption of fairness so that deferential review would
apply. If equity is not willing to embrace affirmative fiduciary duties mandating that
directors test a controller’s bid through an auction or market check prior to approving
it, it should at least decline to afford controllers’ freezeouts deferential review where
no market check or auction has occurred. Without the latter, the controller’s freezeout
has not been tested by the market, and hence it should be tested by the standard of
Entire Fairness in a stockholder suit. The case law under Revlon and Van Gorkom
would seem to require no less.
The recent changes to the listing standards for public company boards ensure a
greater presence of independent directors and more objective standards for
ascertaining directors’ independence.265 Where there is a Special Committee that
undertakes a market check or auction of the company’s full value, prior to approving
a controller’s freezeout bid, and then determines that the controller’s bid offers the
superior value, then there is a reasonable basis for a court to defer to the independent
directors’ judgment and assume that the minority investors’ interests have been
protected as part of the transaction.
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In addition, prior to affording controllers the beneficial burden shift allowed under
Lynch, controllers should have to obtain Dual Ratification, consistent with that
envisioned in Cox. As Cox rightly contends, the two forms of consent – that of
disinterested directors and minority shareholders – complement one another. They
are not adequate indicia of fairness individually.
The argument for affording
controllers the beneficial burden shift where they bypass either the disinterested
directors or the minority investors is not strong. In addition, the improved
information flows described in Cox should make it relatively easy and inexpensive for
controllers to present their proposals for both forms of consent. Where controllers
obtain both forms of consent, as envisioned by Lynch, the plaintiffs should have the
burden of demonstrating the unfairness of the freezeout in order to obtain a recovery
in equity.

CONCLUSION
Corporate law is often analogized to contract law. The Delaware Chancery
Court’s proposed reforms to freezeout doctrine would take this analogy further,
embedding it into the transactional choreography for going private. The metaphor of
contract is appealing where the parties are relatively equally situated, informed, clear
about their entitlements and capable of recourse if there is fraud. There are powerful
reasons to believe that this does not describe the situation of minority investors in a
freezeout transaction.
The Courts should apply the Entire Fairness standard in freezeouts, irrespective of
their structure. Equity should continue to have a meaningful role in reviewing
freezeouts when a stockholder presents a genuine claim of unfairness, as it has in cash
out mergers for generations. The costs of unchecked overreaching by controllers are
incalculable – they are clearly greater than the Delaware Chancery Court’s recent
trilogy of freezeout cases contemplate.
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statute of limitations for securities class actions involving fraud to two years from learning of the fraud or five
years from the time it was committed – it had been one and five. Otherwise, SOX expands the scope of potential
criminal fines and penalties (and adds a new criminal cause of action for fraud): and it imposes federal mandates
on corporate boards and committees – but it does not support the expansion of private causes of action by
investors.
38
This negative view of the plaintiffs’ bar was reinforced in the summer of 2006 when the famous plaintiffs’
class action firm, Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Shulman was indicted for making large secret payments to persons
who agreed to become plaintiffs in lucrative class-action securities lawsuits.
39
In this mode, the “cost” of unfair laws is prices by investors who simply pay less for their shares. See e.g.
A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and Fair Price, 1 Berkeley
Bus. L. J. 83 (2004).
40
DEBORAH DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1999). See also Thomas &
Thompson, [Derivative Litigation] Vanderbilt Law Review (2004)
41
This is the so called “Delaware carve-out” in SLUSA. If Congress had not made this special provision,
then suits against controllers for misrepresentation in freezeouts would not be litigable in equity.
42
By the late ‘90s, corporate legal scholars became fluent in the “law and norms” literature; as incorporated
into corporate law, this school of thought was employed as a way to argue that legal standards – or at least the
enforcement of legal standards – was often unnecessary to the promotion of efficiency or the best resolution of
conflicts. In this tradition, see, e.g., Edward Rock [& Wachter], Saints and Sinners... ; see also, Lisa Bernstein ...;
Cass Sunstein ... .
43
Cox makes this point expressly, see final pages.
44
Vice Chancellor Strine is a highly respected participant in corporate legal symposia and academic debates,
and he appears to be partial to this viewpoint – at least this is what the freezeout cases highlighted herein, as well
as other influential decisions and law revivew articles he has authored and co-authored See e.g. Harbor Finance
Partners v Huizenga, 751 A2d 879 (Del Ch. 1999) Strine, V.C.) ("Although I recognize that our law has long
afforded plaintiffs the vestigial right to prove that a transaction that a majority of fully informed, uncoerced
independent stockholders approved by a non-unanimous vote was wasteful, I question the utility of this 'equitable
safety valve.'"); Hollinger v Black [...] ; Allen, Jacobs & Strine, Jr., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of
Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859 (2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr., If
Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which it is Equitable To Take That Action:
The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 Bus. Law. 877 – 906 (2005. See e.g. and Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The Inescapable Empirical Foundations of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 Del. J. Corp. L 499
(2002).
45
For a innovative discussion of these conflicting impulses within Delaware’s M&A case law, see William
T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 261 (1992.
46
The term and concept are my own.
47
Add citation to procedural justice literature in social science journals, Tom Tyler et alia.
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48

See, e.g., In re Oracle Decision – V.C. Strine (Examining professor-directors’ affiliation with Stanford
University in light of University’s receipt of large gifts from defendant in order to resolve the director
“independence” question).
49
For discussion of investment bankers’ obtaining a contingent upon a freezeout’s consummation and the
Court’s implicit discomfort with this practice, see, e.g., Siliconix at __.
50
In particular, in high stakes M&A deals -- and certainly in the presence of a controlling shareholder, we
regard the presence of multi-layered, potentially antagonistic interests and affiliations as being common, rather
than exceptional See. e.g., Barbarians at the Bedside; How Wall Street Firms Plan to Profit in HCA Hospitals;
Juggling Many Roles in Buyout, WSJ, C1 (Tuesday, July 25, 2006).
51
See Part IV herein.
52
This burden shift issue is discussed below in relation to the Supreme Court's decision in Kahn v Lynch
53
The one proviso is that the shares must still be publicly traded. Cite to NYSE and NASD new standards for
independent directors on Audit Committees.
54
Cite to NYSE and NASD new independence criteria for independent directors, adopted Fall 2003; and
SOX requirement that board contain a majority of independent directors.
55
Delaware law has applied equivalent equitable safeguards to shareholders owning a majority of the
outstanding voting stock and shareholders possessing a lesser stake but still de facto power to dictate governance
and operational outcomes. Hence we refer to both as "controllers." See e.g. Ivanhoe Partners v Newmont Mining
Corp., 535, A2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (requiring for the imposition of fiduciary duties on a large stockholder
"domination through actual control of corporate conduct"). For commentary and further support for more
differentiation between de jure and de facto controlling shareholders in the future evolution of the doctrine, see
Mary Siegel, The Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 Del. J.Corp. L. 27 (1999).
56
In light of the federally-initiated changes to listed companies’ boards, going private deals by de facto
controllers do not pose the usual risks of abuse, at least not to the same degree. Because the listing standards will
require the company to have a majority of independent directors on the board, the controller’s capacity to control
the board’s decision making is limited. The controller could still, by definition, force the incumbent directors off
the board, but would be compelled to replace them with other directors meeting the new, more exacting standards
of independence.
57
Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A2d 173 (Del. Supr. 1985)
58
Id at __.
59
8 Del. C. § 251
60
Equity has never fully resolved the deep normative issues posed by the statutes' obviating the public
stockholders’ right to refuse being cashed out; but the obvious (but not completely satisfactory) response is the
Entire Fairness standard.
61
The Delaware statute provides for removal without cause, with certain limitations (staggered board or
cumulative voting provisions) which the controller might be able to overcome. See 8 Del. C. 141(_). In some
measure the new listing standards will circumscribe controllers’ discretion in replacing the directors formally or
informally forced off the board. If they were part of the cohort of independent directors (which must constitute a
majority of the board), the vacancy created by their departure will need to be filled by directors meeting the listing
standards’ criteria of independence.
62
Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinburger v UOP, Inc., 8 Del.
J. Corp. L 1 (1983) (discussing cycles in judicial treatment of cash out mergers from the 1920’s up to
Weinburger).
63
Singer v Magnavox, __ A2d __.
64
As late as the late 1970’s transactions in which minority shareholders were eliminated at the “mere” desire
of the majority shareholders were highly controversial and presumptively wrongful – even if not “fraudulent” as
defined under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. See e.g. Kellogg v. Georgia Pacific Paper
Co., 227 F. Supp. 719 (1964); Marshel v. Concord Fabrics Inc., 533 F.2d 1277 (1976); Santa Fe Industries v
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
65
Weinburger resolved many questions of law but it also left many crucial questions unanswered, including
questions pertaining to the definition of Entire Fairness. The relevant language in the opinion is as follows: “The
concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The former embraces questions of when the
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the
approvals of the directors and stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic
and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings,
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock ....
However, the test for fairness is not a bifurcated one as between fair dealings and price. All aspects of the issue
must be examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.” Weinburger at __. The second appeal in
Kahn v Lynch made apparent that Entire Fairness does not mean “perfect” fairness. Kahn v Lynch, __ A2d __
(1996) (holding that despite problems pertaining to the Special Committee ratification process, the shareholders
were benefited in the cash out merger so that it would be deemed fair).
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On the precept that fair price is a range rather than a singular value, review for "entire fairness" has
encompassed not only the financial terms of the controller's offer for the minority's stake, but also the
circumstances (such as timing) and process in which negotiations over the freezeout are conducted – "fair
dealings," as well as "fair price." See e.g. Cinerama v. Technicolor, 663 A2d 1134, 1153 (Del. Ch. 1994) aff'd,
663 A2d 1156 (Del. 1995) ("Thus in assessing overall (or entire) fairness in this instance the court must consider
the process itself that the board followed, the quality of the result it achieved and the quality of the disclosures
made to the shareholders to allow them to exercise such choice as the circumstances could provide.").
67
In most instances, the independent directors’ disapproval could not stop the transaction from going
forward, in itself, because the independent directors would not constitute a majority of the board.
68
The Entire Fairness standard was first adopted in the landmark case of Sterling v Mayflower, [cite] but the
case did not involve a cash out merger per se, but rather a parent-subsidiary merger where the subsidiary’s public
investors took stock in the parent.
69
The distinction is of more than formal, academic interest. Cox argues for radically circumscribing
plaintiffs' capacity to obtain judicial review under the Entire Fairness standard. As it argues in favor of limiting
this form of shareholder litigation, the opinion fails to address that this would also diminish the efficacy of the
Entire Fairness standard as a prospective, prescriptive guide for controllers in setting the procedures and terms of
their deals (will diminish the efficacy of Entire Fairness as a standard of conduct). For discussion of corporate
fiduciary law in regard to this duality, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law ...
70
See Weinburger, footnote 7 at 709. For the most current empirical work on the presence and operation of
special committees of independent directors in the representation of minority investors' interests in freezeouts, see
Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freeze-Outs: Theory and Evidence, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion
Paper No. 472 (May 2005) (the “Harvard Study”).
71
The Court was very critical of the rushed job done by the target company’s financial adviser, as well as
their questionable independence from the controller. Weinburger _ A.2d at __ (1983). For discussion of reading
equitable decisions as lessons for lawyers about mistakes not to make, see Lawrence Lederman & Jay A.
Levenson, Dealing with the Limits of Vision: The Planning Process and the Education of Lawyers, 62 NYU L.
Rev. 404 (1987).
72
On the facts therein, representatives of the parent company on the subsidiary’s board used their insider
status to obtain confidential information about the subsidiary that they did not share with the public stockholders
or their representatives in the course of the negotiations. This information was incorporated into a “Feasibility
Study” which stated that the controller could pay considerably more than it had offered the minority and still profit
from the transaction. The Court held that if the controller elected not to share this information (consistent with the
duty of candor that applies in a fiduciary relationship) then it was compelled fully to empower some agency to
negotiate on the minority investors’ behalf. _ A.2d at __.
73
See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1988 WL 111271, at *7 (Del. Ch. 1988)(advocating
the business judgment rule should apply to cash out mergers where approval was obtained from a board with a
majority of independent directors, a Special Committee or a majority of the minority stock); cf Citron v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. , 584 A.2d 490 , 499-502 (endorsing Entire Fairness review on the basis of what has
come to be called ‘inherent coercion.’).
74
As discussed infra, it’s something of a misnomer to describe deferential review in freezeouts as the
“business judgment rule” because the concept alludes to the principle that the business and affairs of the
corporation are to be administered under the discretion of the board of directors. The inconsistency stems from
the fact that controllers, and not corporate boards, initiate freezeout proposals and to date, even under the Entire
Fairness standard, boards have only limited authority to shut these deals down where they appear prejudicial to the
minority’s best interests.
75
638 A2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
76
The concept of inherent coercion was first enunciated in Delaware in Citron v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co. , 584 A.2d 490, 499-502 (Del. Ch.1990).
77
Provide citation to 1967 amendment to Delaware’s cash out merger statute. See Weiss’ Weinburger article
for help/citation.
78
The Williams Act added the Securities Exchange Act Section 13(d), and Sections 14(d)-(f) ___ Pub. L.
No....
79
Under SEC Rule 14d-8, when a tender offer is for less than all the securities of a class, the bidder must
purchase tendered securities pro rata, according to the number of securities tendered by each security holder at any
time during the period of the tender offer. This requirement is designed to limit the time pressure security holders
would otherwise feel to tender into the offer.
80
SEC Rule 14e-1(a) requires a tender offer to remain open a minimum of 20 business days; this time period
may be extended, but not shortened. This too is designed to decrease unreasonable pressure to tender quickly.
81
Tendering security holders can generally change their mind at any time during the tender offer period, as
provided by SEC Rule 14d-7.
NY1:#3400474v18
10/5/06 11:14 AM

80

82

Section 14(d) requires that if the bidder increases the tender offer price even after shares have been
tendered, even shares already tendered must receive the improved price.
83
Section 14(d) makes it unlawful to make a tender offer for an Exchange-Act registered equity security
unless, with limited exception, at the time such offer is commenced the offeror has published or given to security
holders certain filings, including a Tender Offer Statement on Schedule TO. Section 14(e) is the antifraud
provision applicable to tender offers.
84
See SEC Rule 14e-2.
85
The additional disclosure called for by SEC Rule 13e-3 applies to going private deals irrespective of
whether they are structured as cash out mergers (where proxies or information statements are nevertheless
required to be filed) or tender offer freezeouts (where tender offer filings must be made). The bidder must file,
update and finalize a Schedule 13E-3 with the SEC.
86
The comparability of changes of control transactions effected through mergers and tender offers is
evidenced by the fact that where third parties such as lenders require consents to such a transactions, the
provisions are drafted to apply to both forms of transactions.
87
See discussion of Unocal v Mesa Petroleum at footnote _and accompanying text. As a further inhibition
on third parties’ hostile tender offers, during the 1980s many state legislatures enacted “control share” or “fair
price” provisions in their corporation codes. These statutes, including Delaware’s Section 203, may complicate a
controller’s plan to go private through a tender offer to some degree.
88
See footnote __ and accompanying text.
89
See the discussion below in Pure and Cox, where the Chancery Court proposes to alter this extreme posture
of laissez faire.
90
Solomon v Pathe Communications Corp. 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
91
Cite to 8 Del. C § 253.
92
Although that is required in Delaware is a simple filing of a Certificate of Dissolution with the Office of
the Secretary of State.
93
In re Glassman __ A.2d __ (2001). See also Erickson v Centennial Beauregard Cellular, LLC 2003
WL1878583 (Del. Ch. April 11, 2003) (affirming that courts will refrain from applying equitable principles to
short form mergers).
94
Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freezeouts: Theory and Evidence, Harvard Law and Economics
Discussion Paper, May 2005.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
The empirical data documenting the receipt of higher premiums (over the pre-announcement, market
trading price for the minority shares) is presented in Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freezeouts: Theory and
Evidence, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper, May 2005. Although he contends that the difference is
minimal, Even Vice Chancellor Strine acknowledges that freezeouts governed by Lynch's Entire Fairness
requirement have resulted in statistically higher premiums than freezeouts governed by the Solomon's standards,
as in Siliconix. See Cox.... ;
98
8 Del. C. § 262.
99
For discussion of the need to modernize the appraisal statutes, see Randall S. Thomas, Revising the
Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 Delaware L Rev 1 (2000).
100
See Chen, Yee & Yoo, Did Adoption of Forward Looking Valuation Methods Improve Valuation
Accuracy in Litigation? Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance (Forthcoming); Lawrence A. Hamermesh
and Michael Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119 (2005).
101
Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Stockholders, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 785
(2003).
102
See Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity & Majority Rule, Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law 84 Geo. L.
J. 1 – 60 (1995) (Arguing that until there is substantial reform in the Delaware Appraisal action it would be a
mistake to circumscribe the equitable cause of action for Entire Fairness.).
103
Lynch v Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497 (Del Supr. 1981) (Vickers II).
104
reverse stock split by charter amendment with fractional interests paid out as cash; liquidation (sale of
assets) followed by dissolution
105
Note Guhan Subramanian’s hypothesis about tender offer freezeouts being relatively more attractive to
controllers who had retained legal counsel with considerable experience in these more specialized transactions.
106
Interestingly, it appears that the Chancery Court, as in Cox, was concerned about the filing of frivolous
claims and forcing of unearned settlements in shareholder class actions; thus, the Chancery Court stated that "the
propensity for frivolous litigation in shareholder, class action suits requires the application of the pleading test
under Rule 12 with special care." Solomon v Pathe Communications Corp. 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 46; Del Ch.,
C.A. No. 12, 563 Allen, C. (April 21, 1995). Notably, the Chancery Court's decision in Pathe came in the same
year that Congress enacted the PLSRA which raised pleading standards for investor class actions under federal
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securities laws in response to concerns over excessive and frivolous suits. The Supreme Court ruled in Solomon
that the notice pleading remained the standard for shareholder class actions in Delaware, which standard was not
as rigorous, the court indicated, as that applied to evaluate whether pre-suit demand has been excused in a
stockholder derivative suit filed pursuant to Chancery Rule 23.1 S v P, 672 A2d at 39.
107
It seems that the plaintiffs were clever in their complaint. Their claim that the directors owed them a duty
of fair dealing was unusual – perhaps more advantageous to them than merely claiming a lack of diligence (as a
duty of care breach) or a material, financial conflict of interest, which was unsupported by the facts. In effect, they
tried to assert that the directors had a duty to be proactive, vigorous advocates for the minority, consistent with
something like a Revlon duty – although Revlon hadn't (hasn't) been applied in this context.
108
Given the factual circumstances noted in the opinion, it's likely that the bank's tender offer was intended
to push its ownership over the 90% threshold, so that it would be able to obtain a higher price in the sale of Pathe's
stock by conveying to a third party the right to execute a short form merger – but this, like other important features
of the case, is not discussed in the Supreme Court's opinion.
109
This becomes even clearer when the doctrine governing directors' duties in third parties' offers is
analyzed. In its landmark Unocal decision, in 1985, the Supreme Court validated target directors’ duties to defend
corporation and the shareholders from coercive or otherwise unsatisfactory tender offer bids. This duty exists
irrespective of the fact that third parties have no duty to pay a “fair” price in a tender offer, of course. (In fact, the
defensive duty would seem crucial expressly in the situation where the offeror was not under a fair price
constraint.) Unocal v Mesa Petroleum, _ A2d __ (1985).
110
Lynch v Vickers Energy, Inc. __ A2d __ (1976) (Holding that a duty of complete candor applies in tender
offers by controllers); cf [Lynch v Vickers Energy, Inc., __ A2d __ (1978) (Holding that a broader measure of
damages applies in a fiduciary suit where misrepresentation by controllers has been demonstrated than would be
available in an appraisal action.).
111
The measure of fair price is the central question in the second Vickers Energy appeal but as applied to
damages, ex post, where coercion, misrepresentation or other wrongdoing by a controller has been proven.
112
To complicate the matter further, there is a second appeal in the Vickers Energy litigation that is not cited
by the Court, that is indirectly relevant to the issue at hand. In that appeal, the Supreme Court held that going
concern value, or even a higher measures of damages, is the appropriate standard for an award to minority
investors where a controller is found to have engaged in fraud or coercion in tendering for the public stock.
Obviously, the Court's determination that going concern value (at minimum) is the appropriate measure of
damages, after the fact, when misconduct is proven, is not precisely the same as establishing going concern value
as a duty that governs controllers in making tender offers for minorities' shares. But given that Solomon cites the
first appeal in the Vickers Energy litigation for the proposition that controllers do not have any obligation to pay a
particular or "fair" price in a tender offer, this feature of the second appeal is startling. And it's apparent that in
both appeals in Vickers Energy the Supreme Court was sending a stern message to controllers about their duties in
tendering for the minority's shares.
113
Schnell v Chris Craft Industries, Inc. 285 A2d 437 (1971)
114
See, e.g. Blasius v Atlas Industries, Inc. Del. Ch Ct 199_ (Allen).
115
Cite to opinion
116
From one perspective, Glassman's limited view of the room for equitable safeguards in short form
mergers seems inevitable -- courts are not entitled to contravene the will of the legislature. The problem is that
even in this situation, Schnell held out the possibility that equity would come to the defense of the public, minority
investors in these transactions, where overreaching by controllers is a clear possibility. Perhaps on this basis, the
Supreme Court went out of its way to note that in many cases, if they believed that controllers had seized their
stock on the cheap, the holdout stockholders could pursue appraisal proceedings.
117
In re Unocal, supra note ___.
118
On the merits, Glassman represents an intriguing departure from the rationale operating in both Lynch and
Solomon. Again, the former presumes coercion and the absence of genuine consent and thus imposes a fair price
duty on controllers. Solomon presumes the absence of coercion and stockholders’ capacity for genuine choice,
and thus eschews a fair price duty. But in Glassman the Supreme Court observes target directors’ and
shareholders’ inability to stop the freezeout and still does not apply a fair price obligation. This is a notable
inconsistency. Given the Courts’ frequent reference to the idea that something can be legal (conforming to statute)
but not equitable (and hence unlawful), the Supreme Court’s conclusion that it was “preempted” from applying
fiduciary requirements in short form mergers is not a self evident one. Given that the Supreme Court in Glassman
several times alludes to the potential availability of appraisal rights, it’s possible that the Court was basically
relying on appraisal as a pragmatic resolution to controllers’ capacity for overreaching in short form mergers. But
there is no question the Court would have been conscious about the shortcomings and limits applicable to
appraisal, and indeed the broader financial damages remedy available in fiduciary suits proving wrongdoing by
controllers.
119
The notion is that because the ultra-minority has a choice between taking the merger consideration and
electing appraisal, the directors of the controlled entity owe the minority a duty to facilitate their capacity to make
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an informed choice.) The notion is that because the ultra-minority has a choice between taking the merger
consideration and electing appraisal, the directors of the controlled entity owe the minority a duty to facilitate their
capacity to make an informed choice.) Glassman expressly notes this duty of complete candor as it applies to
controllers in short form cash out mergers (and other freezeouts), citing the recent, influential opinion in Malone v
Brincat, for example, as authority.
120
For discussion of the interesting, residual ambiguity in the opinion, see Mark I. Steinberg, Short Form
Mergers in Delaware, 27 Del J. Corp L 489 (200[2]).
121
For discussion of a rare exception, that is an "early" tender offer based going private deal, see Peter
Letsou, The Dilemma That Should Never Have Been...[Business Lawyer, forthcoming, 2005]
122
In fact, the controller remained somewhat indecisive or ambiguous about its intention to complete the
second step, short form merger. The effect of this, however, was to make the target stockholders’ decision to
refuse to tender more perilous, since appraisal rights would not be triggered without the short form merger’s
occurrence. Siliconix at *2.
123
Siliconix at *2 and *4 – 5.
124
Id at *4.
125
See Lynch v Vickers Energy 383 A.2d 278 (1978) Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); Loudon v
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135 (Del 1997); Arnold v. Society of Savings Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d
1270 (Del. 1994);. For an analysis of the evolution of Delaware's fiduciary disclosure doctrine, see Lawrence
Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 Vand. L. Rev.
1087 (1996); and for further commentary see Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability:
Rethinking Delaware Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 505 (2000); Jennifer
O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the
Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 475 (2002).
126
This bias had also been highlighted, after Siliconix, by the Chancery Court’s opinion in In re Aquila,
decided very shortly thereafter. In re Aquila Inc. S'holders Litig. 805 A. 2d 184 (Del Ch. 2002).
127
In Pure the Court attempts to incorporate more shareholder protective equitable safeguards into business
judgment review. As illustrated in Part VI, this Article the Entire Fairness standard is a more appropriate
foundation for protecting public shareholders in tender offer freezeouts.
128
The Special Committee in Aquila provides the most glaring instance of nonfeasance. In re Aquila Inc.
2002 Del. Ch. Lexis 5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2002).
129
In the end, subsequent to the issuance of the Chancery Court's opinion, Unocal remedied the minority
consent and disclosure problems identified therein and concluded its freezeout without having suffered inordinate
delay.
130
Again, “inherent coercion” refers to the ability of controllers to subvert the ability of even independent
directors and public stockholders to reject a freezeout offer they view as inadequate out of fear of financial
retribution. See supra footnote __ and accompanying text.
131
This appears to be the foundational myth that distinguishes Solomon and Pure, but the fallacy that the
controller remains “aloof” from the sell side is revealed as such once it’s clear that the target board is inhibited
from taking defensive action against the controller’s bid or pursuing alternative bids in the market.
132
In Pure itself, Unocal had been in discussions with Pure for over a year, and then launched a "surprise"
tender offer.
133
By this we mean minority investors' willingness to tender into an unsatisfactory bid in order to avoid
being left in a worsened position because their cohort tender on account of the same anxiety. This is the classic
use of the term in the tender offer context, as it has applied in the doctrine analyzing the propriety of target
directors' defenses.
134
In particular, if the controller was thwarted by the public investors' failure to tender, the controller could
still proceed with a unilateral cash out merger at a lower price, or withhold dividends, or engage in other, less
salient self dealing transactions detrimental to the minority. In particular, if the controller was thwarted by the
public investors' failure to tender, the controller could still proceed with a unilateral cash out merger at a lower
price, or withhold dividends, or engage in other, less salient self dealing transactions detrimental to the minority.
135
Cox: “...because the majority stockholder-offeror has access to inside information, and the offer requires
disaggregated stockholders to decide whether to tender quickly, pressured by the risk of being squeezed out in a
short-form merger at a different price later or being left as part of a much smaller public minority."
136
The disparity is more strange for the fact that third parties’ offers, where the equitable protections are
higher, would appear to present less opportunity for overreaching than controllers’ offers do.
137
This is a claim that is at once self-evident and noncontroversial and packed with unstated assumptions and
conclusions. ...
138
Pure at 445, note __ supra.
139
Pure does not explicitly require the controller to impose a 90% non-waivable condition to closing the
tender offer, but practitioners read it as such. Ordinarily, the controller would not proceed to close the tender offer
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or otherwise restructure the freezeout if it failed to reach 90%. In addition, in some cases Delaware's Section 203
would apply and block the consummation of the freezeout by merger for three years. Nevertheless, leaving the
controller with the choice to close and leave the stub of the minority shareholders in possession of shares of a
company that will probably delist, is coercive. For a decision in which the Court asserted that it would not
approve a waivable 90% condition, see Next Level Comm v. Motorola, 2003 WL 549083 (Del Ch Feb. 25, 2003)
("Thus, if the tender offer is consummated, Motorola will have the unilateral exercisable power ... to effectuate the
short form merger and will do so. At footnote 71.)
140
In re Emerging Communications, Co., 2004 Del Ch. Lexis 2004.
141
Verify whether this can be done through private stock purchases without compliance with the Williams
Act. In Rabkin v Olin the Controller waited in this way, but this was held to violate the duty of fair dealings that
applies under Lynch. A plan that contemplates a future acquisition of the sliver required to acquire the shares
necessary to consummate the short form merger involves some risk for the controller – but imposes substantially
more risk on the shareholders in the tender offer who might be inclined not to tender.
142
Again, Pure merely admonishes controllers that they must commit to effectuate the clean up, short form
merger at the tender offer price if they obtain the 90% ownership threshold. It’s up to controllers to determine
whether to attempt to get at least or more than 90% (rather than just under that level). Indeed, in Pure, although
Unocal imposed a 90% ownership requirement on its obligation to close the tender offer, it retained the right to
waive this condition and close the tender offer at less than the 90% level necessary to do an immediate short form
merger.
143
Reading between the lines it is apparent that the Court was sensitive to the limits it had implicitly
validated – that is, the limits it allowed on independent directors' authority to promote the public's investors' best
interests. Interestingly, previously in Siliconix, the Court had simply assumed that it could not affirm target
directors' authority to employ defensive devices once a controller was present. Presumably, in Siliconix and Pure,
the Chancery Court assumed that the controllers would simply replace the directors who attempted to exercise
their office in opposition to the controllers' wishes. However, in adopting this approach -- that is, in attempting to
avoid an express “institutional conflict” by affirming target directors’ authority and duty take actions that
controllers would foreseeably disapprove of – these cases cast doubt on the legitimacy of the concept of
independent directors in this setting. On this basis, applying the Entire Fairness standard to controllers’ deals
would seem even more compelling.
144
That is, consistent with Vickers Energy again, in a suit the controller would have to prove it’s inherent
fairness in order to avoid having to pay damages to the minority investors.
145
See NYT Op-Ed by Maurice Greenburg, [End of August] 2006. The former Chairman of AIG, attributed
the recent trend towards delisting and going private to increased regulatory costs and cautioned that increased
regulation can harm investors. (Mr. Greenburg’s embattled relationship to regulators, however, may be
influencing his views on the matter.)
146
See e.g. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 432;
William W. Bratton [2004/UCLA paper] (arguing that progressive-leaning federal corporate governance reforms
threatened to overshadow Delaware's historic preeminence in the field).
147
Vice Chancellor Strine’s intensive familiarity with the Harvard Study is graphically evidenced in Cox,
where he takes issue with certain features of the Study’s conclusions relevant to the importance of litigation in
benefiting minority investors in freezeouts. In particular, the findings emphasized the enhanced financial benefits
enjoyed by public investors who had been represented by Special Committees in cash out merger negotiations,
that is where they’d had the benefit of Lynch’s leverage. But it also suggested that controllers increasingly
endorsed the use of Special Committees in tender offer freezeouts as well
148
Gilson and Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. (2002).
149
See e.g., Elliott Weiss and Lawrence White, File Early, Then Free-Ride: How Delaware (Mis)Shapes
Shareholder Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1797 (2004). But see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S.
Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition Oriented – Class Actions, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133
(2004) (hereinafter, "The New Look of Litigation");
150
To clarify, the new listing standards impose requirements about the proportionate representation of
independent directors on boards and the exclusive service of independent directors on auditing and compensation
and nominating committees in most instances. However, they do not require that only independent directors serve
on Special Committees involved in freezeouts and they do not require the establishment of a Special Committee in
a freezeout.
151
The picture is complicated by the fact that Cox presents a different version of the Committee
approval/nondisapproval provision at the end of the opinion, one hundred pages later and with no further
explanation of its terms. At that point, the presumption is flipped. Cox proposes that Entire Fairness would not
apply in situations where the reforms proposed by Pure are observed and, additionally, "the tender offer was
recommended by an independent special committee..." at 129.
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152

For one thing the controller can switch to a cash out merger under Lynch, bypass the independent
directors entirely, and still obtain the beneficial burden shift if a majority of the minority shares approve, under the
current Lynch doctrine.
153
If Cox had taken a definite position on the fair price in controllers’ tender offers question, it would have
found itself in the midst of the doctrinal morass bearing on fair price in tender offers described in Part I. In doing
so, moreover, the Chancery Court might well provoke a direct confrontation with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Solomon (which held, most relevantly, that in the absence of exceptionally bad conduct, controllers have no duty
to offer any set, legally determined “fair price” in a tender offer). In such a direct confrontation, the other law
reforms advocated in Pure and Cox might also have been censured and rejected by the Supreme Court.
154
Cysive at 48, note 1 supra ("These realities suggest that the Lynch doctrine, if it is to be perpetuated,
could be usefully simplified.").
155
It had intended to switch from being fundamentally a services provider to a technology product
developer, but its timing was unfortunate.
156
Because the company’s public stock price was severely depressed, the public investors had taken
substantial losses. In contrast, Carbonell had garnered approximately $60 million in the company’s IPO. Cysive 4
– 15, note 1 supra.
157
Id at 55 – 58.
158
To clarify, the Court would normally avail itself only of information in the complaints in deciding
motions to dismiss, but the expansive documentary evidence can be analyzed by the Court consistent with
defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The kind of objective information we describe about the criteria of
director independence and activism would be reflected in the controller’s federal securities law disclosures.
Especially with the new, more structured and objectified standards for independence defined by the NYSE, NASD
and AmEx, the way should be cleared to resolve the validity of director ratification without discovery most often.
159
As discussed in this Article’s Introduction, the allocation of the burden of proof under Lynch depends on
whether there’s been informed, disinterested approval by the target's directors (or, less commonly, the minority
shareholders).
160
See e.g. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mergers and Acquisitions at 211 ("As is often the case, the party
bearing the burden of proof on a given dispute lost.") ; and see, also, Tamar Frankel, Presumptions and Burdens of
Proof as Tools for Legal Stability and Change, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 759 (1994).
161
Cox at [45]. His opinion about the triviality of the burden shift issue is seconded by Professors Gilson and
Gordon in their important law review article on freezeouts.
162
E Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992 to 2004, A
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1399, 1435 (2005).
163
Pepper v Litton; Bayer v Beran; Globe Woolen... passim
164
The “entanglement” critique in Cysive is that to determine the standard or review and which party bears
the burden of proof, the Court must delve into the merits of the claim.
165
The adjudication of employment discrimination, comes to mind, as well as proportionate liability under
tort.
166
To be sure, this assumption depends on there being coherent, enforceable limits on plaintiffs’ attorneys’
fees – which does not seem too difficult to ensure. See discussion below ...
167
Legal scholarship appears only recently to be catching up to the "broad brush" fact that Delaware's
equity courts are hearing substantially more acquisition oriented shareholder class actions than traditional
derivative ones. For the most recent data on this, see The New Look of Shareholder Litigation, note __ supra.
168
To clarify, it’s true that in Rabkin v. Philip Hunt Chemical Co., Inc. (decided two years after
Weinburger) the Supreme Court held that once there is "a credible claim of unfair dealings" appraisal would not
be the exclusive remedy; but the converse has not been tested. Neither Weinburger, nor Lynch nor Rabkin held
that an equitable action can go forward in a cash out merger merely on an allegation of unfair price. Clearly none
of these cases suggest that a full trial must be held upon an allegation of unfair price. And once matters of unfair
dealings are off the table, competing valuation analyses would seem to be susceptible, frequently, to resolution
through summary judgment. Thus, once again, it appears that Cysive is exaggerating Lynch’s dysfunctionality.
169

[Find reference]
The family was quoted as saying that "it would not sell its Cox shares or support a sale of Cox to a third
party." [p12op]
171
This is a very common practice and one that controllers will anticipate in the merger agreement ordinarily.
Because tendering shareholders surrender their appraisal rights, the tender offer serves to cap the controller’s
financial exposure to appraisals. Importantly, once there is a merger agreement between the controller and the
representatives for the company/public stockholders, the Lynch doctrine will apply rather than the more relaxed
approach dictated by Solomon. This remains true even if the deal is consummated through a short form merger
once the controller has obtained 90% of the shares. By going the cash out merger route, the controller obtains
170
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greater certainty about being able to consummate the freezeout, and once the independent directors sign off, at
least the plaintiff have the burden of proof if Entire Fairness litigation ensues.
172
Cox at 26
173
This is a hallmark of Vice Chancellor Strine’s decisions, one he isn’t shy about. To his great credit, he
allows no sacred cows in corporate governance doctrine, doesn’t hide his agenda and doesn’t shrink from
addressing criticism. For commentary on Vice Chancellor Strine’s style of deciding cases, see John Gapper,
Capitalist Punishment, The Financial Times, January 29, 2005 (describing Strine as the “Wunderkind of US
corporate Law”).
174
Justice Veasey enunciates this as a crucial feature of equitable adjudication as practiced by the Delaware
Courts. [Cite to his retrospective on Delaware Corporate Law]. Nevertheless, sweeping, controversial opinions in
the approval of settlements are something of a tradition in Delaware. Perhaps most notoriously, see, e.g., the
elaboration of directors’ duty of oversight in Chancellor Allen’s approval of a settlement in a shareholders’
derivative suit in In re Caremark Int’l Deriv. Litig. 698 A2d 959 (1996).
175
at 5, *49
176
*56-57, *88
177
Cf Solomon v Pathe’s discussion of pleading standards in stockholders’ class actions. In that case the
Court had no difficulty dismissing a complaint against the target directors for breach of fiduciary duty.
178
See data in Thomas/Thompson article. This data suggests that claims under Lynch do indeed make up a
significant proportion of the Chancery Court’s docket of corporate cases. However, this may say as much about
the ease with which other fiduciary cases are dismissed than it does about the intractability of the Lynch doctrine.
179
It’s apparent that the Court is in sympathy with the claims made by the objectors, Weiss and White. As
the Court notes, the authors’ complaints about stockholder class actions under state law are effectively the mirror
image of criticisms they made earlier about investor class actions under the securities laws. They appear to have a
pretty patent ideological bias for this reason. ...
180
516 U.S. 367 (1996) (Thomas).
181
See Epstein v MCA (Matsushita II), 126 F.3rd 1235 (9th Cir. 1997); and see also, William T. Allen,
Finality of Judgments in Class Actions: A Comment on Epstein v MCA, Inc., 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1149 (1998).
182
183

at *50, *90
Cite to Revlon
185
See Weinburger, Cysive, Cox ...
186
The most famous and notorious exception in the acquisitions area is in Smith v Van Gorkom. As relevant
to freezeouts, however, see Justice Jacobs’ decision in In re Emerging Communications. Nevertheless, reading the
facts closely the independent directors in that transaction used extraordinarily bad judgment, to put it mildly.
187
The disparity in dismissal rates is validated (but no explanation provided ) by Professors’ Thomas and
Thompson’s article: The New Look of Shareholder Litigation in Delaware... 2004.
188
This is the consequence of Nondismissability, of course, from controllers’ perspective – as it gives rise to
the shortfall in controllers’ wealth-producing freezeout bids.
189
The opinion even employs colorful metaphors to ridicule the plaintiffs’ lawyers conduct in the Cox
transaction – for example it describes the process of their selecting lead counsel as resembling a “food fight.” Cox
at 15. As an aside, it’s difficult to believe that controller’s lawyers are less concerned about their fees and status
among their peers than are the plaintiffs’ lawyers, but it’s easy to imagine that their battles over status and fees are
less visible.
190
See Del Rule __ requiring the Court to validate settlements in class actions.
191
Add discussion of fee doctrine as per Cox.
192
Chrysler v Dann governs the payment of fees where the plaintiffs' suit has become moot on account of
voluntary action by the defendant. See Cox __. The Court substantially reduced the requested fee notwithstanding
that there was no contention by the objectors that the settlement was reduced by the amount of the fee the
controller agreed to pay to the plaintiffs' lawyers; that is, the objectors could not allege they were harmed by the
agreement to pay the full fee.
193
Under Sugarland the Court may consider: " .... " Cox __.
194
Discuss potential over inclusiveness in Court’s fee ruling.
195
Cox __ . [end of the opinion]
184

196
197

Thompson and Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation, note __ supra.
Id at __.
199
See Cox at **57 – 58. “In seeking fees in these cases, the plaintiffs’ lawyers have been pragmatic.
Recognizing that they, at best, can claim “shared credit” with the special committee, the plaintiffs’ lawyers have
tempered their fee requests and have asked for relatively small percentage of the “benefit” – i.e., the difference
between the price of the controller’s opening bid and the final merger price agreed to by the special committee.
But, at the same time, the rewards they reap are substantial...”
198
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200

Without Lynch as leverage, Cox contends, minority shareholders are still protected because (i) they are
often diversified investors who may own stock in the bidder as well as the minority investor shares; (ii) they can
vote no in the face of disadvantageous deals, especially since the greater presence of institutional investors assists
in the process of informed decision making; and (iii) they can still sue the target directors for breach of duty and
also for appraisal, in many circumstances.
201
Weiss & White, File Early.. Then....
202
Cox cites the objectors’ view that “litigation of this kind is of no material benefit to minority
stockholders,” but it doesn’t present their evidence for this assertion, and thus this evidence never comes under
criticism. In comparison, in disparaging the evidence presented by the plaintiffs’ expert, rather than merely
disagreeing with its meticulous legal and quantitative analysis, Cox describes him as having thrown his data
together “in a bucket,” which “skews the analysis from the start.”
203
According to Cox, in fact, this is universally the case.
204
see Cox at *54, for example.
205
see Cox at *84
206
Formally speaking, the Lynch doctrine pertains to controllers’ duties and not the target directors. The
latter would be governed by distinct doctrines and duties. But the claims against the target directors would be
appended to the claims against the controller under the Entire Fairness standard.
207
Smith v Van Gorkom __ A2d __ (1985).
208
McMullin v Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. Supr. 2000)
209
Most graphically, where the controller does not seek or does not obtain Dual Ratification.
210
As described earlier, where the business judgment rule applies, it blocks judicial inquiry into the merits of
the act or transaction that is the subject of the claim. See supra footnote __.
211
Cite the quotation from Caremark to this effect. That once BJR applied, no matter how mistaken or wrong
a decision appears in retrospect, the Courts will not overturn it to afford a remedy in a suit.
212
To recapitulate, according to Cox, because Lynch has made claims nondismissable on the pleadings, it has
invited self-interested plaintiffs’ lawyers to file nonmeritorious claims in cash out mergers, which has clogged the
Chancery Court’s dockets and damaged the integrity of the system of representative shareholder litigation under
Delaware law. This same pathology, according to Cox, reduces controllers’ enthusiasm for proposing freezeout
deals that would otherwise have created wealth and liquidity for public investors.
213
In relation to the requirement of fair dealings, moreover, it’s possible that the Cox Reforms will encourage
the Courts, consistent with the business judgment rule, to adopt a less than vigorous approach to monitoring the
integrity of the processes underlying Dual Ratification. In any event, if plaintiffs go forward and file claims in
freezeouts, notwithstanding the deals’ having received Dual Ratification, their claims will almost certainly be
dismissed upon the controller’s motion. This is what is intended by the Cox Reforms. Many plaintiffs, realizing
this, will be discouraged from filing a complaint altogether, even if they believe there were irregularities in the
consent or disclosure process in the freezeout. And, as reviewed previously, Cox has endorsed the imposition of
sweeping limits on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in freezeouts, so that these lawyers will have vastly reduced financial
incentives for proceeding with unfairness claims in freezeouts. Much of the “action” will revolve around whether
the Court exercises vigor in scrutinizing the underlying legitimacy of the consents. If it does not, equitable
oversight in freezeouts, and in effect, equitable claims in freezeouts will be drastically reduced.
214
As described previously, late in Cox it’s described as an “approval” condition, whereas earlier in the
opinion, it appears as a “nondisapproval” condition to deferential review in a tender offer freezeout.
215
As the Thomas/Thompson data indicates, appraisals are presently used infrequently as a form of recourse
by aggrieved stockholders in cash out mergers.
216
If the Dual Ratification in a particular freezeout were respected, this would bar an equitable inquiry into
fair price. As the discussion above indicates, it’s not clear how difficult it would be to force a judicial inquiry into
the quality of the independent directors’ judgment about the freezeout.
217
“By now, experience has proven that special committees and independent board majorities are willing to
say no to controllers. Experience has also shown that disinterested stockholders, given a non-coercive choice, will
reject low ball tender offers by controllers.” Cox at *132.
218
In re Oracle, for example. And in securities law, see the “behavioral” work of Donald C. Langevoort (“A
Behavioral Explanation for ...”)
219
Jeffrey Gordon makes the point in his piece on Enron’s Implications for Corporate Governance (2002).
220
For example, there really is no ready solution to the problem of independent director compensation. The
basic problem is that if independent directors are not well compensated, they may not be incentivized to devote
substantial time and attention to critical corporate decisions; but if they are well compensated by the company,
then they may cling to their office when the shareholders need an impartial judgment about whether the company
should be sold, for example. The intractable nature of the (independent) director compensation problem is well
noted in the corporate legal academic literature.
221
Cox at *132.
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222

That is, in controller’s power to undercut the board’s fiduciary duties to act in the interest of all the
stockholders equally, specifically.
223
The recent, major, widespread financial reporting scandals also support the argument that the law should
not move in the direction of loosening oversight over corporate disclosures under the Entire Fairness standard.
forms.
224
Where stockholders bring derivative actions against “ordinary” self-dealing transactions (not involving
controllers), they must first “demand” that the company itself pursue the claim. However, Special Committees of
independent directors may elect to terminate the derivative suit, so that the plaintiff-stockholders cannot proceed.
In certain cases where the apparent conflict of interest is too great or the transaction approved appears egregious in
nature or its effects on the company, equity will provide for the demand requirement to be “excused.” Aronson.
225
Furthermore, the self-dealing transaction would already have passed muster with a majority of
independent directors or disinterested stockholders, that is prior to its occurrence.
226
Fleigler v Lawrence, Agau v USAC.
227
This line of reasoning is continued below in Part V, Section _ which describes how the business judgment
deference has not been the norm in high stakes M&A deals.
228
The extension described is the Dual Ratification part of the Cox Reforms, since under Lynch either form
of ratification would operate to shift the burden of proof.
229
What the list of claims that could still go forward does clearly omit, however, is a reference to a fair price
challenge. Indeed, as discussed below in Part V, Cox implicitly overrules a duty of fair price for controllers’
freezeouts. This is a major shift in equity’s treatment of cash out mergers, of course, and one which would
foreseeably have a major impact on the negotiation process between controllers and the public stockholders’
representatives. On this basis it’s difficult to agree with the Court’s observation in Cox that the switch to the
business judgment rule for freezeouts (upon Dual Ratification) “would not diminish the integrity-enforcing
potential of litigation in any material way Cox at *125 The opinion continues, thereafter, “ Plaintiffs who believed
that a special committee breached its fiduciary duties in agreeing to a merger would continue to have the practical
ability to press a claim; they would just have to allege particularized facts demonstrating a breach of fiduciary
duty.” As mentioned earlier in the text, the suggestion to sue the target directors personally does not make this
section of the opinion clearer.
230
Cox at __
231
Weinburger at __
232
Although it is an undeniable reality that Lynch stated that any merger with a controlling stockholder,
however structured, was subject to entire fairness review, it would be unfair not to make explicit another reality.
No defendant in Lynch and defendant since, has argued that the use of an independent special committee and a
Minority Approval Condition sufficiently alleviated any implicit coercion as to justify invocation of the business
judgment rule. For this reason, it is important not to assume that the Supreme Court has already rejected this more
precisely focused contention. at *42.
233
For a variety of obvious reasons (e.g. informational asymmetries, the possibility that the outside directors
might be more independent in appearance than in substance, or might lack the savvy to effectively counter the
controller), the integrity-enforcing utility of a Minority Approval Condition seems hard to dispute. at *47 -48.
234
This is an interesting omission and suggests the Court’s overzealousness to be rid of the Lynch doctrine
and to reduce stockholder litigation.
235
Cox at *40
236
Writing about the difference between Comedy and Tragedy, Aristotle stated that the former was the more
serious genre. ARISTOTLE, THE POETICS.
237
Cox at __. It’s quite revealing that the only important class of actors left out of the bliss described in the
opinion are the public stockholders – while the controlling stockholders are described as getting their share.
238
Tantra are understood in the West primarily in relationship to exotic sexual practices, although as part of
Hinduism they have a broader and richer meaning. A pungent use of sexually charged rhetoric also appears in the
Court’s reference to the one of the law firms vying for lead counsel position. The Court states, “That firm is no
ingenue to the lead counsel sweepstakes.” *14
239
This is evident also where Cox opinion describes the plaintiffs’ different counsel as having a “food fight”
over who would be lead counsel. See Cox at *15.
240
Cox at *119
241
Cox at *40.
242
Cox at *56.
243
See also Pure at __ (where the Court proposes “easing” Lynch).
244
Cox at *7. Importantly, in this passage, as elsewhere, Cox fails to note that a crucial ingredient of an armslength merger, conducted properly, is that prior to consenting to the transaction, it would have been subjected to
an auction or market check or some other form of valuation that would have measured the offer in hand against
offers that would be attainable in the market.
245
Cox at 44 – 49, note __ supra.
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246

Although the transaction did not involve a freezeout or controlling stockholder, the effect of disinterested
ratification in curing a fiduciary breach was illustrated recently in the Chancery Court’s decision in Harbor
Partners v Huizenga. The opinion was authored by Vice Chancellor Strine; which makes drives home the idea
that he would be cognizant of this secondary effect of shareholder ratification in freezeouts.
247
For a decision where the court found informed, uncoerced minority shareholder ratification precluded a
finding of liability against defendant directors, and granted summary judgment on that basis, see Orman v
Cullman, 2004 Del Ch Lexis 150; and see also Harbor Partners v Huizenga, 751 A2d 879, 900-901 (Del Ch.
1999) for discussion of the exculpatory effect of disinterested shareholder ratification in a duty of loyalty claim,
outside of a freezeout. There is controversy regarding whether shareholder ratification can expunge a duty of
loyalty claim against controllers in a freezeout. Shareholder ratification of directors' fiduciary breaches is
frequently invalidated on the basis of it being inadequately informed; see e.g. Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985) (invalidating shareholder ratification of directors' duty of care breach as inadequately informed). For
discussion and citation to precedent, See In re JCC Holdings Co. Inc Shareholders Litigation, 843 A2d 713 (2003)
(holding that plaintiff minority shareholders' voting in favor of or accepting consideration in a merger effectuated
by a controlling stockholder does not bar them, on the basis of acquiescence, or any other related doctrine of
waiver, from challenging the fairness of the merger in an equitable action. p. 722-723).
248
See Orman v Cullman; Harbor Partners v Huizenga; Emerging Comms.
249
See Harbor Partners v Huizenga; Orman v Cullman; Lewis v Vogelstein...
250
After the stock market bubble and financial analyst and investment banking scandals of the late 1990s, it
is harder for even die hard law and economics aficionados to claim that the capital markets accurately price the
value of companies, consistent with the efficient capital market hypothesis. But even prior to the scandals there
was mounting evidence that markets were “noisy” signals about value.
251
There are a variety of financial reasons why market values at times sink below asset valuations, as appears
to be occurring at present. The last time this phenomenon was widespread was in the mid to late 1980s, when
(leveraged) buyouts also became numerous.
252
In Smith v Van Gorkom for instance, a premium to the market price was acknowledged to be
indeterminate in itself, absent an analysis of the “inherent” or “fair value” of the company to be sold -- measured
as a going concern under modern financial valuation methods.
253
See e.g. Cox at *9 – 10. (“Because Pure Resources already requires the equivalent of an informed, uncoerced
majority of the minority vote condition, for a controller to avoid entire fairness review, the additional step of
triggering review for fairness when controller proceeded against the views of the special committee would bring
together both lines of our going-private jurisprudence in a sensible manner, providing stockholders with
substantial procedural guarantees of fairness that work in tandem while minimizing the role filing of makeweight
cases.” (sic) (emphasis added).
254
Cox at *7
255
See e.g. Cox at *8 (“ Therefore, when a merger with a controlling stockholder was 1) negotiated and
approved by a special committee of independent directors; and 2) conditioned on an affirmative vote of a majority
of the minority stockholders, the business judgment standard of review should presumptively apply, and any
plaintiff ought to have to plead particularized facts that, if true, support an inference that, despite a facially fair
process, the merger was tainted by wrongdoing. This reform to Lynch would not permit a controller to obtain
business judgment protection merely by using a special committee or a majority of the minority vote; in that case,
Lynch in its current form would still govern. To invoke the business judgment rule standard of review, the
controller would have to replicate fully both elements of the arms-length merger process.”)
256
Cox at *8
257
There are several passages in the Cox opinion where the Court describes its proposed doctrinal
framework. In several of these Cox states that the business judgment rule should presumptively apply where there
has been dual ratification. At no point does it state that Entire Fairness should apply until there is Dual
Ratification. The language, instead, provides for the Entire Fairness standard where a controller fails to obtain
Dual Ratification – which controllers will foreseeably seek in almost all instances.
258
“Reform of our common law in this manner also honors our law’s traditions, by respecting the informed bj
of idint’d dirs and stockh” Cox at *10
259
Smith v Van Gorkom
260
Unocal v Mesa Petroleum.
261
An analogous messy institutional conflict is presently playing itself out in the scope of shareholder
adopted bylaws and boards’ power to limit shareholders’ authority in using them to direct corporate affairs. [See
Hamermesh article.] The SEC stepped into a messy institutional conflict in suggesting that stockholders should
have more room to nominate directors in the management proxy statement. The proposal was eventually dropped
on account of the ragingly negative response from businesses, notwithstanding that it was truly a very cautious one
that would have affected the composition of boards only incrementally. See Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 (Proposed
fall 2004).
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262

It’s notable however, that controllers’ power to influence and determine who will remain and be reelected
to the board is diminishing as a result of rules and regulations promulgated in the wake of SOX. Nominating
Committees must be staffed exclusively by independent directors, as a result of the recent listing standards’
amendments. And the same rules will mandate that even if a controller were able to force an independent director
off the board, he or she would have to be replaced, in most cases, with another person meeting the objective
criteria of independence applied by the NYSE, NASD or Amex, as relevant. In addition, the very common
presence of staggered boards in public companies makes it harder for controllers to remove directors without
cause – as this is inconsistent with most statutory requirements relating thereto.
263
See Paramount v QVC in particular.
264
In a closed auction the seller announces to the marketplace that it is inviting prospective acquirers to
submit sealed offers. Prior to this, the company, with the assistance of its investment banker, will have prepared an
offering memorandum and invited the bidders to conduct a limited due diligence review. The bidders will also
generally be given a sample acquisition agreement which they can respond to. After it receives the bids, the seller
may negotiate with the parties and may conduct a further round of bidding if it so desires. A pre-agreement market
check is, in effect, an informal auction where the "prospecting" for potential acquirers is conducted more
discretely. A post-agreement market check confers on the seller the benefit of having at least one deal/sale price in
hand; in a freezeout, this would presumably be an agreement with the controller. As is the case with auctions, with
market checks, in order to proceed, third party offerors must become informed of the opportunity to make a bid,
must have access to the information required for them to make a reasonably informed bid, must have time to
consider their offer and arrange for financing, for example, and must not be precluded by lock ups and other
"entrenching" devices that would legally preclude their offer or make it unreasonably costly in comparison to the
initial offer.
The downside of a post-agreement market check for the selling company (the target in a freezeout) is that it
may be more difficult to structure the sale so that third parties are given a genuine opportunity to make alternative
offers, as compared to the auction or pre-agreement market check scenario. Controllers are likely to demand
termination fees as well as, potentially, no-shop provisions or other kinds of legal and financial "first mover"
advantages in coming to terms with the independent committee. Directors have been afforded discretion to confer
these benefits on initial offerors (again, the controller in a freezeout most probably) where they adjudge this the
best way to maximize the price or value in the sale. Although controllers are in an advantageous position to coerce
highly advantageous termination fees or lock up arrangements from committees, Delaware's courts have
considerable expertise (arising from the adjudication of cases under Revlon and its progeny) in adjudging the line
between reasonable benefits conferred to obtain an advantageous deal for the shareholders and "auction ending,"
value reducing preferences to favored bidders.
265
In November 2003 the SEC approved sweeping amendments to the corporate governance listing
standards of the NYSE and the NASD. The changes focus especially on the composition, structure and precise
functions of corporate boards and committees of directors in companies with publicly listed shares. These new
standards are intended, especially, to promote service by directors free of prejudicial financial conflicts of interest
and compromising social affiliations, as these might impair the directors' capacity for impartiality in judging
corporate affairs. Both the NYSE and NASD standards mandate that a majority of the entire board be comprised
of directors meeting the new heightened criteria of independence, and the NYSE standards require establishment
of audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees comprised exclusively of independent directors.
The NASD also imposes independence criteria for committees, but the requirements are somewhat looser. As
they related to potential freezeout transactions, the standards have different implications for companies with a
large block, de facto controlling shareholders and companies with a majority shareholder ("controlled
companies"). In the large block holder case, the full complement of majority of independent directors and
independent committee requirements apply. For controlled companies, however, the requirements are truncated so
that only the audit committee-independent director requirements apply. In this case of controlled companies, the
standards mandate that no less than three directors must meet the independence criteria pertinent to audit
committee membership. In sum, in companies with a large block holder, there shouldn't be any difficulty in
assembling a committee of independent directors to represent the minority shareholders. And even in listed
companies with a majority shareholder, there will reliably be a minimum of three independent directors who could
serve as an independent negotiating committee on the minority's behalf. The listing standards' board related
reforms are highly comprehensive. In addition to the director independence and committee requirements, many
other provisions support the systematic, professional and meaningfully substantive (rather than reactive, passive or
formalistic) functioning of corporate boards and their accountability to shareholders. These requirements include a
mandate of separate, executive sessions of independent directors, the adoption of company-specific governance
standards and codes of ethics, written committee charters and annual performance evaluations for committees and
directors, and enhanced disclosure to shareholders regarding all of these. See SEC Release Nos. 48745 (File No.
SR-NYSE-2002-33)(Nov. 4, 2003); NYSE Listed Company Manual §§303A.01 and 303.A.05; NASD Manual
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§4350(c). See Rule Change and Amendment No. 1. thereto by The New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to
Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 19,052 (proposed April 11, 2003).
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